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 SUMMARY 
According to conventional wisdom, a good leader is a responsible leader, i.e., someone who 
is disciplined, self-possessed, persistent, focused on strategic long-term goals and respectful 
of the interests of others. But does the experience of being in charge and controlling the 
resources of others affect the capability and motivation to behave responsibly? The current 
dissertation addresses this question in investigating the short-term effects of social power on 
self-control (as opposed to questions such as whether trait self-control facilitates the 
acquisition of power which are not studied here). 
The state of research did not allow drawing a clear conclusion on the nature of the 
relationship between power and self-control. With regard to theory, the two major power 
theories make conflicting predictions. The social distance theory (Magee & Smith, 2013) 
postulates that power should improve self-control performance, because powerholders are 
thought to engage in higher-level construal, which has been proven to benefit self-control. In 
contrast, the approach/inhibition theory (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) suggests that 
power should worsen self-control performance as a consequence of the powerful’s 
heightened attention to rewards and drive to experience these rewards immediately. 
Empirical findings are similarly contradictory. On the one hand, participants in high-power 
conditions are better able to focus on the task at hand (Guinote, 2007b; Smith, Jostmann, 
Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008), and they persist longer and make more attempts to solve 
(unsolvable) tasks (Guinote, 2007a) than participants in low-power conditions. On the other 
hand, they are worse at suppressing thoughts (Guinote, 2007c), withstanding impulses to act 
(Scholl & Sassenberg, 2015), and they take more risks (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). 
This dissertation aims to resolve the contradiction by considering self-control to be a 
two-dimensional construct whose initiatory and inhibitory components are differentially 
affected by power. More precisely, it is hypothesized that social power would benefit task 
performance if the task requires initiatory (start) self-control but would impair task 
performance if the task requires inhibitory (stop) self-control. However, a first direct 
replication as well as a conceptual replication conducted in the laboratory with predominantly 
student participants found no effect of the between-person power manipulations on various 
self-control performance measures.  
To explore the possibility that these null findings resulted from lacking personal 
relevance of power and self-control in the laboratory, an experiment and a quasi-experiment 
investigated the relationship between these two constructs with non-student samples in 
everyday life where having power and exerting self-control are actually consequential. 
Contrary to prevalent research practice to examine the effects of differences in power 
between-person, studying power in the real world implies that power also varies to a 
substantial extent in rather short time spans within-person. Given the limited scientific 
 knowledge about within-person manipulations of power, a pilot laboratory experiment was 
conducted which showed that (psychological) power can indeed be manipulated within-
person by means of a role-play. 
The aforementioned experiment and quasi-experiment tested a theoretical framework 
that links within-person variations in objective power and psychological power to start, stop 
(and interpersonal) self-control in organizational settings. Key predictions of the theoretical 
framework were supported: Variation in objectively demonstrable control of valued resources 
(i.e., situational power) was accompanied by variation in subjective power, such that 
participants experiencing high situational power also reported a high sense of power, high 
personal power and a high sense of responsibility.  
In both studies, real-world power affected real-world self-control motivation. However, 
the effects were complex: From a between-person perspective on both studies, participants 
in low power situations (i.e., situational power) reported on a descriptive level both more stop 
(supporting our hypothesis) and also more start self-control (contradicting our hypothesis) 
than participants in high power situations. From a within-person perspective, the effects were 
inconsistent across the two studies: In the experiment, personal power was negatively 
related to both start and stop self-control, whereas in the quasi-experiment personal power 
was positively related to start self-control but unrelated to stop self-control. This divergence 
might have resulted from differences in the method of the two studies. 
Altogether, these inconsistent results emphasize the necessity to complement 
between-person laboratory experiments by the investigation of experiential episodes of 
varying degrees of objective and subjective power. The findings contribute to a more fine-
grained understanding of the relationship between social power and self-control as well as of 
the way power dynamics operate in real-world organizational settings. Future research might 
benefit from the contextual approach to study power as presented in this dissertation to 
investigate outcomes other than self-control. 
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CHAPTER 1: General Introduction 
« Une grande responsabilité est la suite inséparable d‘un grand pouvoir. » 
Voltaire (Writer, historian and philosopher, 1694 - 1778) 
 
This quotation by Voltaire (prominently cited by the fictional character Benjamin "Ben" 
Parker, uncle of Peter Parker alias Spiderman) puts it in a nutshell: By definition, powerful 
people such as political leaders or leaders in organizations (i.e., individuals who control the 
material and immaterial resources of others, cf. Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner 
et al., 2003) have responsibility. However – does power always lead to more responsible 
behavior? Apparently not, or Voltaire and others throughout history would not have seen the 
need to remind their fellow human beings of this truth. 
Responsibility is a concept with multiple meanings that has been studied from the 
perspective of law, ethics/philosophy, economy and psychology (Nordbye & Teigen, 2014; 
Witt & Stahl, 2016). Responsibility can be understood as causing certain consequences 
through action or inaction (causality), the capability for rational conduct (a mental capacity), 
foreseeing and intending certain consequences (a mental state), a duty arising from social 
roles, and a condition of being answerable to others (Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & 
Doherty, 1994). The latter two meanings are related to the concept of accountability, which is 
defined as “implicit or explicit expectation that one’s decisions or actions will be subject to 
evaluation by some salient audience(s) (including oneself), with the belief in the potential for 
either rewards or sanctions based on these evaluations“ (Hall, Royle, Brymer, Perreweé, 
Ferris, & Hochwarter, 2006, p. 88). 
Within leadership literature, the idea of responsible leadership has received much 
attention (e.g., Cameron, 2011; Voegtlin, Patzer, & Scherer, 2012). In these discussions, 
responsible leadership has been defined, for instance, in the following ways: 
 
“Responsible leadership can be understood as the art of building and sustaining social 
and moral relationships between business leaders and different stakeholders 
(followers), based on a sense of justice, a sense of recognition, a sense of care, and a 
sense of accountability for a wide range of economic, ecological, social, political, and 
human responsibilities’’ (Pless, 2007, p. 451). 
 
“Responsible leadership can thus be understood as the awareness and consideration 
of the consequences of one’s actions for all stakeholders, as well as the exertion of 
influence by enabling the involvement of the affected stakeholders and by engaging in 
an active stakeholder dialogue. Therein responsible leaders strive to weigh and 
balance the interests of the forwarded claims” (Voegtlin, 2011, p. 59).  
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These definitions share the notion that responsible leaders respect the interests of 
others and take the consequences their actions have (for others) into consideration. 
Additionally, they imply the responsible leaders’ engagement in long-term thinking. In this 
dissertation, I define responsible behavior as disciplined, considerate, and deliberate 
behavior in line with the definitions cited above, and mainly operationalize it by the 
established psychological construct of (interpersonal) self-control (e.g., Tangney, 
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004; Vohs, Lasaleta, & Fennis, 2009). As leadership can be 
considered a way to exert power in a specific (organizational) context, I will focus on the 
more basic construct of power in this dissertation (cf. Williams, 2014). 
The relationship between power and self-control can be investigated from two 
perspectives. First, one could ask whether self-control facilitates the acquisition of power 
(McIntyre, von Hippel, & Barlow, 2016). On the one hand, individuals following their desires 
and concentrating on their own benefit might be perceived as having more control, more 
influence, and being less dependent – in short more powerful – than targets who behave in a 
self-controlled and prosocial manner, as observers infer that these individuals experience 
less constraint and are able to act in line with their own volition to a greater extent (Magee, 
2009). On the other hand, individuals high in self-control and low in selfishness could acquire 
power positions more easily, because high self-control is associated with better grades and 
better interpersonal skills (de Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 
2012; Tangney et al., 2004), and individuals who consider others’ needs are granted 
positions higher up in hierarchy (Flynn, 2003; Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006; 
Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Willer, 2009). 
Second, one could ask how power affects self-control. One the one hand, the powerful 
might not behave in a self-controlled way because they tend to experience fewer constraints 
and greater freedom to follow their desires. On the other hand, having power could also 
result in self-controlled behavior because thinking ahead and being disciplined might help 
secure or strengthen one’s power position. 
The current dissertation aims to investigate the short-term effects of power on self-
controlled behavior and is not interested in the long-term effects of personality on the 
achievement of power positions (or the other way around). I want to answer the research 
question “What is the effect of power on self-control?” by presenting one quasi-experimental 
and four experimental studies. I extend previous power research by not only conducting 
laboratory research as is common within power literature, but by also studying organizational 
contexts. 
This introductory chapter is made up of three parts. In the first part I discuss definitions 
of power, self-control, and related constructs that need to be differentiated. In the second 
part I present a summary of research on social power with a focus on power’s effects on self-
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control and self-regulation. The second part closes with a discussion of the deficits of social 
power research the current dissertation seeks to address. Finally, the third part of this 
chapter introduces the current research and provides an overview on the following chapters. 
Definitions 
Both power and self-control are broad constructs. Various definition attempts 
presented in the respective literatures show partial overlap but also stress different aspects. 
This suggests that both constructs are multidimensional. In addition, one encounters several 
related concepts in both literatures that need to be distinguished from the two focal 
constructs. 
Power 
The literature differentiates social power from personal power. Personal power is the 
extent to which power holders are capable of acting with agency or of producing their 
intended effects in the environment (Overbeck & Park, 2001; van Dijke & Poppe, 2006) as 
well as “power over oneself and freedom from the influence of others“ (Lammers, Stoker, & 
Stapel, 2009, p. 1544). In contrast, social power is derived from one’s relationships to others 
(Fiske, 1993; Wolfe & McGinn, 2005) meaning that one cannot have social power in the 
absence of other people. Power is a truly relational construct in this view.  
Social psychology's approach to define social power can be classified into two primary 
domains. The first position considers power to be the (potential) ability to influence others’ 
behavior (Dahl, 1957; Emerson, 1962; French & Raven, 1959). However, Fiske and Dépret 
(1996) point to a problem of equating power with (potential) influence. In the power-as-
influence view, power is a consequence of social interactions rather than a structural 
characteristic and thus cannot be manipulated as an independent variable. Another problem 
with this definition might be that it confounds the power of the agent with the weakness of the 
target (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). Hence, it is now more common to define power in terms of 
control over the outcomes for someone else (e.g., Andersen & Berdahl, 2002; Fiske & 
Dépret, 1996; Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). 
Power-Related Concepts 
When studying social power, several other related notions – status, authority, 
dominance, and leadership – require clarification. In a broad sense, status (as the outcome 
of an evaluation of attributes) produces differences in respect and prominence (Keltner et al., 
2003); more narrowly defined, status can stem from the power an individual possesses due 
to social group membership (Schmid Mast, 2010). It is possible to have status without power 
(e.g., Mother Teresa) and power without status (e.g., a corrupt politician; for an extensive 
comparison of power and status see Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011). Authority can be 
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defined as power derived from institutionalized roles (e.g., supervisor, site manager), which 
is alternatively called position power or structural power (Schmid Mast, 2010). Dominance 
covers personality dominance and dominance behavior. The first can be understood as an 
individual difference variable describing the extent to which an individual has the desire to 
influence or control others (Schmid Mast, 2010); the latter is any behavior used with the 
intention to gain or maintain power over other people (Keltner et al., 2003).  
Leadership involves influencing individuals to willingly contribute to the shared goal of a 
group and coordinating their actions in order to reach a common goal (Kaiser, Hogan, & 
Craig, 2008). Some authors think that power and leadership must be clearly differentiated 
(e.g., Galinsky, Jordan, & Sivanathan, 2008; Wisse & Rus, 2012). However, power can also 
be seen as an essential leadership dimension allowing people who exhibit leader behaviors 
to be viewed as effective leaders (Hollander & Offermann, 1990) as well as a process 
through which leaders direct followers’ actions towards a common goal (Giessner & 
Schubert, 2007; Voyer & McIntosh, 2013). Although studied within different research areas, 
power and leadership show conceptual overlap (Williams, 2014). 
Self-Control-Related Concepts 
When interested in the notion of “self-control“ from a psychological perspective, one is 
confronted with various terms and definitions, such as self-regulation, impulsivity, executive 
functions, willpower, and effortful control, among others. Part of this diversity might stem from 
the fact that the idea of “self-control” has been investigated within social and personality 
psychology (e.g., Ent, Baumeister, & Tice, 2015; Friese & Hofmann, 2009), behavioral 
economics (e.g., Halali, Bereby-Meyer, & Ockenfels, 2013; Joireman, Sprott, Spangenberg, 
2005; Rachlin & Jones, 2008), cognitive psychology (e.g., Bari & Robbins, 2013; Hofmann, 
Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012), clinical psychology (e.g., Crean, de Wit, & Richards, 2000), 
developmental psychology (e.g., Forstmeier, Drobetz, & Maercker, 2011; Mischel & Mischel, 
1987; Moffitt et al., 2011), and criminal psychology (e.g., Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). The 
terms listed above are sometimes used interchangeably (Duckworth & Kern, 2011). 
However, some authors make an effort to distinguish (some of) these concepts. 
Self-regulation refers to the general process by which people adopt and manage 
various goals and standards for their thoughts, feelings, and behavior, and then ensure that 
these goals and standards are met (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1990). Accordingly, self-
regulation incorporates three main components, namely (1) standards such as ideals, values, 
morals, social expectations, and long-term goals that individuals strive to attain, (2) the 
motivation to invest effort in reducing discrepancies between standards and actual states and 
(3) sufficient capacity to reduce the discrepancy (despite being confronted with obstacles 
along the way; Fujita, 2011). Self-regulation involves numerous challenges, such as 
choosing a goal, planning how to pursue this goal, implementing these plans, and shielding 
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goals from competing concerns (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1990; Karoly 1993). 
Advocates of a distinction between self-control and self-regulation proposed to define 
self-control as either of the two following sub-components of self-regulation. On the one 
hand, self-control has been described in terms of inhibition (e.g., Alberts, Martijn, Greb, 
Merckelbach, & Vries, 2007; Burkley, 2008; Martijn, Tenbült, Merckelbach, Dreezens, & de 
Vries, 2002; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998), for instance as “the overriding or inhibiting 
of automatic, habitual, or innate behaviors, urges, emotions, or desires that would otherwise 
interfere with goal-directed behavior” (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003, p. 894), or “self-
regulatory processes [...] that aim to override unwanted, prepotent impulses or urges (such 
as the urge to indulge in a high-calorie desert when on a diet)“ (Hofmann et al., 2012). On 
the other hand, self-control has been characterized as the promotion of one’s abstract and 
distal goals when they are threatened by competing concrete and proximal goals (e.g., 
Ainslie, 1975; Fujita, 2011; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Mischel, 
1974; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Rachlin, 1995; Rachlin & Green, 1972; Thaler & 
Shefrin, 1981). The proponents of self-control as goal-conflict criticize that the definition of 
self-control as effortful inhibition conflates one strategy that people might use to promote a 
particular end with the end itself (Fujita, 2011). They point to the possibility of attaining this 
end with alternative strategies such as regulating the availability and opportunity to indulge in 
temptations or the re-construal of temptations. 
Impulsivity has been defined as an inability to inhibit inappropriate behaviors, a 
preference for a small immediate reward versus a larger but delayed one, an inclination to 
act without forethought or before all necessary information is available, a tendency to act on 
a whim and, in so doing, disregard a more rational long-term strategy for success, 
novelty/sensation-seeking, and an increased propensity to engage in risky behaviors (Bari & 
Robbins, 2013; Madden & Johnson, 2010; Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006). 
It can be regarded as a consequence of impaired executive functioning (Bari & Robbins, 
2013). Impulsivity could therefore be considered the antonym of self-control. 
Executive function has been defined in many ways, for instance very broadly as 
functions associated with the frontal cortices, whereas others define executive function by 
identifying its components (Bickel, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, Gatchalian, & McClure, 2012). 
According to an influential taxonomy (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & 
Wager, 2000) these are: (1) updating, which refers to working memory operations such as 
keeping information in an active, quickly retrievable state and shielding this information from 
distraction, (2) inhibition, which refers to the ability to inhibit prepotent impulses when 
necessary, and (3) shifting, which refers to the ability to switch back and forth between 
multiple tasks or mental sets. Since an individual’s executive function system plays an 
important role in the consideration of and the planning for the individual’s future (Bickel et al., 
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2012), executive function is related to the concepts of self-regulation and self-control.  
Self-Control  
The most basic distinction within self-control is the distinction in trait and state self-
control. Studies about trait self-control as the stable individual ability to align behavior with 
standards or long-term goals have investigated self-control predominantly as an independent 
variable (for exceptions see Diamond, Briand, Fossella, & Gehlbach, 2004; Perrone, 
Sullivan, Pratt, & Margaryan, 2004): Trait self-control is positively linked to success in school 
and at work, health, successful interpersonal functioning, as well as well-being, adjustment 
(de Ridder et al., 2012; Moffitt et al., 2011; Tangney et al., 2004), and happiness (Cheung, 
Gillebaart, Kroese, & de Ridder, 2014; Hofmann, Luhmann, Fischer, Vohs, & Baumeister, 
2013). It is negatively related to unemployment and substance abuse (Daly, Delaney, Egan, 
& Baumeister, 2015; Moffitt, Poulton, & Caspi, 2013). In addition, self-control has been 
investigated as state self-control, which may change from one situation to the next. State 
self-control has had the role of a dependent variable; it is also treated as such in this 
dissertation.  
Apart from the generally accepted distinction between trait and state self-control, there 
is a lively debate on the “real” nature of state self-control: is it a limited, physiologically-based 
resource or a motivational construct? An overview on this debate is given in the following 
paragraphs. 
The strength model of self-control (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000) claims the existence of a limited mental resource that has the capacity to 
(effortfully) alter the self’s behavior, cognitions, and emotions. In formulating their theory, 
Baumeister and colleagues were inspired by the observation that exerting self-control 
reduces self-control performance in subsequent self-control situations (cf. dual task 
paradigm), a phenomenon known as ego-depletion. The limited mental resource is often 
compared to a muscle that gets fatigued with heavy use but can recover after a break. 
Although one meta-analysis found support for the ego-depletion effect and strength model 
hypotheses (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010), other meta-analyses questioned 
the existence (Carter, Kofler, Forster, & McCullough, 2015, Carter & McCullough, 2014) or at 
least the magnitude (Hagger et al., 2016) of the ego-depletion effect. 
Apart from the question of whether ego-depletion is a real phenomenon, the idea of 
self-control as a limited resource was challenged on multiple grounds. To give two examples: 
First, the limited mental resource is still elusive. It has never been observed or measured 
directly, but it has been inferred from patterns of performance results in subsequent tasks 
(Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014). One idea to more directly measure self-control 
expenditure was based on the assumption that self-control exertion would cause blood 
glucose levels to drop as the brain would consume more glucose to tackle self-control 
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challenges than to execute other mental processes (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). However, 
this idea has not been successful because findings apparently supporting this idea either 
could not be replicated or could be explained differently (e.g., Molden, Hui, Scholer, Meier, 
Noreen, D’Agostino, & Martin, 2012).  
Second, if state self-control performance were determined only by the limited mental 
resource, counteracting ego-depletion by manipulating an individual’s psychology should not 
be possible. For instance, studies have shown that increased task motivation (Muraven & 
Slessareva, 2003), perceptions of (rather than actual) mental effort (Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, & 
Alexander, 2010), beliefs that self-control is unlimited (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010), 
perceptions of a task as autonomous versus controlled (Moller, Deci, & Ryan, 2006), and 
perceived self-sufficiency (Boucher & Kofos, 2012) eliminate ego depletion. Other 
intervention studies have demonstrated that affirming some core value (Schmeichel, & Vohs, 
2009), smoking cigarettes (Heckman, Ditre, & Brandon, 2012), watching a favorite television 
program (Derrick, 2013), or even praying (Friese, & Wänke, 2014) also counteract ego-
depletion. All these findings are difficult to reconcile with the limited resource idea (for more 
objections against the resource-based view of self-control see Inzlicht et al., 2014; 
Masicampo, Martin, & Anderson, 2014). 
Building on these arguments, Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) presented the process 
model of ego-depletion. According to this model, self-control exertion at Time 1 is followed by 
a shift in motivational orientation and a shift in attentional focus that together undermine self-
control performance at Time 2. More precisely, the shift in motivational orientation indicates 
that people are less motivated to engage in further effortful control after an initial self-control 
expenditure and are more inclined to do things that they see as more personally gratifying. 
This motivational process is accompanied by a shift in attention toward cues signaling 
rewards. In this view, ego-depletion is the result of shifts in motivation, attention and emotion. 
A more inclusive state self-control theory was put forward by Kotabe and Hofmann 
(2015). In their integrative self-control theory, self-control is conceptualized as a process with 
the three main components of activation, exertion, and enactment. The core element of their 
self-control conceptualization is an intrapsychic conflict between “desire” and a higher order 
goal. Within the activation phase, desire and an at least partly incompatible higher order goal 
generate desire-goal conflict. This conflict marks the transition to the exertion phase in that it 
activates control motivation. Control motivation and control capacity interactively determine 
potential control effort. In the enactment phase, the intended behavioral outcome of the 
previous phase is realized if there are no enactment constraints.  
Taken together, it seems fair to assume that state self-control is a function of attention, 
motivation, and ability (i.e., all the potential non-motivational cognitive resources an individual 
can draw on to face the desire-goal conflict such as directed attention, inhibitory capacity, cf. 
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executive function). The current dissertation is based on this conceptualization of self-control. 
I investigate potential effects of power on attentional and motivational aspects of self-control, 
but do not assume that power alters self-control ability. 
How Social Power Impacts Behavior  
Having – or lacking – power has been shown to influence how people perceive, how 
they think, and how they act (for reviews see Galinsky, Chou, Halevy, & Van Kleef, 2012; 
Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015; Guinote, 2017). Thus, in the words of Keltner and 
colleagues (2003), power is “a basic force in social relationships“ (p. 265). In the following, I 
first present the most influential theoretical developments proposed in the last two decades, 
the approach/inhibition theory (Keltner et al., 2003) and the social distance theory (Magee & 
Smith, 2013). I then provide an overview on empirical findings relevant to this dissertation, 
namely self-regulation/self-control and interpersonal behavior. 
Theoretical Perspectives 
The approach/inhibition theory (Keltner et al., 2003) is an intrapersonal and 
motivational account of the effects of power. Power is thought to stem from interacting 
variables on the individual (e.g., extraversion, dominance, height, prominent jaw), dyadic 
(e.g., investment in and commitment to the relationship), within-group (e.g., status, authority), 
and between-group level (e.g., socio-economic status, majority or minority group affiliation). 
Keltner and colleagues, based on Gray’s (1991) original reinforcement sensitivity theory 
(RST), suggest that (1) high power activates the behavioral approach system (BAS) which is 
sensitive to rewards and opportunities, and (2) low power activates the behavioral inhibition 
system (BIS) which is sensitive to punishment, threat, and uncertainty. Accordingly, Keltner 
and colleagues hypothesize that high power triggers approach-related positive affect, 
attention to rewards, automatic cognition, and disinhibited behavior, whereas reduced power 
activates inhibition-related negative affect, systematic cognition, and situationally constrained 
behavior.1 
In contrast, the social distance theory (Magee & Smith, 2013) posits an interpersonal 
and cognitive account to explain power’s effects. It relies on the assumption that differences 
in control over valued resources cause differences in dependence and is built on two basic 
propositions. The first proposition is that asymmetric dependence between two individuals 
gives rise to asymmetric experiences of social distance, i.e., the subjective perception or 
experience of distance from others, with the high-power individual feeling more subjective 
distance than the low-power individual. Magee and Smith argue that the asymmetric social 
                                                
1 Two attempts to refine or extend the approach/inhibition theory have been published (Anicich & Hirsh, 2017; Hirsh, Galinsky, & 
Zhong, 2011), at least partly because the underlying RST has undergone revision with the key change of partial reformulation of 
the tasks of the three motivational systems - the BIS, the BAS, and the Fight-Flight-Freeze System (FFFS) (Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton & Gray, 2002). However, they are not presented here as the details that were changed are not 
relevant to the current dissertation. 
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distance results from a combination of an individual’s motivation for affiliation and his/her 
expectations of affiliation from the other party. Because of their outcome dependency, low-
power individuals are motivated to affiliate while expecting only little affiliation within the 
relationship, whereas high-power individuals, who are less dependent on their low-power 
counterparts, have less motivation to affiliate with their low-power counterparts (Lammers, 
Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012).  
The second principle, inspired by construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), 
assumes that because high-power individuals have a greater sense of social distance they 
engage in more abstract mental representation (i.e., higher level construal) than low-power 
individuals. Consequently, Magee and Smith suggest that powerholders (a) feel greater 
subjective certainty, (b) behave more in line with their values, (c) select and pursue goals 
more efficiently, (e) show better self-control, (f) use categorical abstractions of targets’ 
behavior, and (g) perceive other people more instrumentally.  
In summary, the approach/inhibition theory and the social distance theory agree on the 
predictions that power makes people “asocial” (i.e., disinterest in others’ mental states, 
inaccuracy in mental state inference, stereotyping, instrumental person perception, 
imperviousness to social influence), more confident, more authentic, and more effective in 
goal pursuit. However, they make different predictions regarding (1) the relative influence of 
desirability versus feasibility on decision-making and (2) self-control. First, whereas the 
approach/inhibition theory makes a valence-based prediction in assuming that the powerful 
would pay attention to positive rather than negative information more selectively in both the 
desirability and the feasibility domains, the social distance theory suggests that the powerful 
will be influenced more by desirability relative to feasibility concerns, as abstract thinking is 
closely linked to desirability. Second, the approach/inhibition theory suggests that power 
impairs self-control due to the powerfuls’ heightened attention to rewards and their drive to 
experience these rewards immediately, whereas the social distance theory predicts that 
power is positively associated with self-control due to the powerfuls’ use of high-level 
construal of goals and situations. 
Social Power Affects Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation entails pursuing a goal, knowing when to act, and managing self-control 
challenges. Several key findings have emerged with regard to goal pursuit. First, research 
indicates that power leads to more behavior in line with own salient goals and less goal 
contagion (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008, Jia, Koh, & Tan, 2018; Karremans & 
Smith, 2010; Laurin et al. 2016; Overbeck & Park, 2006). Second, power is tied to a greater 
readiness to act in the service of goal pursuit (Guinote, 2007b; Scholl & Sassenberg, 2014b, 
2015). Third, power allows focusing on the pursuit of specific goals the powerholder has 
committed to. For instance, the powerful experience less goal conflict in settings with multiple 
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goals (Cai & Guinote, 2017; Schmid, 2018) and are better able to focus on what is relevant 
(Guinote & Ong, 2012; Schmid, Schmid Mast, & Mast, 2015; Slabu & Guinote, 2010; 
Whitson, Liljenquist, Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, & Cadena, 2013). 
Having power also relates to the initiation of (approach) behavior (Galinsky et al., 2003; 
Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2010; Maner, Kaschak, & Jones, 2010; Smith & Bargh, 2008). 
This has even been demonstrated on the level of physiological processes (Boksem, 
Smolders, & De Cremer, 2012; Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers, & Sassenberg, 2012). In a 
similar vein, numerous studies have provided evidence that the powerful tend to take risks 
more willingly than their powerless counterparts (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Carney, 
Cuddy, Yap, 2010; Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009; Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, 
& Galinsky, 2012; Hiemer & Abele, 2012; Jordan, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2011; Maner, 
Gailliot, Butz, & Peruche, 2007; Ronay & Von Hippel, 2010; but see Ranehill, Dreber, 
Johannesson, Leiberg, Sul, & Weber, 2015). This tendency seems to be especially 
pronounced when the position of power is unstable (Jordan et al., 2011), but this effect might 
be reversed for dispositionally power-motivated individuals (Maner et al., 2007). The 
explanatory mechanism for this risk-taking propensity of the powerful seems to be (over-) 
confidence (Fast et al., 2009; Fast et al., 2012). 
Social Power Affects Interpersonal Behavior 
The approach/inhibition theory and the social distance theory agree on the default 
assumption that powerful people are less sensitive in interactions with other people, i.e., are 
able to sense, accurately perceive, and appropriately respond to their interpersonal and 
social environment to a lesser degree (Bernieri, 2001) than their powerless counterparts. On 
the one hand, previous studies documented in support of this theoretical claim that power is 
related to disinterest in others’ mental states (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2010; 
Blader, & Chen, 2012; van Kleef, Oveis, van der Löwe, Luo Kogan, Goetz, & Keltner, 2008; 
Woltin, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Förster, 2011, Experiment 3), empathic inaccuracy (Georgesen 
& Harris, 2000; Gonzaga, Keltner, & Ward, 2008; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987), and selfish 
behavior (Bendahan, Zehnder, Pralong, & Antonakis, 2015; de Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; 
Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010; Wiltermuth & Flynn, 2013).  
On the other hand, power has been shown to increase interpersonal sensitivity and 
attention (Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006; Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009) as well as 
prosocial behavior and generosity (Côté et al., 2011; DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 
2012; Tost, Wade-Benzoni, & Johnson, 2015). This contradiction has been explained by the 
strong goal-dependency of the behavior of high power individuals. That is, if their personality 
or the situation advise them to do so, the powerful can deviate from the default and behave 
responsively and in a prosocial manner instead. 
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The Predominant Methodological Approach and its Critique 
In addition to the content-related question concerning the nature of the relationship 
between power and self-control, this dissertation seeks to address methodological and 
theoretical issues within previous power research. 
From a methodological point of view, most of the studies cited in this introduction share 
the following characteristics: They use relatively small student samples and employ a one-
shot, between-person, experimental two-cell design, comparing high power conditions to low 
power or control conditions. Typically, manipulations without a social-interactional element 
are intended to create differences in (psychological) power, which should then result in 
differences in the dependent variable. These manipulations include experiential priming in 
the form of recall of past powerful or powerless experiences (e.g., Duguid & Goncalo, 2012; 
Fast et al., 2012; Galinsky et al., 2006; Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012; Smith & Trope, 2006), 
semantic priming (e.g., Johnson & Lammers, 2012; Smith & Bargh, 2008; Smith et al., 2008; 
Smith & Trope, 2006), assignment to high or low power roles that are not enacted later on 
(e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007b; Sligte, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011), or the adoption 
of a power-related posture (e.g., Carney et al., 2010; Cesario & McDonald, 2013; Huang, 
Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Guillory, 2011). Among these manipulations, experiential priming is 
most popular.2 
Of course, this experimental approach has undeniable strengths such as high internal 
validity and the causal interpretability of effects (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). 
Moreover, from a practical point of view, the most commonly used priming manipulations are 
cost- and time-saving to administer, as (1) participants can be tested in groups, (2) 
experiments can be conducted online and via large participant pools such as MTurk instead 
of having to laboriously find participants and convince them to come to the laboratory, and 
(3) there is neither the need to recruit confederates nor to schedule real interaction partners 
to the same experimental session as would be the case when using role-play manipulations.  
However, the predominant approach described above has some limitations which the 
current dissertation seeks to address. First, experiential priming has been criticized on 
multiple grounds. Sturm and Antonakis (2014) raised the concern that overtly asking 
participants to think about power could induce demand characteristics. Tost (2015) 
suspected that the experiential priming manipulation might also inadvertently prime a 
strategic orientation, in that participants are likely to recall situations in which their own and 
the target’s interests were in conflict. Both critiques raised the question whether studies 
relying on this priming procedure really tell us something about the effects of “pure” 
(psychological) power. Additionally, it might be problematic to ask students, i.e., people who 
                                                
2 In addition, role-play manipulations have been used, involving both imagined (e.g., Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006; Overbeck & 
Droutman, 2013) and real interaction partners (e.g., Gonzaga et al., 2008; Schmid Mast et al., 2009). However, these “social” 
power manipulations constitute the minority in published research. 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  12 
probably have limited experience with structural power, to recall situations in which they 
actually had power (Lammers, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2017).  
Second, the relationships between previously identified facets of power have been 
neither well differentiated nor well integrated. For instance, a few recent theoretical and 
empirical works suggest that it is important to draw a distinction between structural power, 
i.e., the objectively demonstrable control of valued resources tied to a stable hierarchical 
position, and psychological power, i.e., a psychological state characterized by the activation 
of a power-specific set of cognitive and behavioral tendencies: Tost (2015) elaborated on the 
individual and situational conditions under which structural power is likely to result in 
psychological power. In addition she explained how the effects of structural power are 
conveyed via a sense of responsibility to produce different outcomes from the ones that have 
emerged with respect to the dynamics of psychological power. Empirical data supported 
Tost’s distinction between structural and psychological power in that positional power (= 
structural power) imperfectly predicted feelings of power (= psychological power) and both 
kinds of power had independent effects on various state measures (Smith & Hofmann, 
2016). However, this distinction is rarely made clear and most articles discuss effects of 
power instead of being precise in the sense that, given the manipulations used, they can only 
draw conclusions regarding psychological power.  
Third, the dynamic nature of power has mostly been neglected in previous power 
research (for rare exceptions see Cook, Arrow, & Malle, 2011; Smith & Hofmann, 2016), 
although individuals do change between high power and low power positions depending on 
their respective interaction partners (Leikas, Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, & Nissinen, 2013; Schmid 
Mast, 2010). For instance, in organizational reality, it is possible to compare managers with 
assistants, as one would do in a classical power experiment. However, this comparison 
might be limited in informational value because managers as well as assistants will interact 
with other people occupying positions on different levels of the organizational hierarchy in 
one day: the “high power” manager is in a subordinate role when discussing an investment 
with a superior. Hence, the between-person approach that is commonly used limits the 
adequacy of inferences about higher order constructs (construct validity). 
Fourth, studying power exclusively in the laboratory limits external validity and means 
overlooking important concomitants present in the real world. For instance, real world power 
is often inextricably tied to responsibility for people with thoughts and feelings with whom the 
powerholder is often at least acquainted. Moreover, being powerful or being the subject of 
influence in everyday life has real, tangible consequences - which is not taken into 
consideration in the prototypical laboratory study.  
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Current Dissertation 
This dissertation investigates the effects of social power on self-control. As I have 
detailed above, the two major power theories, the approach/inhibition theory (Keltner et al., 
2003) and the social distance theory (Magee & Smith, 2013), make conflicting predictions 
regarding the effect of power on self-control. Empirical findings are equally contradictory: 
One the one hand, participants in the experimental high power conditions persist longer, 
make more attempts to solve (unsolvable) tasks (Guinote, 2007a), and are better able to 
focus on the task at hand (Guinote, 2007b; Smith et al., 2008). On the other hand, they are 
worse in suppressing thoughts (Guinote, 2007c) and withstanding impulses to act (Scholl & 
Sassenberg, 2015). Tables 1.1 and 3.2 in the Appendix present comprehensive overviews 
on studies about the relationship between social power and self-control, with Table 1.1 
focusing on descriptive characteristics of the studies and with Table 3.2 focusing on 
conflicting results. 
Inspired by the inconsistent pattern of results, I test the idea that the theoretically and 
empirically open question of the relationship between power and self-control can be solved 
by considering self-control as a two-dimensional construct consisting of both predominantly 
initiatory (start) and predominantly inhibitory (stop) components that are differentially affected 
by social power. Hermann (1996), in his commentary on a limited resource account in major 
patterns of self-control failure, was one of the first to point to the fact that self-control failure is 
not only a problem of stopping, but also a problem of starting. In fact, trait self-control 
measures have repeatedly been reported to yield a two-factorial structure consisting of a 
stop and a start component (de Boer, van Hooft, & Bakker, 2011; de Ridder, de Boer, Lugtig, 
Bakker, & van Hooft, 2011; Maloney, Grawitch, & Barber, 2012), or a three-factorial structure 
also including a maintenance component (Hoyle & Davisson, 2016).  
This taxonomy based on functional processes has also received support regarding its 
predictive validity. In the prediction of contextual performance at the workplace, only start 
self-control was positively related to organizational citizenship behavior, personal initiative, 
and proactive coping whereas both stop self-control and start self-control were negatively 
related to counterproductive work behavior (de Boer, van Hooft, & Bakker, 2015). In an 
attempt to model self-control at a broader societal level, indices of stop and start self-control 
derived from a variety of mundane behaviors at the level of U.S. states were shown to exhibit 
unique patterns of association with a wide range of outcomes, including homicide, suicide, 
home foreclosures, divorce, and infidelity (Findley & Brown, 2017).3  
                                                
3 In addition, as these examples of concrete self-control-related behavior suggest, start and stop self-control are not only 
important in the intrapersonal but also in the interpersonal domain. Self-control is needed to maintain interpersonal 
relationships, i.e., for focusing attention on one’s interaction partner instead of own thoughts or distractions, overriding selfish 
and self-interested impulses, or to control own emotions in order not to hurt or frighten the other (Olson, 2005; Vohs et al., 
2009). However, the focus of this dissertation is not on interpersonal self-control and it is hence only investigated in the field 
study (see Chapter 5). 
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I hypothesize that social power benefits task performance if the task requires initiatory 
(start) self-control but impairs task performance if the task requires inhibitory (stop) self-
control. I build my argumentation solely on the motivational account advanced within the 
approach/inhibition theory because the social distance theory is far less broad in focus and 
only allows for predictions in cases when self-control is conceptualized as the struggle 
between smaller, sooner rewards and larger, temporally distant rewards. The effects of 
power on affect and attentional focus are most important for my reasoning, with BAS 
activation being related to positive affect and attention to rewards and BIS activation being 
related to negative affect and attention to threats. 
I begin by pointing out a fundamental assumption: I am interested in self-control 
requiring instances in which an individual consciously makes the choice to exert self-control 
(in contrast to effortless self-control, e.g., Gillebaart & de Ridder, 2015). I posit that this kind 
of self-control is taxing, be it initiatory or inhibitory, individual or interpersonal. This claim is 
corroborated by research using the dual-task paradigm common in the ego depletion 
literature, where the self-control performance in a second task is usually worse after the 
completion of an initial self-control-requiring task (Hagger et al., 2010). 
My central assumption is that because the exertion of self-control is taxing (be it within 
the framework of the process model of ego-depletion, Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012, or the 
strength model of self-control, Baumeister et al., 2007), people in different hierarchical 
positions concentrate their self-control efforts on the kind of self-control that best fits their 
motivational focus and their emotional state. As low power people are attentive to threat, 
punishment, and others’ interests, they should be focused on not doing anything wrong, 
which can be achieved by not violating norms, not following impulses, down-regulating 
feelings, and thinking things through – which are all examples of what I term inhibitory self-
control. Indeed, results by Dholakia, Gopinath, Bagozzi, and Nataraajan (2006) show that the 
higher the prevention focus (operationalized by BIS), the less respondents reported acting on 
their temptation. Additionally, the experience of lacking power is related to negative mood, 
which has been shown to correlate positively with stop self-control (de Boer et al., 2011).  
In contrast to low power people, high power people are attentive to rewards. One way 
to be rewarded is to strive for the attainment of self-relevant, self-set goals. In order to 
successfully achieve one’s goals, it is necessary to turn plans into action, concentrate on the 
goal and nothing else, as well as persist and make multiple attempts even in the face of 
obstacles – which are core characteristics of what I term start self-control. In addition, the 
positive effect of high power on start self-control is further assisted by the positive affect that 
accompanies BAS activation. For instance, positive affect was positively correlated with start 
self-control in a self-report study (de Boer et al., 2011). In several studies, in which self-
control was operationalized as intertemporal choice, a paradigm we classify as requiring start 
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self-control, participants in positive affect were more likely to choose a larger mail-in rebate 
over a smaller instant rebate and do not discount the value of delayed outcomes (in 
comparison to people in neutral affect; Pyone & Isen, 2011). 
Outline 
The research question on the nature of the relationship between power and self-control 
is directly addressed in chapters 2, 3 and 5. Chapter 2 presents a direct replication attempt of 
the finding that power reduces temporal discounting (i.e., improves self-control; Joshi & Fast, 
2013). This finding was chosen for replication because two highly standardized paradigms 
(episodic priming and temporal discounting) were used in this article. Being able to replicate 
this finding was meant to constitute a “calibration” for my subsequent research. I was not 
able to replicate this effect and suspected that the reason might be power priming’s inability 
to reliably affect participants’ sense of power that was thought to be responsible for this 
effect. 
In the light of power priming’s problems, Chapter 3 reports the development of a new 
and more effective role-play power manipulation that is based on another highly standardized 
paradigm known from stress research, the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST, Birkett, 2011). 
Additionally, in order to examine the idea of self-control as a multidimensional construct, four 
different but also established self-control measures capturing the rather initiatory or rather 
inhibitory components were administered. It was not possible to use the temporal discounting 
paradigm again in this context, as it cannot be classified unequivocally as initiatory or 
inhibitory. Although the power manipulation strongly affected participants’ sense of power, it 
did not affect self-control performance. This is surprising given that this study can be 
considered a conceptual replication of previous power research. 
Given these two unsuccessful (replication) attempts to find effects of power on self-
control in the laboratory, a likely conclusion might be that the published literature has 
overestimated these effects. This is even more plausible considering that the personal 
relevance of self-control performance (and also power) in published literature was rather low 
(cf. de Ridder, Kroese, & Gillebaart, 2018).  
To ensure that power and self-control are meaningful for participants, the relationship 
between the two constructs should be investigated in real people in everyday life. Studying 
power in real life has two peculiarities: First, it likely changes within person, depending on the 
respective (interaction) situation. Second, conceptual clarity about different forms of power 
(structural power as objectively demonstrable control over valued resources vs. 
psychological power as conscious subjective judgment about one’s own ability to influence 
others in a given social situation) is indispensable. As literature on effects of within-person 
power changes is scarce (for rare exceptions see Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; 
Li, Wang, Yin, Mao, Zhu, & Huang, 2016; Sivanathan, Pillutla, & Murnighan, 2008; Weick, 
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McCall, & Blascovich, 2017, Study 2), the laboratory study presented in Chapter 4 was 
conducted to gain insights into within-person changes of structural and psychological power 
and possible downstream consequences. Given the prior difficulties to find effects on self-
control, risk-taking and interpersonal accuracy were used as dependent variables because 
(1) previous research has reported less ambiguous effects in their case and (2) both can be 
seen as relevant components of responsible behavior. Although the again newly developed 
power manipulation did not produce the hypothesized effects on the dependent variables, it 
did affect psychological power. 
Chapter 5 presents a theoretical framework linking objective power and psychological 
power to self-control in everyday life. We conceptualize power as a multidimensional 
construct consisting of objective power (i.e., structural power, situational power) and 
psychological power (i.e., sense of power, personal power, sense of responsibility). Results 
of an experiment and an experience sampling study, both conducted with non-student 
samples, supported the key predictions of our theoretical framework: Situational power was 
positively related to sense of power, which in turn was positively related to personal power 
and sense of responsibility. We adopted the idea of self-control as a multifaceted construct 
and investigated effects of this objective-subjective power link on start, stop, and 
interpersonal self-control. In contrast to the laboratory study presented in Chapter 3, real 
world power affected real world self-control. However, the effects were inconsistent across 
the two studies.  
Finally, Chapter 6 includes the General Discussion of the empirical evidence presented 
in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. The findings are summarized, and strengths and limitations are 
discussed. The chapter closes with implications of the current findings for research on social 
power and research on self-control, and implications for future research are discussed. 
Please note that all empirical chapters are written in a way that allows for them to be 
read independently of each other and the general introduction. As the predictions derived in 
Chapter 3 and 5 build on similar theoretical assumptions, these two chapters show some 
theoretical overlap. Additionally, I would like to stress that the empirical chapters refer to “we” 
instead of “I” regarding the authors, as the research reported in these chapters was 
conducted in collaboration. Finally, this dissertation adheres to open science standards. 
Preregistrations, materials, and data for all reported studies can be accessed via the Open 
Science Framework: https://osf.io/rykjp/ 
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CHAPTER 2: Does Power Increase Self-Control? Episodic 
Priming May Not Provide the Answer. 
 
 
Abstract 
Powerful people (e.g., political and business leaders) should be able to control their impulses 
and act in line with long-term rather than short-term interests. However, theories of power 
suggest different answers to the question whether the basic experience of feeling powerful 
decreases (e.g., Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) or increases self-control 
performance (e.g., Magee & Smith, 2013). We conducted a pre-registered direct replication 
of the only experiment testing the effects of power on self-control (Joshi & Fast, 2013, Study 
3). In contrast to the original results, social power, operationalized by episodic priming, did 
not affect temporal discounting. A possible explanation is the fact that the power priming 
failed to elevate participants’ sense of power. Thus, the null findings challenge the power 
priming paradigm rather than the two theories from which opposite predictions were derived. 
In order to understand how power affects self-control, future research may need to rely on 
other manipulations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How to cite: 
Heller, S., & Ullrich, J. (2017). Does power increase self-control? Episodic priming may not 
provide the answer. Collabra: Psychology, 3(1). doi: http://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.48 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Carolin Lorber for her support in data collection, and Naomi Gellner and Simone 
Sebben for their help with coding the responses from the priming task.  
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  18 
Introduction and Theoretical Background 
How does feeling powerful prepare individuals for exercising self-control, i.e., to pursue 
long-term goals? Laypeople seem to agree that powerful people such as organizational or 
political leaders should be particularly persistent, disciplined, and responsible (Lord, Foti, & 
Vader, 1984). Two influential theories in power research – the approach/inhibition theory of 
power (Keltner et al., 2003) and the social distance theory of power (Magee & Smith, 2013) – 
make opposite predictions with regard to the effects of power on self-control.  
Within the framework of the approach/inhibition theory of power, Keltner and 
colleagues suggest that (1) high power activates the behavioral approach system which is 
sensitive to rewards and opportunities, and (2) low power activates the behavioral inhibition 
system which is sensitive to punishment, threat, and uncertainty. Briefly summarized, Keltner 
and colleagues propose that high power triggers approach-related positive affect, attention to 
rewards, automatic cognition, and disinhibited behavior, whereas reduced power activates 
inhibition-related negative affect, systematic cognition, and situationally constrained 
behavior. Accordingly, due to their heightened attention to rewards and their drive to 
experience these rewards immediately, powerful people should show relatively poor self-
control. 
In contrast, the social distance theory of power (Magee & Smith, 2013) assumes that 
high-power individuals exhibit better self-control than low-power individuals. Magee and 
Smith propose that asymmetric dependence between two individuals gives rise to 
asymmetric experiences of social distance, with the high-power individual feeling more 
subjective distance than the low-power individual. Based on assumptions of construal level 
theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), the authors assume that because high-power individuals 
perceive larger social distance, they engage in more abstract mental representation (i.e., 
higher level construal) than low-power individuals. High-level construals have been shown to 
have a positive effect on self-control (e.g., Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; 
Schmeichel, Vohs, & Duke, 2011). Accordingly, due to their use of high-level construal of 
goals and situations, powerful people should show good self-control. 
In line with the assumptions of the social distance theory of power, Joshi and Fast 
(2013) showed in three studies that experimentally induced social power benefits the pursuit 
of long-term goals by reducing the preference for smaller immediate gains over larger future 
gains (i.e., temporal discounting). When two theories make different predictions and only one 
is supported, the question arises as to what extent the other theory should be modified or 
discarded. Given the practical importance of self-control among powerful individuals, 
research must identify the conditions under which one or the other theory is correct.  
However, considering that the only available evidence on the research question comes 
from a single lab, it seems reasonable to first ask if the effect found by Joshi and Fast (2013) 
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is robust before future research can systematically explore moderators of the effect. This first 
step is an important one: As all findings result from a combination of signal (an underlying 
effect) and noise (systematic error in form of moderators as well as unsystematic error in 
form of measurement error), direct replication is the only way to separate the noise from the 
signal and average across different types of error (Simons, 2014). 
The current work was an attempt to replicate Study 3 from Joshi and Fast (2013). This 
study was chosen for two reasons. First, it is the only one that had a 3-cell design (high 
power, low power and control condition) and would therefore show whether the effect is 
attributable to high or low power (Singh, 1998). Second, it was assumed that preferences for 
gains in air quality (nonmonetary temporal discounting) would be more comparable across 
industrialized nations (USA vs. Germany/Switzerland) than preferences for monetary 
rewards where differences in currency, purchasing power, and inflation might play a role. 
In the original web-based study, 78 students experienced a power or control priming, 
then completed a measure of connection with their future self and finally the nonmonetary 
temporal discounting task. We conducted a pre-registered direct replication study 
(osf.io/um3rq) based on the Replication Recipe (Brandt et al., 2014) using a substantially 
larger sample. A successful replication would find a significant effect of the power 
manipulation, in that participants in the high power condition would have lower discount rates 
than participants in the neutral and low power conditions. 
Method 
All study materials and procedures can be accessed via osf.io/dqr4m. The present 
research was done in accordance with the checklist issued by the responsible ethics 
committee of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zurich, meaning that no formal approval 
was needed. This research respects the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of 
Conduct by the American Psychological Association (APA) as well as the Ethics Guidelines 
for Psychologists by the Swiss Psychological Society. 
Participants 
Sample size was determined based on considerations of statistical power. Simonsohn 
(2015) noted that the conventional approach of using the effect size estimate of the original 
study may be problematic. First, publication bias may inflate published effect sizes. Second, 
a replication may be uninformative when the confidence interval of the replication effect size 
does not only include zero, but also a detectable effect, that is, an effect size that the original 
study could have detected with 33% power. According to the recommendations by 
Simonsohn (2015) at least 2.5 times as many observations as the original study should be 
collected to have about 80% power to reject the null hypothesis of a detectable effect (i.e., in 
this case NOriginal = 78, minimum NReplication = 195). In the present case, a power analysis 
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assuming Joshi and Fast’s (2013) sample size, equal per cell sample sizes4 and statistical 
power of 33% indicated that the minimum detectable effect was equal to Cohen’s d = 0.35. 
The desired sample size was set to NReplication = 258 because this affords 80% power to reject 
the null hypothesis that the effect is zero if the effect is detectable (i.e., d = 0.35) and (at 
least) 80% power to reject the null hypothesis of a detectable effect if the effect is in fact 
zero. 
In total, 636 participants gave their consent to participate in the study (210 participants 
in high power condition, 218 participants in control condition, 208 participants in low power 
condition). On the third page where participants were meant to experience the power 
priming, 129 participants in the high power condition, 69 participants in the control condition, 
and 103 participants in the low power condition dropped out. Comparing all three groups, the 
dropout rates differed significantly, Χ2(2) = 38.64, p < .01. Taking only the two power 
conditions into consideration, the dropout rates still differed significantly, Χ2(1) = 5.53, p = 
.02, with 61% vs. 50% dropping out of the study after reading the instructions for the high vs. 
low power priming. This could be a cause for concern if dropout was systematically related to 
individual differences. Unfortunately, participants were asked for their demographics (gender 
and age) only at the very end of the experiment (in line with Joshi & Fast). Accordingly, we 
were not able to test if gender and condition interact in predicting dropout rates. However, if 
this was the case we would observe different proportions of men in women in the three 
conditions, which we do not, Χ2(2) = 0.82, p = .66 (high power: 36% men, control: 40% men, 
low power: 43% men). Furthermore, if age was confounded with condition, we would observe 
differences in the mean age across the three conditions, which we do not either, F(2,278) = 
0.04, p = 0.96 (high power: 27.24 years, control: 27.29 years, low power: 27.56 years). 
Likewise, proportions of students vs. professionals did not differ across conditions, Χ2(2) = 
0.09, p = .96 (high power: 45% students, control: 45% students, low power: 47% students). 
In light of these results, we believe that systematic dropout does not affect the validity of our 
manipulation. 
Finally, several participants were excluded based on the following a priori exclusion 
rules: no answers to either the questions referring to the connection to the future self or the 
temporal discounting questions (31 participants), inconsistent discounting pattern (16 
participants), no discounting at all (6 participants), no meaningful description of the situation 
in which they had / did not have power / were shopping (19 participants). In summary, 22 
participants in the high power condition, 24 participants in the control condition and 26 
participants in the low power condition were excluded. The exclusion rates did not differ 
significantly across condition, Χ2(2) = 4.768, p =.092. The final sample consisted of 263 
                                                
4 For simplicity we report calculations based on the assumption of equal per cell sample sizes because assuming unequal cell 
sizes does not alter our conclusions. 
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participants (Mage = 27.21 years, SD = 7.21 years), 98 men, 147 women and 18 participants 
of unknown gender. 
Materials and Procedure 
A convenience sample was invited via snowball sampling to take part in an online 
study on decision behavior. Participants gave their written consent and were then randomly 
assigned to one of the following three conditions: participants recalled and wrote about a 
situation when they had power (high power, 59 participants), or when they lacked power (low 
power, 79 participants) or when they last went to the grocery store (control condition, 125 
participants). Following the power manipulation, participants completed a measure of 
connection with the future self. Participants selected one of seven, increasingly overlapping 
pairs of circles to indicate how “connected” and how “similar” they felt to their selves in 10 
years. These two items were averaged to form a measure of participant’s connection with 
his/her future self with higher values indicating a stronger connection. 
The next part of the study consisted in the nonmonetary temporal discounting task. 
Within this paradigm, a participant makes a number of choices between a larger and several 
smaller rewards, where the smaller reward is available sooner than the larger one (Green & 
Myerson, 2004; Smith & Hantula, 2008). Participants were provided with eight binary choices 
between “improved air quality immediately for 21 days” and “improved air quality one year 
from now for [number of] days.” The number of days in the future was 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 
33, or 35. A single indifference point for each participant was obtained. This is the point at 
which participants equally value present and future gains. It was calculated by averaging the 
number of days between which participants switched from preferring the present option to 
preferring the future option. A high indifference point represents a tendency to prefer a 
smaller and more immediate reward or a failure to consider long-term potential 
consequences. 
Next, participants completed the Personal Sense of Power Scale (Anderson, John, & 
Keltner, 2012). Participants stated their agreement to 8 items such as “I think I have a great 
deal of power” on a scale from 1 (I disagree) to 5 (I agree). Cronbach’s alpha was α = .72. All 
the original materials for the study were available from the authors. All instructions were 
direct translations. 
After the direct replication, we collected additional measures that are not relevant for 
present purposes. For more information on the procedure and results related to these 
measures please consult the separate report on the Open Science Framework (osf.io/j67ep). 
Finally, participants were asked for their demographics. 
A few details differed between our study and that of Joshi and Fast (2013) beyond the 
obvious differences in language and national context. First, we did not counterbalance the 
order of the connection with the future self scale and the temporal discounting task because 
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the former was described as a mediating variable by Joshi and Fast. Second, our sample did 
not only include students (110 participants) but also professionals (135 participants, no such 
information available for 18 participants). Although professionals were older (Mstudent = 24.55, 
SD = 2.92; Mprofessional = 29.38, SD = 8.77), t(169.02) = 6.01, p < .01, and reported a slightly 
higher socioeconomic status (Mstudent = 3.12, SD = 0.84; Mprofessional = 3.31, SD = 0.94), 
t(241.06) = 1.77, p = .08, these two groups were collapsed as the effects in the two groups 
were similar. Third, in the original experiment participants took part in exchange for course 
credit. In our replication, participants were invited to take part in a prize draw, in which they 
could win one of three vouchers worth 30 CHF / 30 EUR (corresponding to approximately 33 
USD) each. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Two coders, who were blind to both conditions and hypotheses, categorized what type 
of relationship (e.g., manager–subordinate, teacher–student) was described in participants’ 
responses to the writing prompts. They were instructed to reach agreement for this 
categorization. Table 2.1 shows that 98.3% of participants in the high power and 92.4% of 
participants in the low power condition wrote about experiencing power (or the lack thereof) 
in various relationships. Their responses were rated by the same two coders for how much 
power the participant reported having using a scale ranging from 1 (none at all) to 5 (very 
much). The interrater reliability (agreement definition) was good, ICC = .84. We used the 
mean rating of two raters as dependent variable for the manipulation check. Participants 
described themselves as having more power in the high-power essays (M = 4.02, SD = 0.58) 
than in the low-power essays (M = 1.39, SD = 0.66), t(127) = 23.66, p < .01. 
 
Table 2.1 
Percent of power relationship types described by participants. 
 
Type of relationship High power 
condition 
Control 
condition 
Low power 
condition 
Manager – subordinate 13.6 0.0 22.8 
Parent – child 11.9 0.0 8.9 
Peers 8.5 0.0 1.3 
Interview/admission 15.3 0.0 16.5 
Teacher – student 10.2 0.0 11.4 
Friends/relatives 8.5 0.0 3.8 
Romantic/dating/sexual partners 6.8 0.0 1.3 
Miscellaneous 23.7 0.0 26.9 
No power relationship/Unclear 1.7 100.0 7.6 
Note. Types of relationships that totaled less than 1% were aggregated to form the category “Miscellaneous”.  
 
Preliminary Analyses 
A one-factorial ANOVA on the personal sense of power revealed no difference across 
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conditions, F(2,259) = 0.28, p = .75, ηp2 = 0.002, 95% CI [0, 0.02]. Furthermore, there were 
no significant differences between conditions in temporal discounting, F(2,260) = 0.27,  
p = .76, ηp2= 0.002, 95% CI [0, 0.02], or the felt connection with the future self,  
F (2,260) = 0.20, p = .82, ηp2= 0.002, 95% CI [0, 0.02] (for descriptives see Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2 
Means and standard deviations. 
 
Measure High power condition 
(n = 59) 
Control Condition 
(n = 125) 
Low power condition 
(n = 79) 
Personal sense of 
power 
 
3.97 (0.48) 3.91 (0.59) 3.93 (0.47) 
Connection with future 
self 
 
4.30 (1.45) 4.31 (1.44) 4.42 (1.39) 
Discount factor 
 
0.39 (0.27) 0.42 (0.26) 0.43 (0.25) 
 
Table 2.3 shows the intercorrelations of all measured variables. Only one correlation 
was significant: Personal sense of power was positively related to a stronger connection with 
the future self. Although only correlational evidence, this supports Joshi and Fast’s reasoning 
that high power should increase the connection with the future self. 
 
Table 2.3 
Intercorrelations of measured variables. 
 
 Personal sense of power Connection with future self 
Connection with future self 
 
0.23  
Discount factor 
 
0.07 0.08 
Note. Correlations that equal or exceed .13 (.16) are significant at the .05 (.01) level. 
 
Main Hypothesis Test 
Joshi and Fast (2013) reported a significant contrast between participants in the high-
power condition and those in the low-power and baseline conditions combined. The same 
analysis performed on the present data indicated a non-significant difference in the same 
direction as the effect reported by Joshi and Fast (2013), t(261) = 0.71, p = .48, d = 0.09, 
95% CI [–0.15, 0.33]. Thus, the confidence interval indicates that the effect is consistent with 
the null hypothesis of no effect but inconsistent with the null hypothesis of a detectable effect 
(which was determined to be d = .35 see above). As for the presumed mediator of the effect 
observed by Joshi and Fast (2013), high-power participants did not score higher on the 
measure of connection with the future self than did participants in the other two conditions, 
t(261) = 0.33, p = .74, d = 0.04, 95% CI [–0.20, 0.28]. 
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Discussion 
Replication constitutes an important contribution to cumulative science because it 
allows for testing the robustness of results and hence provides researchers with greater 
confidence about the existence and direction of effects (Brandt et al., 2014, Klein et al., 
2014). Given the importance of understanding the relationship between social power and 
self-control, we sought to replicate Joshi and Fast’s (2013, Study 3) finding that power 
increases self-control (d = .53). Using a much larger sample size but nearly identical 
procedures as Joshi and Fast we obtained a much smaller effect (d = 0.09, 95% CI [–0.15, 
0.33]). This non-significant effect is informative because it is significantly smaller than an 
effect that would give the original study a statistical power of 33% (i.e., the minimum 
detectable effect; Simonsohn, 2015) and that the current research had 80% statistical power 
to detect (i.e., d = .35). One straightforward implication of this result is that future replication 
studies relying on the procedures used by Joshi and Fast (2013) should be prepared to 
collect even larger samples to achieve adequate statistical power.  
Ultimately, though, researchers are likely to be more interested in the validity of the 
theoretical claims about the effects of social power than in the reproducibility of one particular 
study using a specific methodology. On the face of it, the null finding regarding the relation of 
power and discounting would seem to disconfirm the predictions derived from both the social 
distance theory of power (predicting a negative effect) and the approach/inhibition theory of 
power (predicting a positive effect). However, every empirical study involves auxiliary 
assumptions regarding the operations and measures used to test a theory, and those may be 
wrong as well. Most prominently, the validity of the manipulation and measures might be 
questioned. 
Temporal discounting as operationalization of self-control is a well validated and 
common paradigm in psychology and economics. It has successfully been used in 
pathological (e.g., substance addicts, MacKillop, Amlung, Few, Ray, Sweet, & Munafò, 2011; 
pathological gamblers, Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003) as well as in normal populations, in 
student as well as non-student populations (e.g., Buono, Whiting, & Sprong, 2015), in the 
USA as well as in Germany and Switzerland (e.g., Gianotti, Figner, Ebstein, & Knoch, 2012; 
Peters, & Büchel, 2009).  
Admittedly, the air quality delay discounting task that was employed in the original 
study differed in two aspects from more widely used versions of this task: the number of 
delays and the discounted reward. Although it is more common to administer temporal 
discounting tasks with several delays, the one-shot discounting task chosen by Joshi and 
Fast should yield comparable results to a more comprehensive version of this task. Reimers, 
Maylor, Stewart, and Chater (2009) compared a one-shot discounting task with a discounting 
task with several delays and obtained comparable results. In a similar vein, Yi, Pitcock, 
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Landes, and Bickel (2010) found that valid and sensitive discounting indices can be obtained 
with fewer indifference points than the standard number of 5 or 7. Regarding the nature of 
the discounted reward, an improvement in air quality for 21 days may seem relatively 
intangible (and maybe irrelevant) in comparison to receiving (hypothetical) monetary rewards 
for oneself. However, previous studies showed that temporal discounting occurs when 
environmental rewards are in question (e.g., air and water quality, Guyse, Keller, & Eppel, 
2002; nuclear and hazardous wastes, Moser, Stauffacher, Smieszek, Seidl, Krütli, & Scholz, 
2013; improvements in green space and storm-water control as well as reducing greenhouse 
gasses, Richards & Green, 2015). Furthermore, in we did not find an effect of social power 
on monetary temporal discounting either5 (see supplementary material available at 
osf.io/j67ep). 
Regarding the manipulation of power, it must be noted that the episodic power priming 
is also a widespread paradigm (Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015) that has already been 
successfully used in German and Swiss samples (e.g., Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2013; Scholl 
& Sassenberg, 2014a). In fact, noting that sometimes one and the same article reports 
similar findings across studies with priming or role-based manipulations, power researchers 
have argued for the superiority of priming manipulations because it “remove[s] issues of 
conscious awareness or intent” (Smith & Trope, 2006, p. 580) or because “it can be difficult 
to manipulate power in an ethical, believable, and effective way in the laboratory” (Smith & 
Galinsky, 2010, p. 928).  
However, we think it is possible that the simplicity of this paradigm is offset by its 
inability to reliably produce a sense of power that would affect participant’s decision-making – 
at least when administered online. Although our manipulation check indicated that 
participants followed instructions and provided examples of situations that differed in 
experienced power, a closer look at the properties of the texts produced by participants 
reveals that the intensity of the manipulation may have been rather low. Participants in this 
online study wrote on average 264 characters (SD = 246, range from 13 to 2352 characters) 
and took about Mdn = 197 seconds to do so. Assuming that the average reading speed 
(German, aloud) is 11.5 characters per second (SD = 5.5, Trauzettel-Klosinski & Dietz, 2012) 
and the average typing speed is 2.82 characters per second (Soukoreff & Mackenzie, 1995), 
participants would have needed about 118 seconds on average for reading and writing and 
accordingly would have had 79 seconds left to find a suitable situation and put themselves in 
this situation. This might not have been enough time to really experience the imagined 
situation. In fact, the differences in sense of power that we observed across conditions were 
non-significant and negligible in terms of effect size. Although this may in part be due to the 
fact that we did not modify the original items so that they would explicitly refer to the current 
                                                
5 Note that comparisons with the monetary delay discounting task have to be interpreted with caution as due to dropouts the 
sample is much smaller than in the main analyses. 
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situation (as opposed to the dispositional sense of power), it is noteworthy that a standard 
power manipulation did not leave its mark on a reliable measure of felt power.  
In order to enhance the effectiveness of the episodic priming manipulation, a reviewer 
suggested freezing the survey on the manipulation page and asking participants to visualize 
the respective situation (e.g., by adding the prompt to picture the faces of the other people 
involved, to imagine talking with the person and to try to feel the other people there with 
them). We agree that these additional instructions may serve to intensify the priming 
manipulation. Another explanation for our inability to replicate the effect of power on self-
control could be a weak explicit concept association between social power and self-control. 
Given that priming occurs as a result of spreading activation of related concepts in memory, 
larger effects should be found for strongly associated concept pairs (Salomon, 2016). We 
have reason to believe that the concepts of power and self-control might be only weakly 
associated (data from an unrelated pilot study). 
In summary, as the power manipulation used here did not affect felt power, it seems 
fair to begin by questioning the superiority of the episodic priming paradigm rather than by 
concluding that there is no effect of social power on self-control. Perhaps the claim that “[a]ll 
the ways of manipulating power seem to have similar effects“ (Smith & Galinsky, 2010, p. 
928) should be evaluated more systematically, either through meta-analysis or via pre-
registered comparisons. The alternative hypothesis would be that some of the effects of 
power require more intense feelings of power and/or conscious awareness of being in a 
powerful or powerless situation. Future research using different manipulations and 
operationalizations of both constructs is needed to clarify this effect and help adjudicate 
between the opposite predictions regarding the direction of the effect. The present research 
suggests that episodic priming may not be an ideal vehicle for this effort. 
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CHAPTER 3: Social Power and Dimensions of Self-control: 
Does Power Benefit Initiatory Self-control but Impair 
Inhibitory Self-control? 
 
 
Abstract 
People in power positions should be able to control their impulses and act in line with long-
term goals. However, two influential theories disagree as to whether power is conducive 
(Magee & Smith, 2013) or detrimental (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) to exercising 
self-control. We propose to resolve this contradiction by distinguishing between initiatory 
(‘start’) and inhibitory (‘stop’) self-control components that may be differentially affected by 
social power. Ninety-five female participants were randomly assigned to either a powerful 
role (interviewer) or a powerless role (applicant) and interacted in a simulated job interview 
(i.e., a modified Trier Social Stress Test). They then completed two inhibitory (d2 Test of 
Attention and emotion regulation) and two initiatory (handgrip and creative problem solving) 
self-control tasks. We tested the hypotheses that social power benefits task performance if 
the task requires start self-control but impairs task performance if the task requires stop self-
control. Although the power manipulation strongly affected participants’ sense of power, it did 
not significantly affect self-control performance. Considering that this preregistered study had 
80% power to detect an effect of d = .64, we conclude that the population effect size is 
smaller than that. 
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Introduction and Theoretical Background 
In general, the stereotypical view of powerful people’s self-control performance is 
inconsistent. On the one hand, we tend to see powerful people as following their impulses – 
often mentioned examples are sex scandals involving top-ranking politicians (e.g., Bill 
Clinton, Dominique Strauss-Kahn). On the other hand, it belongs to the image of powerful 
people that they are always thinking at least 10 steps ahead and aligning their actions with 
strategic long-term goals (such as Francis Underwood (portrayed by Kevin Spacey) in the 
popular TV series House of Cards). The question arises as to whether experiencing social 
power (i.e., control over the material and immaterial resources of others; see Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner et al., 2003) benefits or impairs willingness (not ability) to 
show self-control. 
Psychological research to date is not able to answer this question. The social distance 
theory of power (Magee & Smith, 2013) postulates that power should improve self-control 
performance. In contrast, the approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) 
suggests that power should worsen self-control performance. Empirical findings are similarly 
contradictory. For one, participants in high-power conditions are better able to focus on the 
task at hand (Guinote, 2007b; Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008), and they persist 
longer and make more attempts to solve (unsolvable) tasks (Guinote, 2007a) than 
participants in low-power conditions. But for another, they are worse at suppressing thoughts 
(Guinote, 2007c), withstanding impulses to act (Scholl & Sassenberg, 2015), and they take 
more risks (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). 
If self-control is a unitary construct, these findings cannot all be true. We propose to 
resolve this contradiction by considering self-control to be a two-dimensional construct 
consisting of both initiatory and inhibitory components. We call the predominantly initiatory 
component start self-control and propose that it is needed for initiating and maintaining goal-
directed behavior. Stop self-control, the predominantly inhibitory component, is needed for 
suppressing behavior or refraining from acting impulsively. 
In the following, we will first develop our two-dimensional view of the self-control 
construct and then review previous research on power and self-control with this distinction in 
mind. We then test the hypotheses that social power benefits task performance if the task 
requires start self-control but impairs task performance if the task requires stop self-control. 
Operationalization and Dimensionality of Self-Control  
Self-control (also called self-regulation, willpower, effortful control, among other terms; 
Duckworth & Kern, 2011) has been defined as “the capacity for altering one’s own 
responses, especially to bring them into line with standards such as ideals, values, morals, 
and social expectations, and to support the pursuit of long-term goals” (Baumeister, Vohs, & 
Tice, 2007, p. 351). Impulsivity can be seen as the opposite of self-control. It describes “the 
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tendency to act on a whim and, in so doing, disregard a more rational long-term strategy for 
success” (Madden & Johnson, 2010, p.11) and “has been defined variously as an inability to 
wait, a tendency to act without forethought, insensitivity to consequences, an inability to 
inhibit inappropriate behaviors” (Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006, p. 306).  
To better understand the inconsistent findings regarding the effects of power on self-
control, we turned to the operationalization of self-control and impulsivity. For measurement 
of both impulsivity and self-control there are psychometric and experimental approaches. 
Examples of the psychometric approach are the Eysenck Impulsiveness Scale (Eysenck, 
Easton, & Pearson, 1984), Self-Control Scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), and 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Version 11 (Barratt, 1985). Typical tasks administered in the 
laboratory are tasks targeting executive functions, such as the Go/No-Go task, Stroop task, 
or delay of gratification/delay discounting tasks (Smith & Hantula, 2008). 
The idea that self-control measures may reflect a smaller number of higher-order 
constructs is not new. Looking at both psychometric and experimental approaches, we find 
several classifications for both. Table 3.1 in the Tables section presents an overview of the 
different conceptualizations. First, self-report measures have repeatedly been reported to 
yield a two-factorial structure (De Boer, Van Hooft, & Bakker, 2011; de Ridder, de Boer, 
Lugtig, Bakker, & van Hooft, 2011); those authors first proposed to split the self-control 
construct into an inhibitory and an initiatory component. A recent examination of the factor 
structure of the Brief Self-Control Scale (Maloney, Grawitch, & Barber, 2012) revealed a 
structure consisting of two significantly negatively correlated factors, referred to as restraint, 
“the tendency to resist temptation” (p. 113), and impulsivity, “acting on spontaneous thoughts 
and feelings” (p. 113).  
Second, behavioral tasks can also be classified according to different taxonomies. 
Hagger, Wood, Stiff, and Chatzisarantis (2010) proposed two content-related classifications 
of tasks (without testing them empirically): (a) according to the demands placed on cognitive 
or affective processing systems, and (b) according to task content (controlling attention, 
emotions, thoughts, and impulses; cognitive processing; choice and volition; and social 
processing). The idea of multidimensionality of behavioral self-control measures also 
received empirical support. A meta-analytic principal components factor analysis 
demonstrated that laboratory tasks typically used to measure impulsivity constitute four 
factors: inattention, inhibition, impulsive decision-making, and shifting (Sharma, Markon, & 
Clark, 2014).  
Third, taking both self-report measures and behavioral tasks into consideration 
simultaneously, multidimensional conceptualizations emerge as well. A meta-analysis by 
Duckworth and Kern (2011) used a fourfold classification of self-control measures (executive 
functioning, delay of gratification/temporal discounting, self-report and informant-report 
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questionnaires). Work on primary data usually finds that self-report measures load on a 
single factor, whereas the behavioral measures constitute more than one factor: 
- Self-report, impulsive decision-making, impulsive disinhibition (Reynolds, Ortengren, 
Richards, & de Wit, 2006) 
- Self-report, impulsive decision-making, impulsive disinhibition, and impulsive 
inattention (Reynolds, Penfold, & Patak, 2008) 
- Self-report, response inhibition, delay of reward (Lane, Cherek, Rhoades, Pietras, & 
Tcheremissine, 2003) 
The Start/Stop Distinction 
The evidence presented above clearly supports the idea of multidimensionality, 
although the taxonomies differ considerably. Self-report measures seem to be categorized 
best by a simple functional taxonomy. In contrast, behavioral measures seem to be 
organized best according to more multifaceted taxonomies based on task content. Here we 
propose to apply the functional distinction between inhibitory and initiatory self-control to 
organize the variety of behavioral measures. We acknowledge that a simple dichotomy may 
not suffice to explain method variance, but it may constitute an important step forward in 
developing the theoretical link between power and self-control. 
These two dimensions have already received preliminary empirical support. For 
instance, within the health domain, inhibitory self-control seems to be important for behaviors 
that require stopping a response, such as limiting intake of foods high in saturated fat, 
whereas initiatory self-control (updating) is important for carrying out behaviors that require 
the initiation of a response, such as consuming fruit and vegetables (Allom & Mullan, 2014). 
In the organizational context, De Boer, van Hooft, and Bakker (2015) drew on these two 
types of self-control to predict contextual performance at the workplace: Results showed that 
only initiatory control was positively related to organizational citizenship behavior, personal 
initiative, and proactive coping. Both inhibitory control and initiatory control were negatively 
related to counterproductive work behavior.  
Given this initial evidence for the predictive validity of the proposed two factor 
conceptualization, we categorize laboratory tasks used to measure tendency to act without 
thinking and suppression of impulses as behavioral operationalization of inhibitory (stop) self-
control and laboratory tasks measuring persistence or capability to overcome one’s weaker 
self as operationalization of initiatory (start) self-control. As noted above, within the research 
on social power and self-control there are numerous theoretical and empirical contradictions. 
We propose to begin organizing the different findings in the literature by explicitly considering 
previous classifications of self-control in other areas of research. 
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Effects of Social Power on Dimensions of Self-Control 
The two most influential theories of power make different predictions regarding the 
effects of power on self-control. More specifically, according to the approach/inhibition theory 
of power (Keltner et al., 2003), high power activates the behavioral approach system, which 
is sensitive to rewards and opportunities. Hence, high power should trigger approach-related 
positive affect, attention to rewards, automatic cognition, and disinhibited behavior. 
Correspondingly, due to the powerful people’s heightened attention to rewards and their 
drive to experience these rewards immediately, they should show relatively poor self-control.  
According to the social distance theory of power (Magee & Smith, 2013), high-power 
individuals feel more subjectively distant from others than low-power individuals. Based on 
assumptions of construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), this greater perceived social 
distance should lead to more abstract mental representation (i.e., higher level construal). 
High-level construal was shown to benefit self-control (e.g., Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-
Sagi, 2006; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Duke, 2011). Accordingly, due to their use of high-level 
construal of goals and situations, powerful people should show relatively better self-control. 
When two theories make different predictions and there is empirical evidence in 
support of both, the question arises as to what the conditions are under which one or the 
other theory is correct. We used the distinction between start self-control and stop self-
control to structure published findings on power and self-control (for a detailed overview, see 
Table 3.2 in the Tables section). It appears that regardless of the power manipulation 
(episodic priming, conceptual priming, not enacted role assignment, impact of opinion), 
participants in the high power condition showed better performance in start self-control tasks 
such as dichotic listening task, problem-solving tasks, Stroop task, and temporal discounting, 
whereas in most cases they performed worse in stop self-control tasks such as thought 
suppression, action planning, and deliberation tasks. We decided not to include findings on 
powerful people’s increased risk-taking propensity (e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Carney, 
Cuddy, & Yap, 2010; Jordan, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2011), because risk-taking is not a 
common operationalization of the self-control construct. However, as risk-taking is 
sometimes used as a measure in impulsivity research and entails acting without prior 
deliberation, we consider this to be indirect evidence in favor of our hypothesis of reduced 
stop self-control in powerful individuals. 
Method 
All study materials and procedures can be accessed via https://osf.io/u9xa2/. This 
study was approved by the responsible ethics committee of the Faculty of Philosophy at the 
University of Zurich. Participants gave their written consent to take part in the study. 
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Power Analysis 
We planned to recruit 100 participants, but time and resource constraints only allowed 
us to collect data from 95 participants. A power analysis suggested that this sample size 
affords 80% statistical power to detect an effect of at least d = .64 with an experimentwise 
alpha of 5%, assuming one-sided tests. We will therefore declare an effect significant if it is in 
the expected direction and p < .025 (note that this criterion follows from one-sided testing 
and spreading the experimentwise alpha error across four hypothesis tests that follow from 
our use of four self-control tasks). Otherwise we will conclude that the effect is less than the 
minimal detectable effect size. 
Participants 
We recruited 95 women in the age range 19 to 48 years (M = 25.36, SD = 6.12; 82 
students) from the pool of psychology students and interested community members at the 
University of Zurich to take part in a study on personality and interpersonal behavior. We 
decided in favor of an all-female sample to: (1) avoid possible confounds induced by mixed 
gender interactions in the role play task, and (2) minimize the risk of self-handicapping 
effects (e.g., in the creative problem solving task), as these effects seem to be less 
pronounced for women than for men (McCrea, Hirt, & Milner, 2008). Participants were paid 
either 30 Swiss francs (about 30 U.S. dollars) or partial course credit. One participant 
misunderstood the creative problem solving task (i.e., rather than crossing the lines, she 
retraced the lines) and was therefore excluded only for the analyses of the creative problem 
solving data.  
Procedure 
Before coming to the laboratory, participants were asked to complete an online 
questionnaire that contained questions on demographics, personality (BFI-15; Gerlitz & 
Schupp, 2005), and potential moderator variables (trait self-control: De Boer et al., 2011; 
implicit theories about willpower: Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010; explicit power motive on the 
Inventar zur Erfassung interpersonaler Motive (IIM): Thomas, Locke, & Strauss, 2012). 
When they arrived at the laboratory, participants learned that they and another 
participant (who was in fact a confederate) were scheduled for the same experimental 
session and would work on one task (among others) together. At the very beginning of the 
first part of the experimental session, a female experimenter first administered the baseline 
measure of the handgrip task for each participant separately. Then, a modified version of the 
Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Birkett, 2011) was used to manipulate the feeling of power. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a powerful role (as interviewer) or a powerless role 
(as applicant) and interacted in a simulated job interview (the self-presentation part of the 
TSST) with the female confederate. At the end of the first part of the experimental session, 
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participants completed a manipulation check and several filler questions concerning mood 
and feelings during the interaction. The first part of the session took approximately 25 min. 
To guarantee that the experimenter who administered the dependent measures was 
not aware of the experimental condition, participants were instructed by a second female 
experimenter to complete four well-established self-control measures: For stop self-control 
we used the d2 Test of Attention (Brickenkamp, 1994) and an emotion regulation task 
(avoiding emotional displays and facial expressions while watching a funny, a distressing, 
and a boring short film in counterbalanced order). For start self-control, we used the handgrip 
task and an ostensible test of creative problem solving abilities. These four tasks were 
administered in four different orders, so that every task was once in the first, the second, the 
third, and the last position. Subsequently, participants completed a second manipulation 
check and several filler questions concerning mood and their overall impressions of the 
experiment. Participants received their compensation and were debriefed and thanked. The 
second part of the session took approximately 50 min. 
Power Manipulation 
To create a highly involving and naturalistic hierarchically structured situation we used 
a modified version of the TSST. The TSST generally consists of a waiting period upon 
arrival, anticipatory speech preparation, speech performance, and verbal arithmetic 
performance periods, followed by one or more recovery periods. Our implementation of this 
paradigm differed in the following main aspects from the standard procedure (see Birkett, 
2011): First, we were not interested in assessing stress hormone reactivity, so we omitted 
both the waiting period at the beginning and the verbal arithmetic performance period at the 
end. Second, the interviewers wore their normal clothes instead of lab coats to keep the 
situation more naturalistic and provide a better fit with the cover story. 
Participants believed that the dyadic task was a mock interview in which one person 
would play the role of the interviewer, a professional recruiter, and the other person the role 
of the job applicant. The research assistant would play the role of assistant to the interviewer. 
Depending on the condition, the real participant would either act as the interviewer (high 
power role) or the applicant (low power role). Participants were informed that the applicant 
had 7 min to mentally prepare a 4-min speech in which she presents herself as an ideal 
candidate for her dream job. Her speech was videotaped. In the preparation period, the 
interviewer had to determine evaluation criteria for the presentation and could prepare up to 
three questions for the applicant. Participants believed that the role allocation was randomly 
determined – in fact, it was randomly determined before the experiment started, and the real 
participant drew either one of two interviewer lots or one of two applicant lots. 
The research assistant brought the applicant to an adjacent room where she had to 
mentally prepare her self-presentation. Applicants had to use an annoyingly ticking egg timer 
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to monitor their 7 min preparation time. They were informed that the interviewer would pick 
them up for the presentation. 
In the meantime, the interviewer and the research assistant prepared the setting, 
arranging chairs and table so that both of them sat on the same side of the table, placing the 
chair for the applicant to face them, and positioning the video camera. When the interviewer 
was a real participant (i.e., in the high power condition), she was given written instructions 
that summarized the role requirements in order to make her feel as comfortable as possible 
in her role. The instructions summarized the interviewer’s goals (find out possible strengths 
and weaknesses, evaluate the quality of the presentation) and procedural rules (e.g., ask for 
what job the applicant is applying, do not interrupt the presentation, prompt the participant to 
continue speaking if she remains silent for more than 10 sec, take notes if needed, prepare 
up to 3 questions). 
Then participants played their respective roles: The interviewer welcomed the 
applicant, the applicant gave her speech and answered questions, and the interviewer 
thanked the applicant and brought her back to the preparation room. The interviewer and the 
research assistant took approximately 3 min to discuss the presentation in a way that 
allowed the interviewer to feel like the person in charge. After this discussion, the interviewer 
was asked to evaluate the applicant. The interviewer was informed that her evaluation was 
important because the applicant’s chances of winning a bonus would depend on the 
evaluation, whereas the interviewer’s bonus would be randomly decided. 
Measures 
Manipulation checks 
After the interview role play, the power manipulation, we assessed how powerful and in 
charge of the situation each participant felt during their interaction. On a scale from 0 (not at 
all) to 5 (completely) participants indicated how much they agreed with six self-descriptive 
adjectives: “powerful,” “self-confident,” “unassertive” (reverse-coded), “subordinate” (reverse-
coded), “responsible,” and “competent.” These items were averaged to build an indicator of 
felt power. Cronbach’s alpha was α = .81. At the very end of the experiment, we asked the 
participants again how powerful they felt (0 = not at all, 5 = completely) in order to have an 
indicator of the stability of the power manipulation. 
Behavioral measures 
We used four tasks to represent the two self-control components. We chose well-
established measures in the self-control and ego-depletion literature (e.g., Hagger et al., 
2010) that are easy to administer. To our knowledge, these tasks have not yet been used in 
conjunction with any power manipulation. 
Handgrip task. This task was used as an operationalization of start self-control. We 
implemented this task based on the description by Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister (1998). 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  35 
The apparatus used for this task was a hand exerciser consisting of two handles and a metal 
spring. Participants were told to squeeze the handles together and maintain that grip for as 
long as they could with their dominant hand. A small eraser was inserted between the 
handles so that when the grip relaxed the eraser would fall down, thereby providing a clear 
audio-visual and objective signal to stop timing. The experimenter timed how long the 
participant squeezed the handles (i.e., endurance in seconds). Participants completed a 
baseline measure at the beginning of the experiment and a second measure after the power 
manipulation. 
We conceptualize persistence as an integral component of start self-control. The 
handgrip task requires physical stamina and accordingly becomes taxing with time. 
Therefore, a person must exert self-control to continue squeezing the handles despite the 
uncomfortable condition. The longer participants kept on squeezing, the better their self-
control performance on this task. 
Creative problem solving task. This task was used as an operationalization of start 
self-control. We created this task using elements from tasks used by Vohs et al. (2008) and 
by Guinote (2007b). Participants were given time to study for an ostensibly upcoming 
creative problem solving abilities test that was framed as a predictor of many desirable life 
outcomes. Additionally, participants were told of past research showing that being familiar 
with the test materials significantly improved performance on the test and that a practice 
period of 15 min had proven to be sufficient. The experimenter announced that she would 
leave the room for 15 min and gave participants a sample item for practice. This alleged 
sample item was a geometrical form that looked like the contours of a building. Participants 
had to cross each wall only once in one continuous line. They were told that they could use 
as many copies as they needed to find the solution.  
However, to make the task more difficult in terms of self-control, participants were also 
allowed to read magazines or surf the Internet (magazines and an iPad were on the table) if 
they did not wish to work on the sample item for the entire practice period. We used the 
number of attempts that participants made to solve the sample item as an indicator of task 
performance. 
Focusing on the task at hand and getting (unpleasant) work done is part of our 
definition of start self-control. The creative problem solving task requires participants to start 
and keep working on a frustrating task, while distraction in the form of pleasant activities to 
occupy their time is nearby. Therefore, the participant must exert self-control to stay focused 
and continue working on the task.  
d2 Test of Attention. This task was used as an operationalization of stop self-control. 
It is a timed test of selective attention/concentration, and it measures processing speed, rule 
compliance, and quality of performance in response to the discrimination of similar visual 
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stimuli. The test consists of 14 lines, each comprised of 47 characters (the letters d and p) 
with one to four dashes, for a total of 658 items. The participant must scan each line and 
cross out each d with two dashes. Participants had 4 minutes to work on as many characters 
as possible. We used the error rate (i.e., the ratio of total errors divided by the number of 
attempted items) as an indicator of task performance. 
Stop self-control entails the suppression of impulses. On the d2 Test, participants 
should be tempted to cross out all ds irrespective of the number of accompanying dashes, 
because the visual distinction between ds and ps is far more obvious than the distinction 
between the target stimuli and all other kinds of characters. Self-control is required to ignore 
distractors and override the tendency to act naturally (cross out all ds).  
Emotion regulation task. This task was used as an operationalization of stop self-
control. Participants were seated in front of an iMac and asked to watch a video that 
contained three short films separated by a short break of 12 sec. To ensure that the effects 
were due to self-control rather than the particular emotional response, we used positive, 
negative, and boring stimuli. Based on the results of our pretest, we chose an Ice Age 
compilation (5:56 min), the trailer for Amityville Horror (2:12 min), and a documentary on 
traffic near Lucerne’s main train station (3:48 min). Participants were told that the iMac was 
also filming their faces while they watched the video. They were instructed to watch the video 
and not show any emotions, so that another person watching the filming of their faces would 
not be able to guess which video they were watching.  
Two raters blind to the experimental condition rated the emotional expressiveness of 
participant’s faces on a 5-point scale (1 = absolutely non-expressive, 5 = very expressive). 
The interrater reliability (consistency definition) on the basis of mean ratings over three 
emotions per participant was ICC = .66. We used the mean rating of two raters across the 
three films as an indicator of task performance. 
Keeping oneself from doing something one would want to do or one would naturally do 
is a defining part of stop self-control. In this emotion regulation task, videos prompted the 
participants to show emotions, but the participants were instructed not to do so. They had to 
exert self-control to override the natural tendency to spontaneously express their emotions.  
Results 
After data collection but prior to the analyses, we preregistered an analysis plan on the 
Open Science Framework (osf.io/u9xa2), specifying scale construction, decision rules, and 
planned confirmatory analyses. 
Manipulation Checks 
As expected, interviewers felt more powerful (n = 48, M = 3.68, SD = 0.73) during the 
interview role play than job applicants did (n = 47, M = 2.72, SD = 0.92), t(93) = 5.62,  
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p < .001, d = 1.15, 95% CI [0.71, 1.60]. This effect was robust insofar as for the second 
manipulation check, interviewers still felt more powerful (M = 1.51, SD = 1.35) than 
applicants (M = 1.09, SD = 1.00), t(84.67) = 1.74, p = .043, d = 0.36, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.78]. 
According to their own reports, interviewers invested less effort in the role play (M = 2.25,  
SD = 1.26) than applicants (M = 2.94, SD = 1.42), t(93) = 2.49, p = .015, and they were more 
satisfied with their performance (M = 3.90, SD = 0.97) than applicants (M = 3.40, SD = 1.08), 
t(93) = 2.34, p = .022. However, there was no difference in how well they liked the role play 
task, t(93) = 1.05, p = .30.  
Main Analyses 
Start self-control 
We regressed the second handgrip measurement on the baseline measurement, 
saved the residuals, and used this residualized performance as a dependent variable in a  
t-test. Contrary to our hypothesis, interviewers (residualized handgrip performance in sec:  
M = 2.1, SD = 76.74) did not show more perseverance in the handgrip task than applicants 
(residualized handgrip performance in sec: M = -2.1, SD = 61.18), t(93) = 0.30, p = .384,  
d = 0.06, 95% CI [-0.35, 0.47]. In a similar vein, interviewers (M = 10.42, SD = 4.34) did not 
make more attempts to solve the creative task than applicants did (M = 10.52, SD = 4.55), 
t(92) = 0.11, p = .455, d = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.39, 0.44]. 
Stop self-control 
Contrary to our hypothesis, interviewers (M = .04, SD = 0.06) and applicants (M = .04, 
SD = 0.06) did not differ in the error rate in the d2 Test of Attention, t(93) = 0.16, p = .438,  
d = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.44, 0.38]. Similarly, interviewers (M = 1.47, SD = 0.61) were not better 
at suppressing their emotions than applicants were (M = 1.42, SD = 0.48), t(93) = 0.41,  
p = .680, d = 0.08, 95% CI [-0.33, 0.50]. 
Discussion 
Previous research has found that social power both benefits and harms self-control 
performance, but a theoretical explanation for this paradox was lacking. We suggested that 
social power would increase start self-control, which is necessary for initiating and 
maintaining behavior, but would decrease stop self-control, which is necessary for 
suppressing behavior or refraining from acting impulsively. This distinction helped us 
organize the contradictory findings in the published literature on power and self-control (see 
Table 2). However, the main goal of this study was to use the start/stop distinction to test a 
priori hypotheses regarding the differential effects of power on start self-control vs. stop self-
control. To this end, we used a role play manipulation that allowed us to experimentally 
create large differences in participants’ feeling of power or powerlessness. We used four 
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tasks to represent the two self-control components. Participants completed the d2 Test of 
Attention and an emotion regulation task (both considered to be inhibitory) as well as a 
handgrip task and a creative problem solving task (both considered to be initiatory).  
The results of this pre-registered experiment are non-significant with regard to all four 
self-control tasks. More precisely, high power and low power participants do not differ in their 
endurance in the handgrip task, the number of attempts made to solve the problem-solving 
task, the number of errors made on the d2, and externally rated success in suppressing their 
emotions. We would like to preface the interpretation and discussion of these results by 
saying that effects of power on self-control may well exist, but they are unlikely to be large. In 
fact, the power analysis underlying our experiment allows us to conclude that the effects are 
most likely smaller than d = .64. This is the correct interpretation of non-significant effects in 
this study and should be kept in mind when we talk in the following more categorically about 
the presence or absence of effects. 
Thus, the results of the present experiment are inconsistent with our predictions 
regarding the differential effects of social power on start/stop self-control. However, rather 
than merely disconfirming the direction of the effects postulated by the start/stop distinction 
(i.e., whether power decreases or increases self-control), our results more generally call into 
question the existence of the effects of power and self-control as postulated by the social 
distance theory of power (Magee & Smith, 2013) and the approach/inhibition theory of power 
(Keltner et al., 2003).  
Possible Explanations for the Null Findings 
An effect depends on the outcome variable, the recipients of a treatment, the setting, 
the time, and the treatment (Reichardt, 2006). Reasons for the absence of an effect might be 
found in one or more of these five factors.  
First, with regard to the outcome variable, we must state that every empirical study 
involves auxiliary assumptions regarding the operationalization of the outcome. It is possible 
that the chosen self-control measures are not good indicators of the two postulated self-
control dimensions. For instance, the d2 Test of Attention might be considered to be an 
operationalization of start self-control, because the task – to focus on target stimuli and 
ignore distractors – is highly similar to the Stroop task, for example, which we classified as a 
start self-control measure in our literature review. However, even if our measures do not 
represent the initiatory and inhibitory component well, we used four operationalizations that 
are well established within the self-control and ego-depletion literature. Prior studies reported 
that these measures were sensitive to interindividual differences and experimental 
manipulations (e.g., Friese, Messner, & Schaffner, 2012; Guinote, 2007b; Muraven et al., 
1998; Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005). Accordingly, if self-control had been affected by 
our treatment, we would have expected to find variability in these measures as well. 
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Second, with regard to the recipients of the treatment (i.e., our participants), a possible 
alternative explanation is that we used a sample of female students, whereas most previous 
studies have relied on mixed gender samples. As stated in the introduction, we were 
interested in the participants’ willingness to show self-control (not their ability), which we 
assumed could be altered by a power manipulation. Probably, highly conscientious 
participants would want to do their best in an experiment – irrespective of contextual factors 
such as manipulations; this would minimize variability in willingness to exercise self-control. 
Previous findings show that across different cultures, women score higher than men on 
Conscientiousness (Schmitt, Realo, Voracek, & Allik, 2008), and psychology students tend to 
be more conscientious than students majoring in other disciplines (e.g., Vedel, Thomsen, & 
Larsen, 2015). Indeed, our sample reported relatively high scores on conscientiousness (on 
a 7-point scale: M = 5.31, SD = 0.93). However, previous psychological research found 
interindividual differences in state self-control performance in predominantly female student 
samples (e.g., Martijn, et al., 2007; Vohs et al., 2008), so that this is unlikely to be the reason 
for our null findings. 
Third, with regard to the setting, we have to note that due to administrative reasons the 
experimental sessions took place in two different rooms. However, we took great care to 
furnish and prepare the rooms as similarly as possible. Furthermore, it is very likely that our 
setting is highly similar to the setting in previous psychological research within a university 
context where studies detected differences in self-control measures. Therefore, we do not 
think that the setting is responsible for the absence of power effects. 
Fourth, with regard to the time factor, participants completed the experiment at different 
times of the day. Although it is possible that self-control performance might vary over the 
course of the day, for example due to ego-depletion (Kouchaki & Smith, 2014), we expect 
that this potential time effect was averaged out, as we tested participants both in the 
mornings and afternoons. Time also refers to the time lag between treatment and 
measurement of the outcome variable. In this regard, it is reassuring to note that our 
manipulation check indicates that participants in the high power condition still felt more 
powerful at the end of the experiment than participants in the low power condition did. This 
suggests that it is unlikely that the effect of the interview role play was too short-lived to affect 
all of the outcome variables. 
Fifth, with regard to the treatment, we have to acknowledge that this study is the first 
study on power and self-control to manipulate the feeling of power via a structural 
manipulation. Previous research in this domain adopted experiential and conceptual 
manipulations, such as episodic priming, conceptual priming, and not enacted role 
assignment (see Table 3.2 in the Tables section). Diverse power manipulations could – 
mediated by distinct processes – have different effects on the same dependent variable. 
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Experiential and conceptual manipulations are likely to activate the cognitive power network 
(see Tost, 2015), which might be responsible for the previous findings on the relationship 
between power and self-control. However, the role play manipulation that we used might 
have failed to activate this power network. Nevertheless, the results of our manipulation 
check support the conclusion that we succeeded in affecting the participant’s experience of 
power. Hence, we doubt that the absence of effects on self-control performance is due to our 
power manipulation. 
Strengths of this Study  
This study has two notable strengths. First, this study employed a newly created power 
manipulation that contains important elements of previous role play manipulations. For 
example, the powerful participant has the mandate to direct the powerless participant and 
may evaluate the performance of the powerless participant with real consequences for the 
powerless participant. Besides, our manipulation has considerable mundane realism and fits 
the background of our participants, as most of them have probably already experienced 
comparable interview situations, either as candidates or interviewers or in both roles. 
Second, we see this mock interview as a suitable situation, because participants (mostly 
students and employed adults of the same age) in a prior study (see Chapter 2) often 
provided interview situation examples when asked to describe a situation in which they had 
or lacked power. Moreover, this manipulation creates a strong situation in which the role 
requirements are clear, and therefore, the participant’s personality dominance should not 
have a strong effect (as may be possible in open situation role plays with a non-naturalistic 
task, such as in Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009, Study 1). 
Furthermore, the statistical conclusion validity of this experiment is high, given the a 
priori power analysis and the preregistration of hypotheses and planned analyses. To 
reiterate our main conclusion, the non-significant results mean that the population effect is 
smaller than the one assumed in our power analysis, i.e., d = .64. 
Conclusion 
In a conceptual replication we observed effects that are inconsistent with the large 
effects of social power on self-control reported in the published literature. After considering 
several alternative explanations, the most plausible one is that the existing literature has 
overestimated these effects. This seems all the more plausible in the light of the results of 
the large reproducibility project (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). This study aimed to 
replicate more directly a great number of effects from top journals. Effect sizes of the 
replications were consistently smaller than the original, published effect size if the original 
effect size was greater than d = .5, indicating a potential publication bias. Given its practical 
importance, future research should further explore the relationship between social power and 
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self-control and try to identify possible moderators. Our newly developed role play power 
manipulation seems to be a promising starting point, in that it produces substantial 
differences in felt social power. With regard to the self-control operationalization, it might be 
worth investing further effort in validation of the start/stop distinction proposed here and 
sampling additional tasks that capture these aspects of self-control. 
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CHAPTER 4: Manipulating Social Power Within-Person 
 
 
Abstract 
Surprisingly, only very few studies have tested hypotheses about social power’s effects in 
within-person designs, although power research could benefit from advantages of this 
approach such as increased statistical power and its more natural alignment with the 
everyday experience of most people. Our goal is to show what insights could be gained by 
studying power within-person. We propose to disaggregate power into its stable and dynamic 
components and discuss the roles of time, direction of change and individual differences in 
understanding the relationship between these components. Additionally, we present initial 
empirical evidence on the effect of power gain vs. power loss. Participants assumed first 
either a structurally high power or low power position in a newly developed role-play task and 
changed in the second round their roles and interaction partners. Subsequently to each role-
play participants completed measures of risk-taking and interpersonal accuracy. Within the 
risk-taking measure we manipulated outcome responsibility between person that is whether 
the decision affected only the decision maker or both the decision maker and the interaction 
partner in the role-play. The order in which participants played the two power roles mattered 
for all outcomes. The power manipulation affected participant’s feelings of power only when 
they gained structural power but not when they lost it. Similarly, risk-taking differed in the two 
order conditions and the preregistered hypothesis of reduced risk-taking for participants with 
outcome responsibility was not supported. Suggestions for further within-person power 
research are discussed. 
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Introduction and Theoretical Background 
So far, only very few studies have tested hypotheses about the effects of social power 
in within-person designs, be it experimental work (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; 
Li, Wang, Yin, Mao, Zhu, & Huang, 2016; Sivanathan, Pillutla, & Murnighan, 2008; Weick, 
McCall, & Blascovich, 2017, Study 2) or field studies (Foulk, Lanaj, Tu, Erez, & Archambeau, 
2018; Smith & Hofmann, 2016). This is surprising on both theoretical and methodological 
grounds because within-person designs have some advantages in comparison to between-
person designs that have been predominantly used in power research (Charness, Gneezy, & 
Kuhn, 2012): First, the error variance associated with individual differences is reduced. In 
theory, individual differences should be controlled via random assignment of participants to 
conditions but in practice it is still possible that individual differences cluster in conditions. 
This problem can be circumvented by the use of within-person designs in which the 
participants are the same in the different conditions and accordingly, the conditions are 
identical with respect to individual differences. Second, within-designs offer a substantial 
boost in statistical power. Third, in many circumstances, within-designs are more naturally 
aligned with theoretical mindsets in that a researcher might want to find out how an individual 
reacts to different contexts and things instead of how two people react in two different 
contexts to two different things. From prior power research we only know how different 
people think, feel and behave when they find themselves in either high or low power 
conditions. What is missing is theory and empirical data on the same people being in both 
high and low power conditions, as it would correspond to the everyday reality of most people 
(Leikas, Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, & Nissinen, 2013; Schmid Mast, 2010). 
This paper aims at preparing the ground for studying social power within person more 
systematically. We begin by disaggregating power into its stable and dynamic components. 
We discuss questions of theoretical interest about the relationship between these 
components that can only be answered by using within-designs. Finally, we address one of 
these questions empirically in testing the effects of a within-person structural power 
manipulation on psychological power and two outcomes, risk-taking and interpersonal 
accuracy. 
Different Forms and Levels of Power 
On every single day in our life we experience different forms and levels of power in 
various contexts – for instance as supervisors or employees at work, at home as parents with 
our children, as partners in our romantic relationships and as friends or colleagues in leisure 
time relationships. Depending on the respective relationship, a given individual has more 
asymmetrical and objectively demonstrable control over resources on which the interaction 
partner depends (i.e., structural power) in one situation, but controls less resources than the 
interaction partner in another situation (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Thibaut & 
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Kelley, 1959; Tost, 2015). The control over resources valued by the interaction partner is the 
basis for exerting influence over him/her. This implies that power is actually a property of a 
relationship and as such does not automatically generalize across contexts (Keltner, Van 
Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). 
Consider for instance the example of Mary: She has two small children and works part-
time as shop assistant in a clothes store. It is likely that Mary has a relatively high level of 
structural power vis-à-vis her children because she as parent provides resources such as 
food, safety, and comfort that are critical for her children. However, in her job she has a 
rather low level of structural power vis-à-vis her boss, as her boss decides how many shifts 
she works, when she can take two weeks off to go on holiday with her family and if she gets 
the full end-of-year bonus or not. 
Still, power is not only an objectively assessable characteristic of an interpersonal 
relationship but can also be psychological – the subjective assessment of one’s own ability to 
influence others in a given social situation (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012). Many factors 
determine this assessment such as personality (extraversion, dominance, e.g., Anderson, 
Spataro, & Flynn, 2008), competence (e.g., Darioly & Schmid Mast, 2011), and structural 
power (e.g., Schmid Mast, 2010). One would intuitively assume that high structural power 
goes along with high levels of psychological power. Experimental power research builds on 
this logic when using structural manipulations such as role-plays or manipulations of the 
control over resources in ultimatum or dictator games (Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015).  
However, the relationship between structural and psychological power does not 
necessarily have to be positive as more applied research in family or organization contexts 
shows (e.g., van Dijke, de Cremer, Langendijk, & Anderson, 2018). For instance, although 
parents are in a high structural power position vis-à-vis their children, their self-reported level 
of psychological power does not necessarily have to be high, too (e.g., Bugental & Lewis, 
1999). In an experience sampling study that collected reports about potentially hierarchical 
interactions in work, family and leisure time contexts, structural power predicted feelings of 
power imperfectly (Smith & Hofmann, 2016). Interestingly, participants in a structural low-
power position were more likely to report relatively high levels psychological power, than 
participants in a structural high-power position were to report relatively low levels of 
psychological of power. 
Studying Power Within Person 
As the preceding section illustrates, every individual changes his/her level of structural 
power when changing from context to context and relationship to relationship probably quite 
frequently along the course of a day. But – given that we have also seen that there is no one-
to-one relationship between structural and psychological power – we know far less about 
changes (or stability?) in psychological power. This calls for more research as psychological 
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power has been seen as the main driver responsible for effects reported in social 
psychological (laboratory) power research (Galinsky et al., 2015). 
Initial empirical evidence showed that psychological power is specific to particular 
relationships, but that it is also moderately consistent across relationships (Anderson et al., 
2012). Accordingly, psychological power in situation X might be a function of (1) a trait-like 
aggregate assessment of psychological power i.e., trait power and, (2) situational influences 
that are constituted by (a) situation-specific structural power and (b) other situational 
(“unsystematic”) variation due to for instance the interpretation of structural power in this
specific situation, mood, health condition, sense of achievement and so on (Fleeson & Noftle, 
2008; see Figure 4.1). This conception sets the stage for many interesting theoretical 
questions about the dynamics of (psychological) power. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Conceptual model of determinants of psychological power 
 
First question: The impact of time 
What is the role of time in the interplay between trait power, structural power and 
psychological power? Unfortunately, time has not played a significant role in psychological 
theory building (neither within power research nor in psychological research in general), 
although time impacts what constructs are and how and why they are related (George & 
Jones, 2000). For instance, on a very general level, how in time is situational power 
aggregated to form trait power? Time is an ongoing stream of subjective experiences that 
becomes meaningful in the moment individuals partition this stream into separate episodes 
they reflect upon and interpret. It is possible that trait power is the aggregate of all prior 
experiences of power – but it might also be that only the power related experiences in the 
current phase of life such as adolescence, early adulthood or midlife decisively shape trait 
power. 
Furthermore, more granular questions on the timing of power experiences in specific 
situations arise. Two example questions are illustrated by Figure 4.2, which is meant to 
represent the experiences of a given individual. Figure 4.2 shows a coordinate system with 
time on the x-axis and power in its different forms on the y-axis. The solid line indicates this 
individual’s level of trait power that is seen as the constant power baseline over the depicted 
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observation period. Within this period, the individual had a structurally high power role (e.g., 
interviewed a possible future intern) and a structurally low power role (e.g., presented the 
quarterly figures to her boss). The dotted line depicts a possible trajectory of psychological 
power the individual might experience within the observation period. It is assumed that the 
experience of different levels of structural power shapes this trajectory. Two example 
questions concern the immediacy of changes in psychological power as a consequence of 
changes in structural power. For instance, how long does an individual need to be exposed 
to structural power or experimental manipulations of psychological power in order for this 
experience to translate into psychological power (see parameter a)? Auxiliary analyses of 
power priming data suggest that a minimum of time in which individuals engage with power 
might be necessary for effects to develop (see Chapter 2). How long does it take until an 
individual can disengage from a specific level of psychological power (see parameter b)? As 
power experiments mostly contain a power manipulation directly followed by a manipulation 
check and only one dependent measure there is no empirical data that sheds light on this 
issue. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Temporal fluctuations in individual X’s psychological power 
 
Second question: The impact of direction of change 
Figure 4.3 illustrates considerations on the order in which varying levels of structural 
power are experienced. Similarly to Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3 is meant to depict a given 
individual’s power experiences in a coordinate system with time on the x-axis and power in 
its different forms on the y-axis. The solid line indicates this individual’s stable level of trait 
power. This time, the individual had first a structurally high power role (e.g., discussed his 
assistant’s salary with him), then a structurally low power role (e.g., explained to his boss 
why an important customer order has not been completed in time) and then again a 
structurally high power role (e.g., settled a dispute between two subordinates on the 
distribution of tasks). The dotted line depicts again a possible trajectory of psychological 
power.  
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Figure 4.3. Effects of power loss and power gain on psychological power 
 
Does the direction of change, i.e., power loss (see parameter c1) or power gain (see 
parameter c2), matter? Initial empirical evidence points to an affirmative answer: In the 
experiments by Sivanathan and colleagues (2008) participants moved from ultimatum to 
dictator game (i.e., power gain) or from dictator game to ultimatum game (i.e., power loss). In 
two of the four experiments there were also two control conditions included, in which 
participants played either two times the ultimatum game or two times the dictator game. In 
terms of participants’ demands, the results consistently showed that people reacted more 
strongly to an increase in power (i.e., substantial increase in demands) than to a loss in 
power (i.e., no strong decrease in demands). Unfortunately, the authors did not report a 
manipulation check for psychological power, so we do not know how the changes in 
structural power affected participants’ psychological power.
This issue is closely related to the question where ”baseline psychological power” is 
located. This is (also) an important but unresolved question in the classical between-person 
power research. The mostly implicit assumption is that participants have as default an 
intermediate level of psychological power based on which they can be moved in states of 
high or low power. However, as three-cell designs including control conditions are rather the 
exception than the rule, it is impossible to draw a final conclusion whether power or 
powerlessness is the driver of effects (Moskowitz, 2004; du Plessis, Schaerer, Yap, & Thau, 
2016). 
It is likely that (healthy and typical) participants in power experiments would report 
rather high levels of psychological power as baseline. From a theoretical point of view, 
feeling in control is a fundamental human need (for reviews see Mineka & Hendersen, 1985; 
Pittman & Heller, 1987). Having a sense of control is so important that it even drives 
individuals to see non-existent patterns in their environment (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) or to 
anthropomorphize nonhuman agents because the readily accessible concept of “human“ can 
serve as a useful explanatory source for understanding, controlling, and predicting another 
agent’s behavior (e.g., Epley, Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008). Indeed, with regard to 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  48 
empirical findings, student participants in studies by Anderson and colleagues (2012) 
reported for the majority of studied contexts (i.e., participants in relationships with their 
parents, friends, current dating partners, supervisors at work, teaching assistant from a 
current class, sorority and dormitory members, fellow MBA-students in an experiment) levels 
of psychological power that are significantly higher than the scale midpoint. In a similar vein, 
non-student participants in an experience sampling study by Smith and Hofmann (2016) 
reported levels of psychological power above the scale midpoint. 
In answering the question whether the direction of power changes matters, the point 
probably is how individuals belonging to different populations internally interpret the 
psychological power scale. Non-student participants presumably have a quite good and 
“accurate” understanding of the scale point’s meaning as they have already experienced a 
wide range of levels of (structural) power. In contrast, participants from student populations 
(as commonly studied in power research) might interpret the same scale quite differently. As 
detailed above, they might initially indicate rather high levels of psychological power as 
baseline. However, additionally giving them structural power - i.e., allowing them to see what 
power really is: making things happen they want to happen, influencing others, controlling 
resources - might invite them to reevaluate their interpretation of power. Hence, they would 
not have much room to indicate a substantially higher value on a psychological power scale, 
but this reevaluation could still have strong effects on dependent variables (cf. see above 
Sivanathan et al., 2008). In contrast, power loss in experimental settings would mean that 
student participants do or report what they probably experience as normal – carrying out 
instructions in role plays (as they do in relationships with their parents, professors or 
supervisors) or thinking about situations in which they did so in episodic priming tasks. Again, 
the value on the psychological power scale would probably not change dramatically and no 
strong effects on dependent measures would be expected. Taken together, power gain might 
produce stronger effects than power loss in student participants. However, this does not 
have to be the case for non-student participants. Due to the underrepresentation of non-
student samples in power research this remains an open question. 
Third question: The impact of individual differences in trait power 
Does everybody respond equally strongly to changes in structural power? Figure 4.4 
illustrates the negative answer to this question: the figure shows in a coordinate system with 
time on the x-axis and power on the y-axis the experiences of two individuals, individual D 
high in trait power and individual E low in trait power. Both individuals find themselves in a 
structurally high power and a structurally low power position. The dotted line depicts two 
differing trajectories in response to the two different levels of structural power. It might be that 
placing people high in trait power such as individual D in a position of high structural power 
does not affect their psychological power strongly (see parameter d1). Conversely, placing 
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someone low in trait power such as individual E in the same position of structural power 
increases his/her psychological power profoundly (see parameter e1). Vice versa, people 
high in trait power such as individual D might react more strongly to being in positions of low 
structural power (see parameter d2) as compared to people low in trait power such as 
individual E react to being in positions of low structural power (see parameter e2). This again 
might be a matter of personal default: the larger the difference between trait power and 
structural power, the stronger the effects on psychological power might be. 
 
Figure 4.4. Fluctuations in psychological power for individuals D and E
 
The current work 
All these (and more) questions can only be answered on the basis of within-person 
designs. In the current work, we attempted to empirically tackle the question whether the 
direction of change matters as it is the easiest to answer given that only two data points per 
participant are needed to operationalize power gain and power loss. In the study reported 
here we manipulated power within-person using a newly developed role-play task. 
Participants assumed first either a structurally high power (power loss condition) or low 
power position (power gain condition). Subsequently to the role-plays they indicated their 
levels of psychological power and as such our study extends the findings by Sivanathan and 
colleagues (2008). 
Aside from investigating the within-person relationship between structural power and 
(trait and situational) psychological power, we also explored whether previously studied 
dependent variables within power research are not only affected by between-person 
manipulations, but also susceptible to within-person manipulations. We chose two very 
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different outcomes, risk-taking and interpersonal accuracy. We did so because of the 
following two reasons: on the one hand previous research has suggested that moderators 
might qualify the effect of power on these two variables and we attempt to test one of them. 
On the other hand we wanted to cover the full range of possible outcomes from agentic (i.e., 
behaviors that focus on self-assertion and independence such as risk-taking) to communal 
(i.e., behaviors related to social attention and interpersonal responsiveness such as 
interpersonal accuracy), because of the still unsettled discussion whether a specific power 
manipulation such as episodic priming or role-play would have different effects or effects at 
all on the same (agentic or communal) outcome (Tost, 2015). Interpersonal accuracy has 
been studied previously using role-play manipulations (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; 
Gonzaga, Keltner, & Ward, 2008; Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009), whereas risk-taking 
has not. 
Power and Risk-Taking 
Risk-taking involves making a decision or taking action that could lead to negative 
consequences such as for instance physical harm, financial loss or disapproval by the social 
environment (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999) but might also present an opportunity for a 
rewarding outcome. According to two prominent power theories, the powerful should be 
prone to risk-taking. The approach/inhibition theory (AIT, Keltner et al., 2003) posits that 
having power activates the reward-sensitive behavioral approach system, which in turn leads 
to more risk-taking. The social distance theory (SDT, Magee & Smith, 2013) assumes that 
having power induces an abstract mental representation (i.e., higher level construal) that has 
been shown to increase risk-taking within the gain domain (Lermer, Streicher, Sachs, Raue, 
& Frey, 2015; Raue, Streicher, Lermer, & Frey, 2015). 
Numerous studies have examined the hypothesis of increased risk-taking propensity in 
the powerful with generally supportive results (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Carney, Cuddy, 
Yap, 2010; Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009; Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & 
Galinsky, 2012; Hiemer & Abele, 2012; Jordan, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2011; Maner, 
Gailliot, Butz, & Peruche, 2007; Ronay & Von Hippel, 2010; but see Ranehill, Dreber, 
Johannesson, Leiberg, Sul, & Weber, 2015; Comprehensive Results in Social Psychology 
special issue on power poses). These studies have in common that the (risky) decision only 
had consequences for the decision-maker him-/herself. However, this focus is at odds with 
the fact that the powerful in the real world usually take risks not only for themselves, but also 
for other people. For instance, decisions made by CEOs usually concern employees, 
shareholders and various stakeholders, decisions made by a head of state concern the own 
and/or other nations in the present or future and so on.  
We want to address this gap by introducing a possible moderator of the effects of 
power on (risky) decision-making: outcome responsibility, that is whether risky decisions 
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affect only the self or both the self and another person within the power relationship. Indeed, 
prior risk-taking research has shown that when people are responsible for other’s outcomes, 
they are less willing to take risks (Charness & Jackson, 2009; Bolton, Ockenfels, & Stauf, 
2015; Pahlke, Strasser, & Vieider, 2015, Study 1; Wang, Kuang, Tang, Gao, Chen, & Qin 
Chan, 2018). Based on these arguments, we tested the preregistered hypothesis that the 
factors Power and Outcome Responsibility interactively affect risk-taking, such that the 
positive effect of power on risk-taking should be smaller when the decision-maker had 
outcome responsibility as opposed to when he did not (see osf.io/yxf6e). 
Power and Interpersonal Accuracy 
Interpersonal accuracy is the degree to which an individual is able to correctly assess 
characteristics of an interaction partner such as affective states, thoughts, and nonverbal 
behavior. The approach/inhibition theory (AIT, Keltner et al., 2003) and the social distance 
theory (SDT, Magee & Smith, 2013) agree on a negative relationship between power and 
interpersonal accuracy as default, albeit explaining this outcome differently, either by 
increased automaticity of social cognition (AIT) or perceived social distance (SDT).  
So far, many studies have shown that having or lacking power affects interpersonal 
accuracy when assessing a target. However, it is not obvious how, as there is evidence in 
support of both the ideas that power improves interpersonal accuracy (e.g., Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002, Study 2; Kunstman & Maner, 2011, Study 4; Schmid Mast et al., Study 1) and 
power impairs it (e.g., Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Gonzaga et al., 2008; 
Snodgrass, 1985). Several explanations have been proposed to make sense of these 
contradictory (laboratory) findings, namely based on characteristics of the power 
operationalization (Hall, Schmid Mast, & Latu, 2015; Tost, 2015) or characteristics of the 
accuracy measure (Bombari, Schmid Mast, Brosch, & Sander, 2013; Hall et al., 2015). 
For instance, the meta-analysis by Hall and colleagues (2015) examined how various 
operationalizations of verticality (pre-existing vertical position, personality dominance, SES, 
experimental manipulation) are related to various ways to measure accuracy (inference vs. 
recall, stimulus material is either a standardized test vs. a real interaction partner). An 
important distinction is made between inferential accuracy which requires making inferences 
about other people’s states, traits, attitudes, or personal attributes as conveyed through their 
nonverbal cues or a combination of their nonverbal and verbal cues, and recall accuracy 
which involves noticing and recalling others’ (non-)verbal behavior (e.g., appearance, 
frequency of smiling or nodding). Importantly, inferential accuracy is dependent on the 
expressive clarity of the interaction partner (i.e., does the interaction partner actually show 
feelings that could be interpreted?), whereas recall accuracy is based on factual information 
that cannot be sent with varying degrees of clarity. 
Interestingly, the meta-analysis by Hall and colleagues (2015) showed that in studies in 
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which one person perceives another person, people in experimentally assigned low power 
positions were more accurate than people in experimentally assigned high power positions 
when they had to make accurate interpersonal inferences. In contrast, when the task was to 
recall things about targets, there was no difference between people in experimentally 
assigned high and low power positions. In our study, we included both inferential and recall 
accuracy. Despite the meta-analytic null finding for recall accuracy, we see value in including 
it in order to have at least one measure that is not sensitive to the possible confound of 
differing levels of expressive clarity. Given the possibility that the five studies on which the 
null finding is based had a between-person design6, we might still be able to find differences 
in a statistically more powerful within-person design.  
Taken together, it is for our purposes not urgently relevant whether power increases or 
decreases interpersonal accuracy, what matters is the fact that in past research power has 
been shown to reliably affect interpersonal accuracy. Accordingly, we explore whether 
interpersonal accuracy is affected by power in a within-person design, and consider it to be a 
result supporting our hypothesis if states of low and high power produce significant 
differences in accuracy.  
Method 
The present research was done in accordance with the checklist issued by the 
responsible ethics committee of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zurich, meaning that 
no formal approval was needed. This research respects the Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists and Code of Conduct by the American Psychological Association (APA) as 
well as the Ethics Guidelines for Psychologists by the Swiss Psychological Society.  
Power Analysis 
A power analysis for our main hypothesis test suggested that a sample size of n = 74 
affords 80% statistical power to detect an effect of at least d = .50, one-sided test, alpha error 
10%. Due to our experimental design (group testing), the number of participants had to be a 
multiple of 4, i.e., 76 participants. In order to be sure to have a sufficient number of usable 
cases, we intended to collect at least 80 participants. 
Sample 
We recruited 82 men in the age range 18 to 59 years (M = 27.12, SD = 9.19; 63 
students) from the pool of students and interested community members at the University of 
Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich to take part in a study on 
decision behavior. We decided in favor of an all-male sample because prior research 
suggested that men are in general less risk averse (Byrnes et al., 1999; Cross, Copping, & 
                                                
6 Only two of the five included studies are publicly available. These two (Hall, Carter, & Horgan, 2001; Hall, Murphy, & Carney, 
2006) used between-person designs. 
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Campbell, 2011) and we wanted to increase the probability to have a strong positive effect of 
power on risk-taking that we could reduce by our manipulation of outcome responsibility. 
Participants were paid either a fixed compensation of 15 Swiss francs (about 15 U.S. dollars) 
or received partial course credit. In addition, the compensation had a variable component 
that participants determined themselves via the decisions they made in the lotteries used to 
measure risk-taking (more information in the measures section). Participants could augment 
their compensation by between 0.15 to 20 Swiss Francs. The mean variable amount paid 
was 5.64 Swiss Francs. Due to technical problems with the administration of the risk-taking 
measure, 4 participants had to be excluded from all analyses, resulting in a final sample size 
of 78 men. 
Procedure 
Before coming to the laboratory, participants were asked to complete an online 
questionnaire that contained questions on demographics and potential moderator variables 
such as habitual decision-making style (Rational and Intuitive Decision Styles Scale, 
Hamilton, Shih, & Mohammed, 2016; Cognitive Reflective Test, Frederick, 2005), habitual 
risk-taking (DOSPERT, Blais & Weber, 2006; GESIS one item measure), promotion / 
prevention focus (items taken from Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002), trait self-control 
(items taken from de Boer, van Hooft, & Bakker, 2011), explicit power motive (items taken 
from Cassidy & Lynn, 1989), trait power (Anderson et al., 2012), and social value orientation 
(Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011). 
At least 24 hours later, participants were invited to a laboratory experiment in which we 
manipulated two factors: social power as within-factor and outcome responsibility, namely 
the beneficiary of the decision, as between-factor. The power manipulation encompassed 
two role-plays with two different interaction partners: each participant experienced once the 
high power and once the low power role. Accordingly, participants were invited in groups of 
four.  
Participants were welcomed and gave their written consent. Then, participants were 
randomly assigned to the two different roles that result from crossing power position and 
order: (1) high power first, low power second (power loss condition), and (2) low power first, 
high power second (power gain condition). An experimenter accompanied one dyad 
consisting of a high power and a low power individual to an adjacent room, the other dyad 
stayed with another experimenter in the first room. Both dyads were instructed to follow the 
same procedure.  
Participants received written instructions that explained the rules of the role-play and 
the task of solving tangram puzzles (see also below power manipulation section). The dyads 
worked on this task for 10 minutes sitting on a large table in front of one another with the 
parts of the puzzle between them. Then, participants in the high power role evaluated the 
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participants in the low power role. 
Subsequently, participants were reseated in front of computers facing each other and 
individually completed the risk taking measure. Depending on the outcome responsibility 
condition, participants made either decisions that affected their own variable compensation, 
or also the variable compensation of their interaction partner in the role-play analogously. 
Then, participants were asked to answer questions on their impressions of the joint work in 
the role-play and their interaction partner that were used to determine different kinds of 
interpersonal accuracy. 
Once both dyads had finished the first part, participants in the power-loss-condition 
changed the room to meet the yet unknown participant in the opposing role. Participants 
were informed that this second round of the experiment would be highly similar to the first 
round, but that they should not try to remember their decisions in the first round and to only 
base their behavior and answers on the experiences made in this new situation. Moreover, 
they were asked not to talk about their experiences from the first round. The course of action 
in the second round was identical to the first round. In both rounds, participants were filmed 
while completing the tangram-solving task used as power manipulation. These videotapes 
were later coded by several raters and mainly served as one possible operationalization of 
interpersonal accuracy. As outcome responsibility was manipulated as between-person 
factor, participants who decided only for themselves in the first round did so also in the 
second round and vice versa for those who decided for the dyad. In the end, participants 
received their fixed and variable compensation, were debriefed and thanked.  
Manipulations  
Power manipulation 
In both roles, participants read that they should imagine taking part in an internal 
assessment center organized to identify career development potential of employees. The 
goal of this ostensible assessment center task was the observation of behavior vital for 
cooperation. Within the role-play, the participant’s task was to solve tangram puzzles. The 
tangram is an ancient Chinese jigsaw puzzle consisting of seven tiles that can be combined 
to form different shapes. Each participant dyad received in addition to the written instructions 
concerning their roles an envelope with the seven tiles and one of two tangram sets, i.e., 
sheets that showed 10 shapes each (only silhouettes). In addition, the high power participant 
received the solutions of the respective tangram set, i.e., a view on the shapes that indicated 
the position of the seven tiles. There were two versions of tangram sets, so that one 
participant worked on different sets when in the high power or low power role. The two 
tangram sets did not differ in difficulty as indicated by comparable numbers of solved puzzles 
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in the high power role (set 1: M = 4.53, SD = 1.87; set 2: M = 4.71, SD = 1.98), t(76) = 0.43, 
p = .67. The order of tangram sets was counterbalanced across all experimental sessions.  
The high-power participant played the role of the decision maker. The decision maker 
was described as being in charge of the decisions how and in which order to solve the 
shapes from the tangram sets, how to structure the building process, and he also had to 
manage time as well as to evaluate the low-power participant at the end. Although the high-
power participant had the solution, he was not allowed to show it to the interaction partner 
but he was instructed to only provide hints if necessary.  
The low-power participant, the assistant, had to follow the instructions given by the 
high-power participant, and had to build the chosen shapes. Furthermore, he was informed 
that he could make suggestions but that the decision maker would make the final decision. 
Each role instruction contained also the basic information about the other role. Participants 
read that they would have ten minutes time for this task and that although they should try to 
solve as many shapes as possible, the focus should be on cooperation. 
Subsequently to the tangram solving, the high power participant evaluated the low 
power participant. On 6-point-scales, high power participants indicated their satisfaction with 
the performance and work motivation of low power participants, rated the overall impression 
of their interaction partners und made a recommendation whether their interaction partners 
should be invited to enter the next round of the imagined assessment center (higher values 
meant greater satisfaction). Cronbach’s alpha for these four evaluative items was .83. It 
made no difference for the evaluation whether participants were first in the high power role 
(M = 4.84, SD = 0.77) or second in the high power role (M = 4.88, SD = 0.88), t(76) = 0.21,  
p = .83, d = 0.05. 
Manipulation of outcome responsibility 
Participants made the choices between lotteries either for themselves only or for 
themselves and their interaction partner. In case participants made a decision involving 
another person, they were informed that their decision was anonymous, i.e., no participant 
would know how his variable compensation was composed. 
Measures 
Risk taking 
We operationalized risk (in line with prior research within the gain domain, e.g., Adam, 
Kroll, & Teubner, 2014; Bolton et al., 2015; Eijkelenboom & Vostroknutov, 2016) adapting a 
method presented by Holt and Laury (2002). Participants were confronted twice in the 
experiment with two blocks of nine binary choices between two lotteries with different 
variabilities in outcomes. While the potential payoffs stay the same throughout one block of 
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choices, the probability of receiving the higher payoff increases, rendering the lottery with 
higher variability progressively more attractive.  
For instance, in one block the safe lottery consisted of a decision between 3.80 CHF 
and 3.05 CHF in varying probabilities versus a risky lottery with decisions between 9.95 CHF 
and 0.20 CHF in corresponding probabilities. In order to limit memory effects, we chose the 
probabilities not in increments of 10 (in contrast to prior research). Namely, we chose 9% vs. 
91%, 18% vs. 82%, 36% vs. 64%, 45% vs. 55%, 54%vs. 46%, 63% vs. 37%, 72% vs. 28%, 
81% vs. 19%, and 90% vs. 10%. The amounts in the other three safe lotteries were 3.90 
CHF vs. 3.10 CHF, 3.75 CHF vs. 3.00 CHF and 3.95 CHF vs. 3.15 CHF. The amounts in the 
other three risky lotteries were 10.05 CHF vs. 0.25 CHF, 9.90 CHF vs. 0.15 CHF and 10.10 
CHF vs. 0.30 CHF. The four lottery blocks were presented in four different orders so that 
each block was once the first, once the second, once the third and once the fourth. We 
presented the nine choices per block in random order. Participants were informed that one of 
their choices in the four blocks would randomly be determined to be played and that they 
would receive the additional amount as variable part of their compensation. Following Holt 
and Laury (2002), we used the number of choices of the less variable lottery as a measure of 
risk aversion. 
From the four blocks, only two were used in the analyses presented here, namely the 
ones in which participants made choices either for themselves only or for themselves and 
their interaction partner. The remaining two blocks that were not used here always referred to 
choices that would affect participants themselves and an unknown future participant. 
Interpersonal accuracy 
To operationalize interpersonal accuracy we used different approaches, as there is not 
the one way to do so. These approaches require different ratings from different sources: In a 
given role-play interaction, individual A and individual B work together. Both of them indicate 
subsequently to the interaction their own thoughts (5 items) and feelings (19 items) as well 
as what they think that their interaction partner thought and felt in the interaction. Example 
items for measuring thoughts were “[I am/ My interaction partner] is contented with our way 
to solve the task” and “[I /My interaction partner] would want to work again together with [my 
interaction partner/me]”. With regard to feelings, participants indicated how e.g., “relaxed”, 
“attentive”, and “confident” they and their interaction partner felt. The items concerning 
thoughts and feelings were answered on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely). 
Participants also rated the extent to which their interaction partner showed different 
behaviors such as speaking, gazing, smiling, nodding self-touching and gesturing on a scale 
ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (very frequently). Additionally, these behavioral indicators were 
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rated by external raters who were as blind as possible to the hypotheses7 (timed: speaking 
time and gazing; frequencies: smiling, nodding, gesturing and self-touching). 
Self-rating (i.e., how does my interaction partner rate himself), other-by-self-rating (i.e., 
how do I rate my interaction partner) and external rating (i.e., how does a coder rate my 
interaction partner) allow for determining two indicators of interpersonal accuracy. First, the 
agreement between other-by-self-rating and self-rating with regard to thoughts and feelings 
describes inferential accuracy (cf. Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990). Second, the 
agreement between the other-by-self-rating of behavior and the corresponding external 
rating describes recall accuracy. 
Inferential accuracy. Inferential accuracy can be determined in two ways. On the one 
hand for a given participant the other-by-self-rating and the self-rating of the interaction 
partner can be correlated. This correlation is positive when the interaction partner’s self-
rating and the rating by the participant (other-by-self-rating) match. The higher the 
correlation, the higher is the inferential accuracy. On the other hand, the absolute differences 
between these two ratings can be averaged across the thoughts-items and the feelings-
items. The smaller the difference score, the higher is the inferential accuracy. These two 
accuracy scores should be negatively correlated across participants. 
Recall accuracy. Recall accuracy is determined following the procedure described in 
Hall, Murphy, and Schmid Mast (2006, 2007). Because the six behaviors are not all coded on 
the same metric (i.e., frequency vs. timing), each coded behavior is first z-scored across 
participants so that for each behavior each participant has a score that indicates how much 
of the behavior he engaged in relative to others in the experiment. Then, the other-by-self-
rating regarding the six behaviors is correlated with his z-scores for the same behaviors 
(external rating), creating an individual profile correlation that represents an individual 
accuracy score. This correlation is positive when the participant ranked the partner’s relative 
amounts of each behavior in a way matching the partner’s actual behavior. The higher the 
correlation, the higher is the recall accuracy. 
Behavioral coding 
Both participants were coded at a time (frame rate per second: 0.7) and coders were 
instructed not to rewind the tape for more than 10 seconds. A subset of eight recorded 
interactions (this corresponds to 10 %) was chosen to establish interrater reliability. Three 
external, female coders, coders 1, 2 and 3, coded the six behaviors in these eight 
videotapes. Their ICCs were: .89 for speaking, .90 for eye contact, .95 for gestures, .89 for 
self-manipulation, .92 for smile and .73 for nodding. Coders 1 and 2 coded each half of the 
remaining videotapes.  
                                                
7 They were not familiar with the hypotheses regarding risk-taking and interpersonal accuracy, but they were probably able to 
figure out who was supposed to be the decision maker and who the assistant. 
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Manipulation checks 
In order to assess the effects of our power manipulation, participants were asked how 
they felt during the interactions after each role-play. On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(completely) participants indicated how much they agreed with several self-descriptive 
adjectives such as, “self-confident”, “powerful”, “dominant”, and “competent” 8. These four 
items were averaged to build an indicator of felt power. For participants in the power-loss-
condition, Cronbach’s alpha was α = .69. For participants in the power-gain-condition, 
Cronbach’s alpha was α = .78. 
In order to determine whether our outcome responsibility manipulation was successful, 
we asked participants to indicate how responsible they felt on a scale ranging from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (completely).  
Results 
Prior to data collection, we preregistered an analysis plan on the Open Science 
Framework (osf.io/yxf6e), specifying decision rules, and the planned confirmatory analyses. 
All analyses for manipulation checks and main hypotheses tests were done using the same 
mixed ANOVA with Power (decision maker, assistant) as within-subjects factor and Order 
(high power first/power-loss-condition, low power first/power-gain-condition) and Outcome 
Responsibility (yes, no) as between-subjects factors. We provide correlations for selected 
measured traits and measured experimental variables in Table 4.1 in the Appendix. It 
appears that trait power and situational power are moderately positively correlated; the same 
is true for the two risk-taking questionnaire measures. The numbers of safe choices 
constituting the experimental risk-taking measure in the first and second round were strongly 
correlated. In contrast, the variants of interpersonal accuracy measures are all non-
significantly correlated across the two rounds (r = -.04 to r = .12). As expected, the difference 
scores and the profile correlation scores for inferential accuracy are significantly negatively 
correlated. Table 4.2 in the Appendix shows means and standard deviations of outcome 
variables by power-gain- and power-loss-condition. 
Preregistered Manipulation Checks 
Within factor power 
At the very end of the experiment, participants had to indicate which roles they had 
played in the first and in the second role-play. All 78 participants remembered correctly the 
                                                
8 Participants also indicated how “unassertive” and “subordinate” they felt. Contrary to our scale construction proposal in the 
preanalysis plan these two items were excluded because they decreased the reliability of the self-constructed power 
manipulation check scale. 
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order in which they represented the decision maker and the assistant (N power loss + responsibility = 
20, N power loss + no responsibility = 17, N power gain + responsibility = 20, N power gain + no responsibility = 219).  
The mixed ANOVA described above revealed a significant interaction between Power 
and Order, F(1,74) = 25.17, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.25. In the power-loss-condition, participants did 
not differ in their self-rated power in the high power role and the low power role, t(36) = 0.13, 
p = .895, d = 0.02. However, in the power-gain-condition, participants reported feeling 
significantly more powerful in the high power role than in the low power role, t(40) = 7.80,  
p < .001, d = 1.67.  
Between factor responsibility 
We subjected the manipulation check item to the mixed ANOVA described above. We 
did not find the expected main effect of outcome responsibility, F(1,74) = 0.11, p = .74,  
ηp2 =0.01. However, we found a significant main effect of power, F(1,74) = 27.11, p < .001, 
ηp2 = 0.27. Participants in the high power role felt more responsible (M = 5.33, SD = 1.06) 
than when they were in the low power role (M = 4.13, SD = 1.58), t(77) = 5.33, p < .001,  
d = 0.60. Given this unsuccessful manipulation check and anecdotal evidence reported by 
the experimenters that participants did not seem to have noticed this manipulation, we 
caution against attaching great importance to responsibility effects in this study. 
Preregistered Main Analysis: Risk-Taking 
We tested this hypothesis with the mixed ANOVA described above. Our main 
dependent variable was the number of safe choices. If our hypothesis was true, we should 
expect to find a significant interaction (p < .10, one-sided test) between Power and Outcome 
Responsibility with a probability of 80% (see power analysis above), indicating that the 
positive effect of Power on risk-taking is smaller in the condition with Outcome Responsibility 
as opposed to the condition without Outcome Responsibility. Additionally, it would be 
plausible to expect significant main effects of Power and/or Outcome Responsibility, but no 
other effects and interactions should be significant. 
Unexpectedly, we only found a significant interaction effect of Order and Outcome 
Responsibility, F(1,74) = 3.78, p = .06, ηp2 = 0.05 (note that in line with our power analysis we 
set the significance level to 10%). All other main effects and interactions were not significant. 
In order to better understand the aforementioned significant interaction of Order and 
Outcome Responsibility, we further analyzed the power-gain-condition and the power-loss-
condition separately. In the power-gain-condition there was a significant simple main effect of 
Outcome Responsibility, F(1,39) = 4.99, p = .03, ηp2 = 0.11, such that participants who had 
outcome responsibility (HP: M = 5.85, SD = 2.41; LP: M = 5.70, SD = 2.39) made more safe 
                                                
9 Please note that the unequal cell sizes are the result of unforeseeable no-shows of participants. In this case one randomly 
determined role was played by an uninitiated confederate. However, as eight participants in total did not show up and the same 
confederate accordingly participated eight times, his data were excluded. 
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choices than participants without outcome responsibility (HP: M = 4.29, SD = 2.19; LP:  
M = 4.14, SD = 2.50). Neither the simple main effect of Power nor the interaction of Power 
and Outcome Responsibility were significant.  
In the power-loss-condition we found a simple main effect of Power, F(1,35) = 3.29,  
p = .08, ηp2 = .09, but no significant effect of Outcome Responsibility. The main effect of 
Power was qualified by an interaction of Power and Responsibility, F(1,35) = 4.27, p = .05, 
ηp2 = .11, indicating that participants in the low power position without responsibility  
(M = 6.24, SD = 2.17) made more safe choices than the others (LPResponsibility: M = 5.40, SD = 
2.35; HPResponsibility: M = 5.45, SD = 2.54; HPNoResponsibility: M = 5.47, SD = 2.27). Taken 
together, these results show no support for our preregistered hypothesis expecting a reduced 
positive effect of power on risk-taking when the decision-maker had outcome reponsibility as 
opposed to when he does not. 
Exploratory Analyses: Risk-Taking 
The following observations might help to explain why the experimental data was not in 
line with our main hypothesis. In order for our main hypothesis (reduced risk taking in 
temporary powerful people with outcome responsibility) to receive support, the “default 
finding” of increased risk-taking propensity in response to having power should be true. 
Otherwise, it does not make sense to try to reduce the powerful’s risk-taking. When 
comparing participants in low power and high power positions in their first round in the no-
responsibility condition (that is best comparable to the previous studies examining how 
power affects risk-taking), we were not able to replicate the “default” finding”: Participants in 
low power positions (M = 4.14, SD = 2.50) made less safe choices (i.e., took more risks) than 
participants in high power positions (M = 5.47, SD = 2.27), t(36) = 1.70, p = .10, d = 0.55.  
Additionally, in this subsample and more importantly also in the whole sample, the 
problem is that participants made – irrespective of conditions and manipulations – so many 
safe choices that our responsibility manipulation did not have room to reduce risk-taking,  
Mall  conditions = 5.28, SD = 2.41 compared to the theoretical mean of 4.50, t(155) = 4.05,  
p < .001 (remember: the answer scale ranges from 0 to 9). This general risk aversion might 
be due to our compensation strategy: Our participants received a fixed compensation of 
about 15 U.S. dollars for investing 1.25 to 1.5 hours of their time (questionnaire and 
laboratory experiment). Swiss student participants generally expect to receive this amount for 
a one-hour-lasting laboratory experiment, so they might have seen sticking to the safe 
choices as their only possibility to increase their compensation to come closer to their 
expected compensation. 
Another reason why we failed to find support for our main hypotheses might be that 
participants in the power-loss-condition (M = 2.76, SD = 0.80) indicated significantly lower 
scores in one of two administered trait risk-taking measures compared to participants in the 
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power-gain-condition (M = 3.27, SD = 0.87), t(76) = 2.71, p = .008, d = .62, although 
participants were randomly assigned to the order conditions. These personality differences 
are mirrored in the deviations from the theoretical mean of the number of safe choices,  
M = 4.50. In the power-gain-condition, the participants’ mean number of safe choices was 
not significantly different from the theoretical mean in both low power, t(40) = 1.02, p = 0.32, 
and high power positions, t(40) = 1.46, p = 0.15. In contrast, in the power-loss-condition, the 
participant’s mean number of safe choices was significantly higher than the theoretical mean 
in both low power, t(36) = 3.43, p = .002, and high power positions, t(36) = 2.44, p = .02.
Given that our power manipulation was only partially successful, we also performed 
internal analysis (Wilson, Aronson & Carlsmith, 2010) and tested our main hypothesis using 
trait power and mean situational power as independent variable in correlational analyses. 
First, we regressed trait power (standardized), the experimentally assigned outcome 
responsibility (0 = no responsibility, 1 = responsibility) and their interaction term on the mean 
number of safe choices in the two power roles. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Effects of trait power and outcome responsibility on risk-taking 
 
A significant effect was found for outcome responsibility, b = 8.23, SE = 3.12,  
t(73) = 2.64, p = .01, 95% CI [2.01, 14.44], meaning that when participants had responsibility 
they made more safe choices than when they had no outcome responsibility. In addition, a 
significant interaction effect was found, b = -7.70, SE = 3.14, t(73) = -2.45, p = .02,  
95%CI [-13.96, -1.44], indicating that trait power and outcome responsibility interactively 
affected risk-taking (see Figure 4.5). Simple slope analyses showed that in the no-
responsibility-condition, trait power did not influence the number of safe choices participants 
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made, b = 2.49, SE = 2.07, t(35) = 1.20, p = .24, 95% CI [-1.72, 6.70]. In contrast, in the 
responsibility-condition, we found a negative relationship between trait power and the 
number of safe choices, b = -.5.21, SE = 2.36, t(38) = -2.21, p = .03, 95% CI [-9.98, -0.43]. 
This pattern of results does again not corroborate our hypothesis. It rather suggests that our 
outcome responsibility manipulation was not able to increase participant’s sense of 
responsibility beyond the amount that is per definition tied to power, whereas the decisions of 
low power individuals were shaped by their experience of being responsible for other’s 
outcomes or not. 
Second, we regressed the mean situational power (standardized), the experimentally 
assigned outcome responsibility (0 = no responsibility, 1 = responsibility) and their interaction 
on the mean number of safe choices in the two power roles. No significant effects were 
found. 
Exploratory Analyses: Interpersonal Accuracy 
We tested the effects of the experimental manipulations on the two interpersonal 
accuracy measures with the mixed ANOVA described above. Table 4.3 in the Appendix 
shows main and interaction effects for both approaches, the absolute difference scores and 
the profile correlation scores. We had expected to find significant main effects of power, 
however we failed to do so with one exception: On the recall accuracy measure, participants 
in low power positions outperformed participants in high power positions. Unexpectedly, in all 
five analyses (i.e., difference scores and profile correlations with regard to thoughts and 
feelings plus profile correlation for the recall of nonverbal behaviors) the interaction of Power 
and Order was significant at least at p < .10 indicating on a descriptive level a general trend 
for participants to be more accurate (or at least never less accurate) in judging thoughts and 
feelings of their second interaction partner. 
The test of whether the experimental groups’ performance exceeds chance was a 
single-sample-t-test of the mean profile correlation against zero. Participants in the low 
power role were better than chance with regard to inferential accuracy and recall accuracy 
(thoughts: t(62) = 4.47, p < .001; feelings: t(73) = 17.91, p < .001; behavior: t(76) = 3.50,  
p < .001), whereas participants in the high power role were better than chance only for the 
inferential accuracy measures (thoughts: t(65) = 1.88, p = .03; feelings: t(73) = 16.84,  
p < .001; behavior: t(74) = 0.86, p = .20). Taken together, these findings indicate that 
individuals with low power tend to be at least a bit more accurate in rating their counterparts. 
Discussion 
Previous power research has almost exclusively relied on between-person designs in 
which participants assumed either a high power or a low power role. However, this is at odds 
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with the everyday reality of people experiencing context changes and it leaves theoretical 
questions about the dynamics of power unanswered.  
The goal of this paper was to expand the foundations for studying power within person. 
We proposed to split psychological power (i.e., the subjective assessment of one’s own 
ability to influence others in a given social situation) into its stable (trait power) and dynamic 
components (situational power resulting from structural power, i.e., objectively demonstrable 
control of resources valued by others, and other situational influences). We discussed the 
role of time, direction of change (i.e., power gain vs. loss) and individual differences in the 
interplay between trait power, structural power and psychological power. Based on these 
theoretical considerations we presented initial empirical evidence showing that gain in power 
and loss of power differ in their impact on affected (student) individuals.  
In our study, participants assumed first either a structurally high power (power-loss-
condition) or low power position (power-gain-condition) in a newly developed role-play task 
and changed in the second round their roles and interaction partners. Subsequently to each 
role-play participants completed measures of risk-taking and interpersonal accuracy. Within 
the risk-taking measure we manipulated outcome responsibility between participants, that is, 
whether the risky decision affected only the decision maker or both the decision maker and 
the interaction partner in the role-play.  
Unexpected Results of Preregistered Analyses 
Contrary to our preregistered expectations, the order in which participants played the 
two power roles mattered. In the power-loss-condition, participants did not differ in their self-
rated power in the high and low power roles. However, in the power-gain-condition, 
participants reported feeling significantly more powerful in the high power role than in the low 
power role. In a similar vein, risk-taking behavior differed in the two order conditions. In the 
power-gain-condition, participants who had outcome responsibility made more safe choices 
than participants without outcome responsibility. In the power-loss-condition, participants in 
the low power position without responsibility made more safe choices than the others. Taken 
together, the hypothesis of reduced risk-taking for participants with outcome responsibility 
was not supported. 
Our hypothesis was based on the precondition suggested by prior research that power 
increases risk-taking. If the powerful, who per definition control the outcomes of others, were 
not prone to increased risk-taking to begin with, it would not make much sense to try to 
reduce the powerful’s risk-taking by making their responsibility vis-à-vis their subordinates 
salient, as we attempted to do in this study. We provide two possible explanations why we 
were not able to replicate previous findings.  
First, a notable difference to prior studies is that these studies have relied on non-
interactive power manipulations such as episodic and semantic priming, not enacted role 
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assignment, and power posing (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Carney et al., 2010; Fast et al., 
2009; Fast et al., 2012; Hiemer & Abele, 2012; Jordan et al., 2011; Maner et al., 2007; Ronay 
& Von Hippel, 2010) in contrast to the current study that manipulated power via a role play. 
Different manipulations could trigger different mechanisms that could differentially affect 
outcomes (Tost, 2015). Our choice of manipulation could also explain why our power 
manipulation was only successful in the power-gain-condition. Maybe it is for participants in 
the case of other manipulations more obvious whether they have high or low power without 
needing to also experience the opposite. 
Second, another noteworthy difference between our study and prior studies on power 
and risk-taking is that we increased the stakes and created more uncertainty. For instance, in 
the study by Carney et al. (2010), participants had a 50:50 chance of winning four instead of 
two dollars, in the first experiment by Fast and colleagues (2009) participants could win five 
dollar if they correctly predicted the outcome of a single roll of a six-sided dice. In our study, 
participants only knew that the maximum variable amount they could get was about the 
equivalent of 20 dollars and that this variable amount paid was the result of playing one 
randomly selected lottery among all their decisions on which lottery they wanted to 
participate in.  
Difficulties in Manipulating Outcome Responsibility 
In instructing participants that their decisions would determine their own and their 
interaction partner’s variable compensation, we used an operationalization of outcome 
responsibility that is established within prior risk-taking research (Charness & Jackson, 2009; 
Bolton et al., 2015; Pahlke et al., 2015, Study 1; Wang et al., 2018). Thus, we would have 
expected that this manipulation affected the responsibility manipulation check. However, this 
was not the case, and instead the power manipulation impacted the responsibility 
manipulation check. This might be due to one of the following reasons: One the one hand, 
participants in our experiment might not have noticed this rather subtle manipulation (slightly 
different wording of the instruction). On the other hand, the outcome responsibility 
manipulation might have added no incremental sense of responsibility. The outcome 
responsibility manipulation took place subsequently to the power manipulation. The concept 
of power is already closely related to the concept of responsibility, as the powerless depend 
on the powerholders for important resources and powerholders are in the unique position to 
take care for others  (Tost, 2015). In our study, the power-as-responsibility-interpretation 
(Sassenberg, Ellemers, Scheepers, & Scholl, 2014) might have been especially salient 
because we manipulated power by means of a role-play task and real participants were in 
the presence of each other for the whole experiment. This idea is also compatible with (1) the 
results of our internal analysis showing that the responsibility manipulation only made a 
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difference for participants low in trait power and (2) the finding that the outcome manipulation 
check varied as a function of the power manipulation and not the responsibility manipulation. 
Future research should try to disentangle power and responsibility more thoroughly. 
For instance, instead of using one power manipulation and embedding the responsibility 
manipulation in the outcome measure as we did in this study, a better approach might be to 
use two power manipulations that differ in their ability to make responsibility salient (e.g., not 
enacted role assignment and role-play with real interaction partners) and use the identical 
outcome measure in both power conditions. 
On a more abstract level, being aware of one’s responsibility does not mean that one 
also acts upon it. Results of a study in which both self-/other-focus and power were 
manipulated suggest that even though power holders became more aware of their 
responsibility than those low in power after adopting an other-focus, this did not seem to 
change the outcomes, namely the perceived relationship to their counterpart in terms of 
objectification and interpersonal closeness (Scholl, Sassenberg, Scheepers, Ellemers, & de 
Wit, 2017, Study 2). 
Exploration of Power’s Effects on Interpersonal Accuracy 
In our study we examined inferential accuracy with regard to thoughts and feelings of a 
real interaction partner as well as recall accuracy with regard to recalling the interaction 
partner’s (non-)verbal behavior. We did not find systematic differences in inferential accuracy 
between participants as a function of their hierarchical position. However, albeit failing to 
reach conventional levels of significance, on the descriptive level there was a tendency for 
participants to be more accurate in assessing their second interaction partner’s thoughts and 
feelings. Practice effects are a known disadvantage of within-person designs. 
Interestingly, we did not find practice effects for recall accuracy, but effects that are in 
line with the theoretical prediction of increased interpersonal accuracy in the powerless 
(Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Smith, 2013). Given that recall accuracy is not subject to the 
confounding effect of differences in expressive clarity (Hall et al., 2015) and also given that 
the study setting (with participants in powerless positions focusing on the puzzle and 
participants in powerful positions free to focus their attentional resources on their interaction 
partner) increases the likelihood of the opposite effect, we see our finding as evidence for the 
claim by the approach/inhibition theory and the social distance theory. 
Suggestions for Future Within-Person Power Research 
In the empirical part of this article we focused on the question whether power gain and 
power loss would produce different effects. We chose this question among the questions 
presented in the theoretical background as it can be addressed with relatively simple 
research designs. Participants in our study played the same tangram-building task twice, 
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once as decision maker directing another participant (i.e., high power role), and once as 
assistant receiving instructions from the decision maker (i.e., low power role), whereby the 
order of roles was counterbalanced across participants. This newly created power 
manipulation contains critical determinants of prior role-play manipulations such as the 
powerful’s mandate to direct the powerless (cf. legitimate power, French & Raven, 1959) and 
the powerful’s possibility to evaluate the powerless (cf. reward and coercive power, French & 
Raven, 1959). In addition, we equipped the powerful with superior knowledge (cf. expert 
power, French & Raven, 1959) and designed our procedure in a way that participants in low 
power positions played their roles not in a familiar environment as they were the ones who 
had to change rooms (cf. stage setting, Raven, 1992). Nevertheless, our study setting was 
not a strong situation (Ashforth, Kreiner, & Fugate, 2000; for an example in this context see 
Chapter 3) in the sense that the situation allowed participants to behave in line with their 
personality dominance or individual beliefs on leadership. As we studied dyads of real 
participants and did not rely on confederates this could have distorted our manipulation. 
However, previous research has shown that role-play power manipulations work even when 
using rather weak situations (e.g., Schmid Mast et al., 2009, Study 1). 
In this regard, the approach to manipulate power by means of economic games such 
as ultimatum or dictator game chosen by Sivanathan and colleagues (2008) is advantageous 
because personality differences have less influence in this non-interactive setting as 
compared to a conversation situation like in our study. Moreover, economic games allow for 
operationalizing power as continuum – in contrast to the prevailing dichotomous treatment of 
the power construct (Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke & De Dreu, 2008; Rus, van 
Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2010). However, in economic games the manipulation and the 
outcome are by nature intrinsically tied to one another. Accordingly, this approach is not very 
flexible if one is interested in outcomes other than prosociality vs. selfishness. 
The most instructive (but also most costly and quite complex) laboratory power 
manipulation would be one that follows the principles of a round robin design (Warner, 
Kenny, & Stoto, 1979). In a round robin design, all possible pairs of participants from a given 
set of participants interact. For instance, one could schedule five participants, A, B, C, D, and 
E on the same experimental session and then there would be four rounds, in which 
participant A would interact with participants B, C, D, and E (participant B with A, C, D, and E 
and so on) and could play the high power role twice and the low power role twice. For each 
participant paired with every other participant, an observation could be made of the outcome 
variable of interest. This design would allow for (1) the observation of individual differences 
among participants (such as e.g., trait power), (2) a more reliable measurement of effects of 
power gain and loss as – depending on the number of interactions – more than one gain and 
loss episode can be investigated and (3) relatedly due to multiple interactions in the same 
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power position effects of specific interaction partners are controlled for (e.g., participant A 
was in the low power position in the interactions with B, C, and D; C and D behaved in line 
with their high power role, but participant B was very shy and overstrained by his high power 
role therefore A was forced to leave his assigned low power position). 
However, questions of within-person power dynamics could also be investigated in the 
field using intensive longitudinal methods (also known as e.g., everyday experience 
methods, experience sampling, momentary ecological assessment). A key characteristic of 
these methods is to sample a person’s thoughts, feelings and behaviors repeatedly across a 
relatively brief period of time (Fisher & To, 2012). This approach could be especially well 
suited to answer questions on the role of time in power dynamics (see first meta question in 
theoretical background). For instance, let’s assume that one wants to find out how long it 
takes for individuals to disengage from a specific level of power and drop back to their 
habitual level of psychological power. One could design an experience sampling study that 
makes use of two sampling strategies, event-contingent and signal-contingent recording 
(Reis, Gable, & Maniaci, 2014). Event-contingent recording means that a participant has to 
complete a questionnaire whenever (s)he experiences an event that matches predefined 
criteria; in the current example this could be an interaction with a superior (i.e., the actor is in 
a position of low structural power) or a subordinate (i.e., the actor is in a position of high 
structural power) at work. Signal-contingent recording entails that participants describe their 
activity at the moment when the signal is delivered; in the current example one could send 
participants signals in predefined (or adaptive?) distances to the reported event and ask 
them extremely briefly how they feel in this moment on the three most basic emotional 
dimensions pleasure, arousal and dominance (e.g., by using the self-assessment manikin, 
SAM, Bradley & Lang, 1994). In this way one could keep track of psychological power’s 
trajectory in response to an instance of high or low structural power. 
To conclude, studying power within-person is an exciting new direction for future power 
research as there are still many theoretical questions open and established practices for 
manipulating power within-person are lacking. We hope to have made a valuable contribution 
to build a basis for further exploration of this issue. 
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CHAPTER 5: Contextual Variations in Social Power 
 
 
Abstract 
Experimental research conducted with student participants has documented that feeling 
powerful or powerless affects outcomes with high practical relevance for organizations. 
However, it is unclear how results from these studies can be generalized to organizational 
settings in which individuals have various roles that imply more or less objective power. To 
address this gap we present a theoretical framework to aid in the understanding of how 
objective power in organizations (i.e., structural power, situational power) affects 
psychological power (i.e., sense of power, personal power, sense of responsibility) with its 
various downstream consequences on outcomes. In contrast to previous research, we 
investigate power from a within-person perspective: Apart from being tied to stable 
hierarchical position in the organizational structure (between-person perspective), power also 
fluctuates dynamically within-person in reaction to an individual’s interactions with people in 
different hierarchical positions. Results of a preregistered experiment (n = 190 participants) 
and a preregistered experience sampling study (n = 129 participants) conducted with non-
student samples support the key predictions of our theoretical framework: Situational power 
is positively related to sense of power, which in turn is positively related to personal power 
and sense of responsibility. Effects of this objective-subjective power link are tested on the 
example of self-control. The dimensional investigation of self-control revealed that start, stop, 
and interpersonal self-control are affected differently by changes in power. 
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Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Power is a key aspect of social relationships. Psychological research has documented 
that having or lacking power impacts such diverse outcomes as self-control, goal pursuit, and 
interpersonal sensitivity (for reviews see Galinsky, Chou, Halevy, & Van Kleef, 2012; 
Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015; Guinote, 2017). Although the outcomes studied by power 
researchers are highly practically relevant for organizations, there is a lack of theory linking 
the experimental work to organizational reality (Schaerer, Lee, Galinsky, & Thau, 2018).  
The preferred approach in social psychology has been to compare student participants 
in high-power, low-power, and sometimes control conditions in one-shot experimental 
designs. In doing so, power manipulations have mostly targeted psychological power, a 
psychological state characterized by the activation of a power-specific set of cognitive and 
behavioral tendencies (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). It is unclear how results from 
these studies can be generalized to organizational settings in which individuals have various 
roles that imply more or less structural power, i.e., the objectively demonstrable control of 
valued resources tied to a stable hierarchical position. The main aim of the present paper is 
to fill this gap. We present a theoretical framework to aid in the understanding of how 
structural power in organizations impacts psychological power with its various downstream 
consequences. The second aim of the paper is to provide initial empirical evidence for key 
assumptions of the theoretical framework. 
In the attempt to transfer social psychology’s knowledge on power to organizational 
settings, two main aspects must be considered. First, the contexts of taking part in an 
(online) experiment or wielding power in real (organizational) life differ considerably 
(Schaerer et al., 2018). For instance, organizational power usually implies being held 
accountable, making decisions that are meaningful for subordinates (e.g., wages, 
promotions, holidays), and having to face the affected people again, whereas experimental 
power in its default version has no real consequences. Second, in contrast to experimental 
settings in which an individual experiences only one kind of hierarchical position (i.e., high 
power or low power), people in the real world change their hierarchical position during the 
course of a working day and/or their professional career. Taking both these aspects into 
consideration, we investigated the effects of power fluctuating within person in reaction to the 
individual’s interactions with people in different hierarchical positions within their natural 
context - a phenomenon we will refer to in the following as contextual variations in power. 
In the first part, we develop propositions about contextual variations in structural 
power, psychological power, and sense of responsibility in organizational settings. A core 
characteristic of contextual variations in social power is that they occur within-person, which 
is at odds with experimental research practice. We therefore devote a section to discussing 
the particularities of studying power within-person. To illustrate the relevance of contextual 
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variations in power, we discuss their effects on self-control as an exemple. Self-control is an 
important component of organizational life, as employees are constantly faced with the need 
to work in the service of long-term goals and to overcome conflicting desires in order to 
complete their tasks successfully (Lian, Yam, Ferris, & Brown, 2017). All propositions are 
presented in the schematic overview in Figure 5.1. In the second part, we test some of our 
propositions empirically. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Theoretical model linking structural power to psychological power and self-control as 
exemplary outcome 
 
Dimensions of Power 
Power can be defined as the ability to influence others’ behavior due to asymmetrical 
control over valued resources (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; 
Lammers, Stoker, Rink, & Galinsky, 2016; Sturm & Antonakis, 2015; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). 
However, this concept is too broad to be useful in bridging between experimental social 
psychology and organizational reality. Thus, we begin by clarifying our usage of various more 
specific concepts that can be subsumed under the broad concept of power (for an overview, 
see Table 5.1). 
We use two related concepts to refer to the objective state of having more or less 
power. Power can manifest in structural power, the objectively demonstrable control of 
valued resources (Tost, 2015). This includes managerial authority or being in charge of 
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decisions about wages, bonuses, and promotions. Structural power translates into a stable 
hierarchical position in the organization chart. While structural power is (relatively) stable, 
situational power is potentially highly variable. When two or more individuals interact with 
each other, their situational power is determined by their relative structural power. Thus, 
when individuals’ interaction partners come from different levels in the organizational 
hierarchy, their situational power changes. 
 
Table 5.1 
Relevant concepts, definitions and examples 
 
 Concept Definition Examples 
Objective 
Power 
Structural 
power 
 
Objectively demonstrable control 
of valued resources (Tost, 2015), 
tied to a stable hierarchical 
position in the organizational 
structure  
 
Managerial authority, being in 
charge of decisions about wages, 
bonuses, and promotions, span of 
control 
 
Situational 
Power 
 
Superiority of one’s own or the 
other’s stable hierarchical position 
within a specific social interaction 
of two or more individuals. 
A works in a team with B and C that 
is supervised by D. When A 
interacts with D, A is in the 
subordinate role and D in the 
superior role. When A interacts with 
B, both are in a peer role, i.e., on 
the same hierarchical level. 
 
Subjective 
Power 
Sense of 
power 
Conscious subjective judgment 
about one’s own ability to 
influence others in a given social 
situation (Anderson, John, & 
Keltner, 2012)  
 
• I can reward and/or punish the 
other to a greater extent than 
the other way around. 
• “I can get him/her/them to do 
what I want“ (Anderson et al., 
2012) 
 
Personal 
power 
Conscious subjective judgment 
about one’s own competence, 
agency, autonomy, and 
independence (Overbeck & Park, 
2001; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006; 
Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2009) 
• I can impact on things in my 
environment. 
• I can do things or make 
decisions without another 
person being able to interfere. 
• „I had the feeling that I was 
independent from other people“ 
(Lammers et al., 2016) 
 
Sense of 
responsibility 
Concern for others’ well being 
and awareness of the 
consequences of own actions for 
others (Tost, 2015) 
• “I am always thinking about how 
my actions will affect others” 
(Schaumberg & Flynn 2012) 
• “When making these decisions I 
need to take care of others’ 
needs” (Scholl, Sassenberg, 
Scheepers, Ellemers, & Wit, 
2017) 
 
We use three related concepts to refer to the subjective experience of power. Sense 
of power describes a conscious judgment about one’s own ability to influence others in a 
given social situation (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012), which results from situational 
power. Personal power is a conscious judgment about one’s own competence, agency, 
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autonomy, and independence (cf. Overbeck & Park, 2001; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006; 
Lammers et al., 2009). Although personal power may result from feeling a sense of power 
(“power over”) at a given point in time, it also reflects a more generalized perception of 
“power to” that can also arise from non-social control over outcomes (Overbeck & Park, 
2001). Sense of responsibility describes a state of being concerned for other’s well being and 
an awareness of the consequences of one’s own actions for others (Tost, 2015). 
The relationship between structural power and situational power is key to our theorizing 
about contextual variations in power. Although relatively high levels of sense of power have 
been linked to high managerial positions (supplementary analyses of data by Lammers, 
Stoker, & Stapel, 2010), it is important to point out that organizational behavior is situated in 
diverse interaction contexts. For instance, individuals in a high structural power position, 
such as a CEO or members of the advisory board, interact mostly with people who have less 
influence and resources. Accordingly, these individuals should often find themselves in a 
superior role and have a relatively constant experience of a high sense of power. Individuals 
in a low power position, e.g., clerks, mostly interact with people who have equal or more 
influence and resources than they do. Hence, these individuals should often find themselves 
in a subordinate role and are more likely to experience a rather low sense of power. People 
situated in the middle level of an organizational hierarchy frequently switch between superior 
and subordinate interaction partners. Therefore, they will probably change between states of 
higher and lower sense of power from situation to situation, which could aggregate to a 
sense of middle power when they are asked to make a global self-assessment (Anicich, & 
Hirsh, 2017).  
We assume the existence of two pathways linking power to outcomes (cf. Tost, 2015): 
The sense of power can unfold its effects via the perception of personal power and via the 
sense of responsibility. Per definition, individuals experiencing a high sense of power get 
others to comply with their own wishes. Thus, they experience that they have an impact and 
should accordingly feel agentic, competent, and autonomous (i.e., high personal power). At 
the same time, they might recognize that others’ outcomes depend on their actions, 
especially because their superior position encompasses unique actual (or felt) means and 
possibilities to do good or avoid harm in the interest of others (Scholl et al., 2017). This 
perception of other’s dependency should result in a high sense of responsibility. However, 
we agree with Tost (2015) that individual differences might moderate the relationship 
between sense of power and sense of responsibility such that women and individuals high in 
other-orientation might feel more responsible when in positions of power than men and more 
self-oriented individuals. 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  73 
Proposition 1:  Structural hierarchical positions (i.e., structural power) determine the 
probability to have a certain situation-specific power role in interactions 
(superior, peer, subordinate; i.e., situational power). 
 
Proposition 2:  Situational power translates to a sense of power: When interacting with 
a superior, an individual will have a lower sense of power than when 
interacting with peers or subordinates. When interacting with a 
subordinate, an individual will have a higher sense of power than when 
interacting with peers or superiors.  
 
Proposition 3:  The sense of power is positively related to (a) personal power and (b) a 
sense of responsibility. 
 
From Propositions 1 – 3, it is tempting to derive the conclusion that organizational 
members of relatively high ranks in the organizational hierarchy should chronically 
experience higher personal power and sense of responsibility than organizational members 
of lower ranks. As noted by Tost (2015) however, all three subjective (or psychological) 
forms of power are causally determined in multiple ways, including non-conscious influences, 
weakening the link from structural power to personal power and sense of responsibility. If the 
goal is to predict subjective power, a dynamic (or within-person) perspective beginning the 
causal chain at situational power would seem to be more appropriate.  
Within-Person Power Changes 
In experimental research, little is known about the dynamic nature of power (for scarce 
exceptions see Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000, Study 3; Li, Wang, Yin, Mao, Zhu, & 
Huang, 2016; Sivanathan, Pillutla, & Murnighan, 2008; Weick, McCall, & Blascovich, 2017, 
Study 2). However, these few studies do suggest that participants alter their behavior as a 
response to changes in their structural and psychological power in laboratory settings. For 
instance, Goodwin and colleagues assigned each participant to three different roles – a 
powerful allocator role, a powerless receiver role, and a power-neutral observer role – and 
asked them to form an impression of people with whom they would ostensibly work together 
in an upcoming task based on descriptive statements about these people. The amount of 
time participants spent reading and processing the different statements constituted the 
dependent measure. Although the amount of attention toward the target did not vary as a 
function of participants’ role, they focused on stereotype-inconsistent information when in the 
powerless role but changed their focus to stereotype-consistent information when in the 
powerful role. 
Initial evidence suggests that within-person changes in power also have effects in real-
world settings. The only published study in this category – replicating previous findings 
established in between-person designs in the laboratory – showed that having power is 
related to positive mood, less resource depletion and less stress (Smith & Hofmann, 2016). 
However, results also revealed that positional power (corresponding to situational power in 
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our terminology) imperfectly predicted feelings of power (which corresponds to subjective 
power in our terminology). This emphasizes the importance of subjecting this link to further 
scrutiny. After giving a brief overview on previously discussed moderators involved in 
perceptions of positional security, we will discuss some individual characteristics as well as 
properties of the context that might determine to what extent situational power predicts 
subjective power. These newly proposed moderators share the idea that they are thought to 
amplify the perceptions of power differences between hierarchical positions, which should 
ultimately result in stronger effects on outcomes. 
Perceptions of positional security 
How secure individuals perceive their hierarchical position to be might affect how 
situational power translates into psychological power. Security in this context is the result of 
multiple sources: legitimacy, interdependence, and stability, which have previously been 
theorized (e.g., Keltner et al., 2003; Tost, 2015; Williams, 2014) and shown (e.g., Lammers, 
Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008; Sligte, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011) to alter the effects of 
power. Importantly, in order for all these moderators to take effect, the self-perception of the 
individual in question is what matters. The objective circumstances can be neglected. 
Legitimacy describes the perception that actions of an agent are in line with a shared 
understanding of what is desirable, appropriate and compliant to norms and values (Raven, 
1992, Suchman, 1995). For instance, within organizational settings, leader selection or 
promotion decisions can give rise to perceptions of (il)legitimacy: power positions can be 
gained legitimately based on fair and recognized factors such as competence or 
performance. However, they can also be gained illegitimately based on luck, nepotism, or 
sexual favors. Not having earned one’s power position for the right reasons or merely 
suspecting that others might think one does not deserve one’s power position might evoke 
feelings of insecurity and diminished self-confidence in the powerholder, which could result in 
reduced subjective power. In contrast, being in a powerless position illegitimately might 
evoke a sense of moral superiority that could bolster positive self-perception and increase 
subjective power. 
Interdependence refers to a situation in which both actors control resources that are 
mutually important for the other actor (Langer & Keltner, 2008; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). For 
instance, when CEOs want to implement a new wage plan that would save their companies 
money but disadvantage the workers, the CEOs have the formal power to do so but will 
probably not evaluate their power to be high if a charismatic, experienced worker or unionist 
convincingly threatens to organize a strike. Meanwhile, the assistants to the CEO might not 
feel as powerless as one would suppose based on their inferior structural power position 
because they also control resources their superiors depend on. These include work-related 
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skills, knowledge of administrative processes, or contacts to important internal and external 
stakeholders. 
Finally, stability might play a role for the evaluation of subjective power. Powerholders 
may feel secure in a stable power position. However, after learning that ambitious 
subordinates are trying to topple them to take over their position, or that a superior is likely to 
dispose of them in favor of a younger and less expensive candidate, they might feel less 
secure and less powerful. In contrast, the powerless might perceive the instability of the 
situation as a chance to strengthen their own position (e.g., showing how competent they are 
when the reason for a possible displacement of their superior is a lack of competence) or 
interpret it as a chance to rise in hierarchy themselves. Hence, someone with unstable low 
situational power could report higher subjective power than someone with unstable high 
situational power.  
Interpersonal hierarchy expectation 
People high in interpersonal hierarchy expectation (IHE) act on the assumption that 
dominance hierarchies are present or develop in interpersonal interactions or relationships 
(Schmid Mast, 2005). Based on the mechanism of self-fulfilling prophecy, hierarchy-
expecting individuals might behave in line with the assumed power balance between them 
and another person, which in turn causes the interaction partner to behave complementarily 
(Tiedens & Fragale, 2003; Tiedens, Unzueta, & Young, 2007). The interaction partner’s 
complementary behavior reinforces the (assumed) hierarchy.  
Consider for instance employee A and employee B, who both have separate meetings 
with their supervisor. While all other parameters are kept constant (tenure, gender and so 
on), employee A, who values hierarchy and acts in line with this guiding principle, is likely to 
perceive the power difference between him/her and his/her supervisor as larger than 
employee B, who does not believe in the value of hierarchy and accordingly meets his 
supervisor without deference. When both A and B subsequently speak to the trainee they are 
responsible for, A might feel the need to appear as a demanding and competent superior, 
whereas B tends to see the relationship between superior and trainee as cooperative 
relationship between peers. To summarize this example, the distance A covers to change 
from the subordinate role to the superior role is larger than the distance B covers for the 
same change. The “power manipulation” in the case of A is stronger and the effects of power 
on outcome variables should therefore also be stronger for A. 
 
Proposition 4:  The effects of contextual variations will be more pronounced among 
employees high in interpersonal hierarchy expectation (IHE) than 
employees low in IHE.  
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Self-monitoring 
Self-monitoring refers to the extent to which people observe, regulate, and control the 
public appearances that they display in social settings and interpersonal relationships 
(Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1987). High self-monitors are particularly sensitive and 
responsive to (social) cues in their environment indicative of situationally appropriate 
behavior. In contrast, low self-monitors tend to be true to themselves and display more 
consistent behavior across various social contexts.  
In an organizational context various cues might tell a high self-monitor where his place 
in the hierarchy is and what sort of behavior is expected. For instance, the most proximal cue 
is the interaction partners’ behavior. If they appear higher ranking – be it due to their dress 
(Kraus & Mendes, 2014), their way of speaking (Hall, Coats, & Smith LeBeau, 2005; Schmid 
Mast, 2002) or their nonverbal behavior (Hall et al., 2005) – it would be appropriate to 
behave as a subordinate. A more distal cue is the organizational hierarchy climate (see 
section below). If it emphasizes the importance of hierarchy, high self-monitors are likely to 
strongly adapt their behavior when interacting with subordinates or superiors. 
 
Proposition 5:  The effects of contextual variations in power will be stronger among 
high self-monitors than low self-monitors. 
 
Role integration/segmentation preferences 
Role integration and segmentation constitute a continuum that describes the degree to 
which aspects of one domain are kept separate from the other domain (Ashforth, Kreiner, & 
Fugate, 2000). High segmentation is characterized by inflexible and impermeable role 
boundaries whereas high integration is characterized by flexible and permeable role 
boundaries. For instance, a supervisor who prefers segmentation might avoid having 
blended meetings with both her subordinates and her boss as well as she might have clear 
rules about her communication style and content with her subordinates and her boss (e.g., 
never be on first-name terms with subordinates, never tell subordinates about her family). In 
contrast, a supervisor who prefers integration might address both his subordinates and his 
boss informally, share personal stories with his subordinates as well as his boss and prefer 
to attend meetings with all concerned parties regardless of their hierarchical position. 
Individuals differ in their preference for highly integrated or highly segmented roles (Edwards 
& Rothbard, 2000; Rothbard, Phillips, & Dumas, 2005).  
The way members of an organization have organized their roles at work determines 
the magnitude of change they experience when moving from one role to the next. Role 
integrators will perceive little change and the “power manipulation” for them will be less 
strong than for role segmentors, who might appear as different people as a function of their 
interaction partner. 
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Proposition 6:  The effects of contextual variations in social power will be stronger 
among employees who adopt a role segmentation strategy than among 
employees who adopt a role integration strategy. 
 
Organizational hierarchy climate 
Organizational climate, the “summary perception derived from a body of interconnected 
experiences with organizational policies, practices and procedures and observations of what 
is rewarded, supported, and expected in the organization“ (Schneider, González-Romá, 
Ostroff, & West, 2017, p. 468), has a fundamental influence on organizational behavior such 
as job attitudes, job performance, strain, turnover intentions, and organizational citizenship 
behaviors (Chang, Rosen, & Levy, 2009; Wallace, Edwards, Paul, Burke, Christian, & Eissa, 
2016). Organizational climates might not only pertain to service, safety, justice, 
discrimination, and harassment (Schneider et al., 2017), but might also differ regarding the 
importance of hierarchy. In some organizations (or even industries: e.g., IT, Research vs. 
Consulting, Banking) differences in power might be very salient and actively cultivated.  
For instance, people on different hierarchical levels might dress differently, there might 
be rules about the maintenance of professional distance between people on different 
hierarchical levels, communication might be regulated strictly in a way that does not allow 
skipping hierarchical levels in upward communication, or the rise in organizational hierarchy 
might be visibly accompanied by presents or privileges such as a (bigger) company car, a 
nicer office, or one’s own secretary. In contrast, in other working environments, interns and 
vice presidents might dress similarly and get together for organizational and casual social 
functions easily and frequently regardless of job title. When working in an environment in 
which power differences are salient, an individual should easily know the difference between 
interacting with his subordinate or her boss and this could make him/her feel and behave 
differently. 
 
Proposition 7:  For employees working in organizations high in hierarchy salience the 
effects of contextual variations in social power will be stronger than for 
employees working in organizations low in hierarchy salience. 
 
Power Effects in Organizational Contexts: The Example of Self-Control 
Employees face many challenges throughout the course of a day. They must focus on 
their tasks and avoid being distracted by every incoming e-mail. They must tackle tasks they 
dislike. They must not allow themselves to be carried away to do or say spontaneously 
something inappropriate. They need to cultivate their relationships with their coworkers by 
taking on some of their workload or explaining them for the umpteenth time how to proceed 
in case X. These are demands that cannot be dealt with by routine and instead require the 
effortful and conscious control of thoughts, feelings, and behavior in order to comply with 
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performance goals, organizational values and norms as well as coworker, supervisor, and 
subordinate expectations (cf. Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). In short, self-control is an 
indispensable part of working life. 
As the above examples suggest, these self-control challenges can be clustered. 
Organizational psychologists proposed to discern impulse control from overcoming inner 
resistances and from resisting distractions (Schmidt & Neubach, 2010). Comparable two- or 
three-factorial conceptualizations based on functional processes, i.e., initiation, 
(maintenance), and inhibition, were also proposed by psychologists from other less applied 
disciplines (e.g., de Boer, van Hooft, & Bakker, 2011; de Ridder, de Boer, Lugtig, Bakker, & 
van Hooft, 2011; Hoyle & Davisson, 2016; review in Chapter 3). We borrow the idea of self-
control as a multifaceted construct for our rationale: In the following, self-control that is 
needed for initiating goal-directed behavior is referred to as start self-control, whereas self-
control needed for suppressing behavior or refraining from acting impulsively is referred to as 
stop self-control. What is obvious but rarely discussed from the above examples is that self-
control is also related to interpersonal functioning and interpersonal relations, not only 
directed at behavior mainly concerning the self (i.e., interpersonal self-control; Olsen, 2005; 
Vohs, Lasaleta, & Fennis, 2009).  
In the past decade, research on in-role and extra-role behavior at the workplace linked 
to the exertion of self-control (such as unethical behavior, deviance, workplace aggression, 
organizational citizenship behavior, job engagement, distraction; Lian et al., 2017) has 
revealed substantial within-person variability over days and weeks (e.g., Dalal, Lam, Weiss, 
Welch, & Hulin, 2009; Johnson, Lanaj, & Barnes, 2014). As predictors of this variability, 
situational characteristics such as affect, experiences of incivility, justice behaviors, stress, 
and sleep deprivation have been investigated (e.g., Barnes, Lucianetti, Bhave, & Christian, 
2015; Dalat et al., 2009; Johnson et al., 2014; Meier & Gross, 2015; Spence, Ferris, Brown, 
& Heller, 2011). These effects have often been interpreted with reference to a resource-
based account of self-control. However, more recent theorizing stresses the importance of 
motivation and attentional focus in explaining changes in state self-control (Inzlicht & 
Schmeichel, 2012; Kotabe & Hofmann, 2015), an idea based on which we will further 
develop our reasoning. 
We propose that contextual variations in power could be an additional predictor of state 
self-control variability. For start and stop self-control, we draw on the motivational account 
advanced in the approach/inhibition theory of power (AIT, Keltner et al., 2003) and related 
theoretical developments in suggesting that people in different hierarchical positions 
concentrate their self-control efforts on the kind of self-control that best fits their motivational 
focus. This suggests that social power benefits start self-control but impairs stop self-control. 
In brief, the approach/inhibition theory (Keltner et al., 2003) assumes that having power 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  79 
activates the behavioral activation system (BAS), which is related to experiencing positive 
affect and being attentive to rewards. In contrast, lacking power activates the behavioral 
inhibition system (BIS), which is related to experiencing negative effect and focusing 
attention to threats. As people in states of low power are attentive to threat, punishment and 
others’ interests, they should be focused on not doing anything wrong. The most 
straightforward way not to become a target of threat or punishment is to restrain oneself, i.e., 
not to violate norms, to down-regulate feelings and to think things through – which are core 
characteristics of what we term stop self-control. In contrast, people in states of high power 
are attentive to rewards. The attainment of self-relevant, self-set goals is rewarding. In order 
to successfully achieve one’s goals, it is necessary to turn plans into action, concentrate on 
the goal and nothing else, and persist even in the face of obstacles – which are core 
characteristics of what we term start self-control. Importantly, we think that the subjective 
perception of power triggers these effects and not the objective perception of having or 
lacking structural power. 
 
Proposition 8:  The sense of power positively affects start self-control. This 
relationship is mediated by personal power.  
 
Proposition 9: The sense of power negatively affects stop-self-control. This 
relationship is mediated by personal power.  
 
In the interpersonal self-control domain, we expect that individuals in high power 
positions who recognize their responsibility towards their subordinates would be motivated to 
behave in a self-controlled way, e.g., not to yell at subordinates, not to say negative things to 
subordinates in the spur of the moment, not to be aggressive, and not to behave unethically 
at their expense. This is in line with past findings, which showed that powerful participants 
unaware of the responsibility component of their power do not care about others (Bendahan, 
Zehnder, Pralong, & Antonakis, 2015; de Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & 
Gruenfeld, 2006; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010). However, powerful participants who 
do perceive their responsibility act in ways that are beneficial for others (e.g., DeCelles, 
DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012; Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009; Tost, Wade-Benzoni, 
& Johnson, 2015).  
 
Proposition 10: The sense of power positively affects interpersonal self-control. This 
relationship is mediated by the sense of responsibility. 
 
Present Research 
So far we have presented various propositions related to the effects of contextual 
variations in power in an organizational setting. First, we have elaborated on the different 
facets of power: Power can be an objective property (i.e., structural and situational power) or 
a subjective perception (i.e., sense of power, personal power) of an interpersonal situation. 
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Situational power gives rise to a sense of power, which in turn affects various outcomes 
mediated by personal power and the sense of responsibility. Second, we have proposed that 
the magnitude of power effects caused by within-person power role changes common in 
organizational reality is dependent on individual and situational characteristics such as the 
organizational hierarchy climate, interpersonal hierarchy expectations, self-monitoring, and 
role integration/segmentation preferences. Third, we have discussed how real-world power 
would impact self-control, an example outcome relevant in organizational reality.  
In the following, we present two studies that test key assumptions of our theoretical 
framework. As detailed above, we assume that the structural power differences between two 
interaction partners (i.e., situational power) determine how powerful the interaction partners 
perceive themselves to be (i.e., subjective power). Participants in Study 1 were asked to 
imagine themselves in the position of dealing with a subordinate, a peer or a superior and to 
answer questions on the thoughts, feelings and behavior they would be likely to have. In 
Study 2, an experience sampling study, participants reported their current state after 
meaningful interactions with other people in different hierarchical positions at their workplace.  
Study 1 
This study had three goals. First, we wanted to test in an efficient way whether 
information on one’s own and the other’s hierarchical role in a workplace interaction is 
sufficient to manipulate participants’ self-assessment of the facets of power discussed above, 
i.e., whether this kind of information constitutes a successful “natural power manipulation” 
(see Proposition 2). We therefore simulated this situation in an online experiment, in which 
each participant had to report about situations in which (s)he adopted a subordinate, peer or 
superior role.  
Second, we were interested in finding out how this manipulation affected self-control. 
We tested whether a high sense of power would increase start and reduce stop self-control 
and if this relationship was mediated by personal power (see Propositions 7 and 8)10. We 
focused on the comparison between high power (interactions with people from a lower 
hierarchical level) and low power situations (interactions with people from a higher 
hierarchical level) as we were unsure what to expect in the equal power situation. It is 
possible that people on the same hierarchical level still experience their interactions as 
hierarchical, therefore we did not know how participants would translate these experiences in 
one aggregate score. 
                                                
10 In the preregistration we stated the expectation that the sense of responsibility should be positively related to stop self-control. 
However, this was not the case. The reason might be that our stop self-control scale contained ambiguous items that could be 
understood as referring to either individual or interpersonal self-control. As interpersonal self-control in our definition is 
predominantly stop self-control (e.g., overriding selfish and self-interested impulses, controlling own emotions in order not to 
hurt or frighten others), we did not stress the difference between individual and interpersonal self-control in formulating the 
items. So, it might still be that the sense of responsibility would mediate the relationship between sense of power and 
interpersonal stop self-control, but not the relationship between sense of power and individual stop self-control. This issue will 
be addressed in Study 2. 
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Third, our goal was to investigate effects of within-person variations in power in 
organizational settings. Accordingly, in order to design Study 2 appropriately, we needed 
background information on the phenomenon’s base rate (i.e., how often do employees 
experience power role changes?), sample characteristics (i.e., who is most likely to 
experience a fair amount of changes?), and effect sizes.  
Method  
The preregistration of this study can be accessed via https://osf.io/cgu47/. Data and 
materials can be accessed via https://osf.io/3b6wr/. 
Sample 
We recruited as many working adults as possible between November 10 and 
December 7, 2017 via personal contacts, various mailing lists and electronic bulletin boards, 
to take part in an online study on role changes in the workplace. We committed ourselves to 
terminating data collection before analyzing the data. In total, 316 individuals gave their 
consent to participate, of which 123 individuals had to be excluded because they did not 
provide answers to the key questions presented in the measures section. Additionally, three 
individuals were excluded because they gave identical answers to the key questions, which 
we interpreted as unserious responding. 
The final sample consisted of 190 German speaking individuals (114 female, 76 male; 
5 in top management, 20 in middle management, 22 in lower management, 60 experienced 
employees, 83 employees11) in the age range between 19 and 63 years (Mage = 32.85, SD = 
12.08) who reported Md = 38.5 (Range: 2 - 60) working hours per week in their main jobs. As 
compensation, participants could win one of six vouchers for various online stores, worth 20 
EUR/Swiss Francs each (approximately 23.50 USD). 
Power manipulation 
Participants were asked to imagine dealing with people at the same, higher, or lower 
hierarchical level and to indicate how they would feel and act in this situation in general. For 
instance, when a participant imagines an interaction with someone who belongs to a lower 
hierarchical level, the focal participant is in a high power position. Participants were 
instructed to give their ratings per item, i.e., answer one item with regard to all three 
hierarchical positions in succession and only then proceed to the next item. 
Measures 
The items for the five dependent constructs sense of power, personal power, sense of 
responsibility, start self-control and stop self-control were formulated based on the construct 
                                                
11 We clearly defined what we meant by the five hierarchical levels participants were asked to assign themselves to. We 
differentiated between top, middle and lower management, experienced employees who temporarily take on the lead or act as a 
role model, and employees without managerial responsibilities. 
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definitions (cf. Table 5.1) and pretested in a pilot study. All items were answered on a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely). There was always a reference to “the people 
mentioned below” in the item stem. These people were either “people above me in 
organizational hierarchy”, “people on my level in organizational hierarchy”, and “people below 
me in organizational hierarchy”.  
Sense of power. Participants indicated to which extent they agreed to the following 
three items: “If I imagine to interact with the people mentioned below, I would...” (1) “control 
the resources (e.g., time, money, information) the other person needs”, (2) “be able to punish 
or reward the other person”, (3) “get the other person to do what I want”. Cronbach’s alpha 
was .49. 
Personal power. Participants indicated to which extent they agreed to the following 
four items: “If I imagine to interact with the people mentioned below, I would...” (1) “have the 
feeling that I can impact on things in my environment”, (2) “have the feeling that I can do my 
work in a self-determined way”, (3) “have the feeling that I can do things and make decisions 
without the possibility that someone else can change it”, (4) “be free from the influence of the 
other person”. Cronbach’s alpha was .58. 
Sense of responsibility. Participants indicated to which extent they agreed to the 
following four items: “If I imagine to interact with the people mentioned below, I would...” (1) 
“feel responsible for the other person’s well-being”, (2) “be concerned about the other 
person’s needs”, (3) “want the other person to benefit from my actions” (4) “consider the 
other person’s well-being to be very important”. Cronbach’s alpha was .72. 
Start self-control. Participants indicated to which extent they agreed to the following 
four items: “If I imagine to interact with the people mentioned below, I would tend in this 
situation to...” (1) “put plans into action”, (2) “follow through with difficult or taxing tasks”, (3) 
“start working on new challenging tasks”, (4) “be able to complete tasks that need to be done 
even if I don’t feel like it.” Cronbach’s alpha was .63.  
Stop self-control. Participants indicated to which extent they agreed to the following 
four items (the first two items were recoded): “If I imagine to interact with the people 
mentioned below, I would tend in this situation...” (1) “to let myself go”, (2) “to give free rein to 
my feelings”, (3) “not to be carried away to do spontaneously something inappropriate”, (4) 
“to try to control how I react to impulses (e.g., spontaneous thoughts, feelings)”. Cronbach’s 
alpha was .60.  
Other measures. Participants also provided information on how often they changed 
hierarchical roles the day before and the week before. When answering these questions, 
participants referred to the following roles: lower-ranking coworker (staff, intern…), higher-
ranking coworker (team leader, boss), coworker on the same hierarchical level, 
client/customer, and retailer/supplier/service provider. We explained that participants should 
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consider interaction situations that fit the following three criteria: The interaction should (1) 
not be purely private, i.e., it should be at least partially about work, (2) take place in real-time 
(i.e., face-to-face, over the phone, by messenger), and (3) have a certain significance (i.e., 
greetings or brief small-talk are of no interest). 
Procedure 
Participants provided informed consent and demographic information. Then, they 
answered questions related to their employment situation. Subsequently, we were interested 
in descriptive information regarding hierarchical role changes (i.e., how many in a normal 
working day). Finally, participants answered the questions on the facets of power and self-
control for the three different situations. Participants were thanked and informed about the 
compensation. 
 
Table 5.2 
Intercorrelations of study variables 
 
 Low 
situational 
power 
High 
situational 
power 
Sense of 
power 
Personal 
power 
Sense of 
responsibility 
Start SC 
High 
situational 
power 
 
-.50***      
Sense of 
power 
 
-.59*** .62***     
Personal 
Power 
 
-.62*** .50*** .63***    
Sense of 
responsibility 
 
-.53*** .38*** .56*** .45***   
Start SC 
 
.32*** -.23*** -.26*** -.25*** .00  
Stop SC 
 
.54*** -.17*** -.36*** -.47*** -.36*** .29*** 
Note. Stop SC = Stop self-control, Start SC = Start self-control. N = 570 observations of 190 participants. All variables but 
situational power were person-mean centered to allow comparisons with Study 2. The two situational power variables were 
dummy-coded such that interactions with peers are the reference category. 
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Table 5.2 shows the correlations between the dependent measures. The correlations 
between the measures of subjective power were positive and hence in line with our 
expectations. Also confirming our expectations, both sense of power and personal power 
were negatively correlated with stop self-control. Surprisingly, we also found sense of power 
and personal power to be negatively correlated with start self-control. With regard to the two 
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self-control measures we replicated previous findings showing a weak positive correlation 
(e.g., Hoyle & Davisson, 2016).
Table 5.3 shows the descriptives for the three experimental conditions. The sense of 
power scale can be considered a manipulation check. As expected, participants reported 
having more power in the high power role than in the low power role, t(189) = 15.87,  
p < .001, d = 1.15. Thus, manipulating power by referring to the changing roles people 
assume as a function of their interaction partners seems to be a promising approach. We 
made no prediction regarding the peer situation but found the sense of power to be at an 
intermediate level between the ratings for high power and low power positions. 
 
Table 5.3
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) 
 
Situational power Low power role Peer role High power role 
Sense of power 2.27a (0.73) 2.76b (0.71) 3.32c (0.83) 
Personal power 2.76a (0.74) 3.31b (0.61) 3.59c (0.67) 
Sense of responsibility 3.46a (0.81) 3.89b (0.70) 4.04c (0.72) 
Start self-control 3.98a (0.68) 3.76b (0.64) 3.69b (0.70) 
Stop self-control 4.09a (0.66) 3.56b (0.72) 3.67c (0.73) 
Note. In one line, conditions with different subscripts differ with at least p < .05. 
Main analyses 
To test the hypothesized main effects, we conducted paired t-tests of the scale 
measures of start and stop self-control. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found that 
participants reported more start self-control when low in situational power than when high in 
situational power, t(189) = 5.60, p < .001, d = 0.41. However, in line with our expectations, 
participants reported more stop self-control when low in situational power than when high in 
situational power, t(189) = 9.25, p < .001, d = 0.67. A post-hoc power analysis for this main 
effect’s hypotheses suggested that our sample size of n = 190 allows for the detection of an 
effect of (at least) d = 0.26 with 95% statistical power, assuming two-sided tests and an 
alpha error of 5%. 
 
Figure 5.2. Results of meditational analyses for start self-control 
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We used the analytical framework described in Judd, Kenny, and McClelland (2001) 
to test the within-person mediation hypotheses. We regressed the difference score of the 
dependent variable (either start or stop self-control) on the difference and (centered) sum 
scores of the two mediator variables (personal power and sense of responsibility). When the 
difference score is a significant predictor, this points to mediation. When the sum score is a 
significant predictor, this points to moderation. 
With regard to start self-control, the results of the regression indicated that the four 
predictors explained 4.8% of the variance12, F(4,184) = 2.32, p = .06. Both the intercept, 
t(184) = 2.90, p = .004, and the personal power difference score, t(184) = 2.03, p = .04, were 
significant, pointing to partial mediation (because of the still significant intercept). Figure 5.2 
displays the results of the mediation analyses. The remaining three predictors (personal 
power sum score, responsibility sum, and difference scores) were not significant. Although 
we expected personal power to mediate the relationship between situational power and start-
self-control, a negative effect does not conform to our expectations (cf. Proposition 8). 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Results of meditational analyses for stop self-control 
 
With regard to stop self-control, the results of the regression indicated that the four 
predictors explained 19.2% of the variance, F(4,185) = 10.96, p < .001. The intercept,  
t(185) = 2.45, p = .02, and the personal power difference score, t(185) = 5.82, p < .001, were 
significant predictors, indicating partial mediation. The personal power sum score was a 
marginally significant predictor, t(185) = 1.86, p = .06. Neither sum nor difference score of 
sense of responsibility were significant. Figure 5.3 displays the results of the mediation 
analyses. In line with Proposition 9, higher situational power was related to less stop self-
control. As expected, personal power mediated this relationship. 
                                                
12 These were the results when one extreme outlier was excluded. In our preanalysis plan, we stated that we would report 
results separately in the case that the analyses with and without outliers yield different conclusions with regard to 
significance/non-significance of results (McClelland, 2000). Using the complete data set, the results of the regression indicated 
that the four predictors explained 7.1% of the variance, F(4,185) = 3.53, p = .008. The intercept, t(185) = -.41, p < .001, the 
personal power sum score, t(185) = 2.24, p = .03, and the responsibility difference score, t(185) = 2.56, p = .01, were significant 
predictors. 
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Analyses related to within-person variations in power: background information 
Given their explorative nature, most results in this section are presented graphically. 
Most participants were familiar with the phenomenon in question: 139 out of 190 participants 
indicated to have experienced between 1 and 120 power role changes at work the day 
before (M = 7.32, Md = 4, SD = 11.6). In the preceding week, 155 participants experienced 
between 1 and 500 role changes at work (M = 26.5, Md = 15, SD = 47.79). It appears that 
participants on all hierarchical levels experienced role changes quite frequently (see Figure 
5.4), with a (visually identified) tendency for participants in lower or middle management to 
report more role changes than non-management members. Additionally, Table 5.4 suggests 
that people who are older, work more hours per week, and have more coworkers in their 
department are more likely to experience hierarchical role changes. 
 
Figure 5.4. Number of role changes split by hierarchical position. The width of boxes is proportional to 
the sample size. For the sake of facility of inspection, we excluded one participant who gave the most 
extreme answers. 
 
Given the extremely large range in reported role changes, we assume the median 
better reflects reality (even when working 60 hours per week, 500 hierarchical role changes 
conforming to our definition per week would mean that one has to have 8 interactions per 
hour on average). We cannot rule out the possibility that the large range is a result of 
imprecise definition – for instance, we did not specify how to count situations that include 
multiple interaction partners. Participants may also have had different interpretations of what 
to count. Consider Sarah’s preceding day: She interacted with her colleague Mark, with her 
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colleague Mary, with her boss Tom, and the intern Claire. Given that our question was “How 
often have you changed between the above specified roles?”, Sarah could have answered 
either “3” because she had the peer, superior, and subordinate role that day, or she could 
have answered “4” because she counts interaction partners rather than role labels.  
 
Table 5.4 
Correlations between the number of role changes and participants’ background information 
 
 No of 
changes 
yesterday 
No of 
changes last 
week 
 
No of direct 
reports 
No. of 
coworkers in 
Department  
 
Working 
hours 
 
Female 
No of 
changes last 
week 
 
.96***      
No of direct 
reports 
 
.08 .11     
No of 
coworkers in 
department 
 
.13 .16+ .10    
Working 
hours 
 
.03 .14+ .17+ .12   
Female 
 
-.06 -.12 -.01 .02 -.20**  
Age .24** .24** .13 .06 .11 .08 
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. + p < .10. 
 
Study 2 
In Study 1 we asked participants to imagine being in different hierarchical roles and to 
indicate how they would tend to feel or behave. This is very likely difficult because 
participants must remember multiple suitable situations, their inner states in these situations, 
to which they probably do not devote much attention on a normal day, and finally decide how 
to aggregate these experiences to give one single answer. Accordingly, participants’ answers 
probably reflect beliefs rather than actual experiences. 
To come closer to participants’ actual experiences, we conducted an experience 
sampling study. Experience sampling (ES) is a method used to collect multiple observations 
of the same participants in their daily lives, usually several times a day for up to several 
weeks, with a focus on assessing variables that fluctuate over the short term such as affect, 
behavior, thoughts, and/or situational context (Fisher & To, 2012). Major advantages of this 
method are (1) the reduction of both recall bias and use of heuristics, and (2) the possibility 
to unconfound within- and between-person processes. 
This study was designed to test our key assumption, namely whether changing real-
world hierarchical roles (i.e., objective power) would have an impact on psychological power 
(Propositions 2 – 3b). In addition, we investigated whether variations in personal power 
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would explain variability in individual-focused start and stop self-control motivation 
(Propositions 8 and 9) as well as whether variations in sense of responsibility would explain 
variability in interpersonal self-control motivation (Proposition 10). 
Method  
The preregistration of this study can be accessed via https://osf.io/cbxhq. Data and 
materials can be accessed via https://osf.io/3b6wr/. 
Sample 
We recruited 129 participants (69 females, 60 males, Mage = 39.96, SDage  = 12.01, 
range: 23 – 63 years) working for different organizations in different domains. Among them, 6 
had a position in top management, 22 in middle management, 20 in lower management, 46 
were experienced employees, 21 were employees, and 14 did not find a suitable category to 
describe their position. The majority had at least a university or polytechnic degree (70%) 
and worked full time (68%). Our inclusion criteria (based among other considerations on the 
insights from study 1) were the following: Participants had to (1) be German-speaking, (2) 
possess and use a smartphone with Internet access, (3) be employed (not self-employed, 
retired or seeking employment), (4) have a certain amount of latitude with regard to the 
temporal organization of the own work, (5) work maximum one day per week from home, (6) 
work for an organization with at least 5 employees at their site, and (7) to have no 
psychological diseases such as e.g., depression, burnout. 
Our data initially encompassed 1649 observations. We excluded (1) observations that 
were reported between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. (2.8%) because given that all participants were 
employed in Europe, it is highly unlikely that they actually experienced work-related 
interactions within these times and (2) observations that included only an answer to the very 
first question of the questionnaire (1.6%). Our final sample comprised 1577 observations 
from 129 participants. Among all observations, 18% referred to high power situations, 30% to 
equal power situations, 25% to low power situations, 16% to interactions with customers, 4% 
to interactions with suppliers, and 7% to other kinds of interactions. Our analyses are based 
solely on observations referring to interactions with subordinates (= high power situations), 
peers (= equal power situations) and own superiors/other superior colleagues (= low power 
situations), of which participants provided 8.83 observations on average (Md = 8, SD = 4.79, 
range 1 – 21). Viewed differently, 15% of participants experienced only one kind of three 
possible interactions, 45% experienced two kinds of interactions and 41% experienced all 
three kinds of interactions. 
The sample size was determined based on a temporal criterion. Namely we collected 
data from as many participants we were able to recruit between March 12 and November 30, 
2018. Data analysis began only after data collection had been terminated. As exact power 
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analyses for multilevel designs depend on several assumptions, which we cannot reasonably 
make due to the lack of empirical data, we performed a simpler post-hoc analysis as 
described by Ketturat, Frisch, Ullrich, Häusser, van Dick and Mojzisch (2016): The power of 
detecting within-person effects can be approximated by the power of a correlation test with a 
sample size that equals the number of participants (e.g., 129) times the number of 
observations per participant minus 1 (e.g., 8 – 1 = 7). Accordingly, our sample size affords at 
least 85% statistical power to detect a within-person effect of r > .1 assuming two-sided 
testing. 
As compensation, participants received a nine page long individual feedback on their 
work stress and health behavior during the experience sampling period and entered a price 
draw for five vouchers worth 50 CHF (approx. 52 USD). If they filled out more than ten 
experience-sampling questionnaires, they entered additionally a prize draw for an iPad Pro 
Wi-Fi 11“, 64GB worth 899 CHF (approx. 905 USD). 
Procedure 
All data collection was done online. Potential participants were informed about key 
features of the study via a webpage that described the purpose of the study, the procedure, 
inclusion criteria, the benefit for participants, and gave information on privacy protection. We 
promoted the study by referring to this webpage via personal contacts, various mailing lists 
and electronic bulletin boards, alumni organizations of both the University of Zurich and the 
ETH Zurich, several professional organizations, and by distributing flyers. Interested 
individuals had to contact the first author/her research assistants to be included. The first 
author and her research assistants communicated with participants by default with a set of 
standardized E-mails.  
The study consisted of three elements: First, we administered an initial questionnaire 
that contained questions concerning traits, professional situation, demographic information, 
and our inclusion criteria (latitude, Work Design Questionnaire, Stegmann et al., 2010; trait 
self-control, Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004 among others).  
Second, participants took part in an experience-sampling phase for five (if possible 
consecutive) working days. Each morning at 7 a.m. participants received an E-Mail with two 
individualized links to the short questionnaire and the evening questionnaire. In this phase, 
they were instructed to answer a short questionnaire directly after each time they 
experienced an interaction situation that fit the description already used in Study 1 (real-time, 
importance, focus on work) with the additional information that the number of interaction 
partners did not necessarily have to be restricted to one. In the beginning of the short 
questionnaire, participants selected from a list of possible roles their interaction partner could 
have had (i.e., situational power). If they interacted with more than one person, they were 
asked to specify on who they had concentrated most. Then, participants answered the 
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questions on sense of power, personal power and sense of responsibility. Subsequently, 
they rated the extent to which they would be able to exert self-control and whether they 
needed to do so. Finally, participants indicated how stressed they were at the moment and 
how well they felt able to cope.  
Third, after work, we asked participants to answer questions concerning aggregated 
behavior indicative of self-control over this working day, which will not be reported here. The 
evening questionnaire also contained most of the information needed for the individual 
feedback. The order of topics covered in the short questionnaire and the evening 
questionnaire remained the same during the experience-sampling phase, while the order of 
items within the topics was randomized. 
Measures 
Given the time-intensive nature of ES studies, we used very short measures of our 
focal constructs. 
Situational power. Participants reported with whom they had interacted: A subordinate 
colleague, a colleague on the same hierarchical level, their superior, another superior 
colleague, a customer, a supplier, or none of the above. 
Sense of power. Participants answered the following three questions on a scale 
ranging from 1 (the other person does) to 5 (I do): “At the moment, who controls more 
resources that the other needs (e.g., time, money, information)?”, “At the moment, who can 
make the other do something specific to a greater extent?”, and “At the moment, who can 
reward and/or punish the other to a greater extent?”. Cronbach’s alpha was .86. 
Personal power. Participants indicated to which extent they agreed to the following 
two items using a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely): “At the moment, I have 
the feeling that I can impact on things in my environment” and “At the moment, I have the 
feeling that I can do things or make decisions without another person is able to interfere”. 
Cronbach’s alpha was .65. 
Sense of responsibility. Participants were asked “At the moment, who feels more 
responsible for the other?”. They gave their answer on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (the 
other person) to 5 (myself). 
Start self-control. Participants were asked “If you needed to get going on something 
right now that you really don’t want to do, how likely is it that you would do it right now?” They 
indicated the likelihood on a scale ranging from zero to one hundred percent. To clarify what 
we meant, we gave three examples of situations in which the respective kind of self-control 
would be needed for every self-control dimension. Additionally, we asked whether their start, 
stop and/or interpersonal self-control had actually been challenged. 
Stop self-control. Participants were asked “If you were facing something you find very 
tempting right now, how likely is it that you would resist it right now?” They indicated the 
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likelihood on a scale ranging from zero to one hundred percent. 
Interpersonal self-control. Participants were asked “If another person would benefit 
from you holding back, how likely is it that you would hold back right now?” They indicated 
the likelihood on a scale ranging from zero to one hundred percent. 
Analytic strategy  
Multilevel modeling was used to account for the nested data structure resulting from 
asking the same participants to answer the same questions repeatedly. Analyses were 
performed using the R packages lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and 
lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017).  
The Propositions 2 – 3b and 8 – 10 were tested by evaluating whether the coefficient of 
the relevant predictor variable was significantly greater (Proposition 9: smaller) than zero. For 
the variable ”situational power“ we used two dummy variables ”high power“ and ”low power“ 
with 0 coding for interactions with peers. Accordingly, we expected the coefficient of ”high 
power“ to be greater than zero and the coefficient ”low power“ to be smaller than zero. For all 
three self-control dimensions, we included either personal power (cf. Proposition 8 and 9) or 
sense of responsibility (cf. Proposition 10) as predictors, as well as sense of power in all 
three analyses. Additionally, the models included the person-specific means of these 
variables as predictors to explore possible between-person effects (e.g., Hoffman & Stawski, 
2009). We started with a random intercept model for all models and subsequently tested the 
adequacy of adding random slopes using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).  
The indirect effects were tested by fitting a two-level structural equation model with 
random intercepts using the R package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). We modeled the 
hypothesized relationships on level 1 and specified a saturated model on level two by adding 
all variances and covariances to the endogeneous variables. 
Results and Discussion 
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the study variables are 
reported in Table 5.5 (see Appendix). In line with our expectations, the facets of power were 
significantly positively correlated within individuals. The same was true for the three self-
control dimensions. We were surprised to find only one significant correlation between one 
facet of power (i.e., personal power) and one dimension of self-control (i.e., start self-control). 
As a first test, we verified that there was sufficient within-person variability to support 
multilevel analyses (see Table 5.6) in all dependent variables. With regard to psychological 
power, our results corroborate findings from the only previous experience sampling study 
within the power literature (Smith & Hofmann, 2016). In the study by Smith and Hofmann 
58% of the variance in psychological power represented situational fluctuations. In our study 
we split psychological power into sense of power and personal power and found that 72% 
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and 59% of the variance in subjective power was due to situational fluctuation. This 
emphasizes the importance of studying power not only as a between-person difference 
variable, as is common in experimental power literature, but also as a variable that changes 
substantially within-person. 
 
Table 5.6 
Percentage of within-individual and between-individuals variance among variables 
 
Construct Within- 
individual variance 
(e2) 
Between- 
individuals variance 
(r2) 
% of within- 
individual variance 
Sense of power 0.89 0.34 72% 
Personal power 0.45 0.31 59% 
Sense of responsibility 0.85 0.23 79% 
Start self-control 333.62 303.49 52% 
Stop self-control 422.44 338.42 56% 
Interpersonal self-control 319.07 493.49 39% 
Note. Given that our measurement occasions are nested within individuals, we first specified a null model to calculate the 
percentage of within-individual variance for each repeated measures variable. The percentage of variance within-individual was 
calculated as e2/( e2 + r2). 
 
Confirmatory analyses  
Results from our multilevel path analyses are shown in Table 5.7 in the Appendix. All 
reported multilevel model estimates are unstandardized. Consistent with Proposition 2, 
participants reported a reduced sense of power in situations in which they had low situational 
power as compared to peer interactions (γ = -1.00, p < .001), whereas participants reported 
an increased sense of power in situations in which they had high situational power (γ = 0.99, 
p < .001). Moreover, as hypothesized in Propositions 3a and 3b, sense of power was 
positively related to both personal power (γ = 0.14, p < .001) and sense of responsibility  
(γ = 0.59, p < .001). In line with our expectation, personal power was positively related to 
start self-control (γ = 2.99, p < .001). Finally, neither the expected negative relationship 
between personal power and stop self-control (γ = 0.48, n.s.) nor the expected positive 
relationship between sense of responsibility and interpersonal self-control (γ = -0.39, n.s.) 
were found. Unexpectedly, we found significant between-person differences. People higher 
in personal power than the average personal power in the sample were more motivated to 
employ start as well as stop self-control. 
Exploratory analyses  
Given the insecurity regarding how many participants we would be able to recruit, we 
did not include Proposition 1 stating that structural power would determine the probability to 
have in interactions a certain situation-specific power role (i.e., situational power) in our 
pregistration. However, Table 5.8 presents an overview on the proportions of low power, 
peer and high power interactions participants in different structural power positions reported. 
In line with our expectations, top managers mostly reported being in high power positions, 
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members of the middle and lower management reported being in all three kinds of situational 
power positions, and employees mostly reported interacting with peers and superiors. 
We tested whether the relationship between situational power and the three self-control 
dimensions was mediated by sense of power and personal power (start and stop self-control) 
or sense of responsibility (interpersonal self-control). Tests of the indirect effects revealed 
that the effect of situational power on start self-control via sense of power and personal 
power was significant (indirect effecthighpower = 0.60, SE = 0.21, 95% CI [0.19,1.02]; indirect 
effectlowpower = -0.59, SE = 0.20, 95% CI [-0.99, -0.19]. However, the other two indirect effects 
of situational power on stop and interpersonal self-control were not. 
 
Table 5.8 
Proportions of situational power positions as function of structural power  
 
 Structural power 
Situational 
power 
Top 
Management 
Middle 
Management 
Lower 
Management 
Upper non-
management 
Lower non-
management 
High power 
positions 
 
68% 55% 44% 8% 6% 
Peer positions 
 
16% 21% 30% 56% 37% 
Low power 
positions 
16% 24% 26% 36% 57% 
Note. Descriptives reported here are based on 1021 observations from 114 participants: 14 participants did not indicate their 
structural power, and one only reported interactions with customers that are not considered here. 
 
We also explored the effects of actually facing these self-control challenges in the 
moment participants completed the short questionnaires. We designed our self-control 
measures to capture self-control motivation rather than actual behavior in order to guarantee 
that it would be possible to answer these questions in every situation. However, we also 
asked participants to indicate whether they actually had to exert start, stop, or interpersonal 
self-control. We added this predictor (0 = no, 1 = yes) to the models presented in Table 5.9 
and found it to be significant in all three models. Facing an actual start or interpersonal self-
control challenge increased the respective self-control motivation (start: γ = 6.43, p < .001; 
interpersonal: γ = 6.18, p = .003), whereas the need to actually exert stop self-control 
reduced stop self-control (γ = -5.82, p = .01). 
As shown in Table 5.9, we also investigated the relationships between the dimensions 
of power (except sense of responsibility because this predictor had no effect in any of the 
analyses) and both self-control and sense of responsibility that were not part of our 
hypotheses. Results showed that sense of responsibility was independent of personal power. 
As in the analysis presented as main hypothesis test, participants in situations in which they 
experienced higher personal power than their individual average personal power reported 
higher start self-control (γ = -2.99, p = .01), and there is also a significant between-person 
effect in the same direction (γ = 7.77, p = .01). However, stop and interpersonal self-control 
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seem to be determined predominantly by trait-like characteristics. Participants who 
experienced higher situational power than the average reported more stop self-control  
(γ = 21.15, p = .01) as well as more interpersonal self-control (γ = 18.74, p = .04). 
Participants who experienced a higher sense of power than the average reported less stop 
self-control (γ = -7.40, p = .05) as well as more interpersonal self-control (γ = -9.89, p = .03). 
We also found that participants who perceived higher personal power than the average 
reported more stop self-control (γ = 10.67, p < .001). Taken together, both objective and 
subjective power had independent effects on self-control. These results emphasize the 
importance of studying power as multifaceted construct. 
 
Table 5.9 
Results of exploratory multilevel analyses using situational power, sense of power and personal power 
to predict sense of responsibility and the three self-control dimensions. 
 
 
Criterion Start self-control Stop self-control 
Interpersonal  
self-control 
  
Fixed effects 
Parameter    
Intercept 70.57*** (3.77) 63.01*** (3.90) 67.34*** (4.65) 
Level 1 (Measurement 
occasions) 
   
Low situational power -0.29     (1.65) 1.64     (1.87) -1.15     (1.62) 
High situational power -0.79     (2.02) -3.05     (2.29) -2.62     (1.97) 
Sense of power -2.02     (0.95) 2.01+    (1.07) 0.80     (0.93) 
Personal power 3.07*** (0.88) 0.47     (1.00) 0.32     (1.16) 
Sense of responsibility 1.49+    (0.77) -0.49     (0.87) -0.58     (0.75) 
Level 2 (Individuals)    
Low situational power 7.10     (8.42) 15.93+   (8.75) -7.17   (10.34) 
High situational power 9.96     (7.42) 20.52**  (7.73) 19.21*    (9.02) 
Sense of power -8.56*    (4.04) -9.41*    (4.18) -7.56     (4.97) 
Personal power 8.23**  (2.92) 10.94*** (3.00) 4.89     (3.66) 
Sense of responsibility 6.55     (3.61) 3.84     (3.74) -4.55     (4.45) 
  
Random effects 
Variance    
Intercept 288.17   (16.98) 294.69   (17.17) 483.14   (21.98) 
Low situational power - - - 
High situational power - - - 
Sense of power - - - 
Personal power - - 44.02     (6.64) 
Sense of responsibility - - - 
Residual 329.23   (18.14) 421.97   (20.54) 299.83   (17.32) 
R2 33.9% 31.1% 51.9% 
Note. For fixed effects standard errors are in parentheses. For random effects standard deviations are in parentheses. (Pseudo-
)R2 was calculated comparing the absolute null model without any predictor to the model presented in this table. N = 128 
because one participant who reported only interactions with customers was excluded in these analyses. 
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. + p < .10. 
 
In our confirmatory analyses we only included observations that referred to interactions 
with superiors, peers and subordinates. However, one fifth of our data described interactions 
with customers and suppliers (for descriptives per role see Table 5.10). Comparing the data 
from interactions between members of the same organization to interactions with outsiders 
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revealed two interesting differences on a descriptive level. First, the relationships between 
our power constructs do not conform to our hypotheses: Although participants in the supplier 
role report lower levels of sense of power than participants in the customer role, they report 
higher levels of personal power and sense of responsibility. Second, being in a supplier or 
customer role has stronger effects on self-control than being in a high power, low power, or 
peer role. 
 
Table 5.10 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of measures per situational power role 
 
 High power 
n = 276 
Peer 
n = 464 
Low power 
n = 386 
Supplier 
n = 255 
Customer 
n = 64 
Sense of 
power 
 
4.12 (0.84) 3.08 (0.70) 2.04 (0.79) 3.33 (1.19) 3.89 (1.09) 
Personal 
power 
 
3.74 (0.82) 3.60 (0.88) 3.37 (0.93) 3.72 (0.94) 3.49 (1.05) 
Sense of 
responsibility 
 
4.02 (0.85) 3.26 (0.84) 2.76 (1.04) 4.07 (1.20) 3.19 (1.15) 
Start self-
control 
 
75.63 (23.82) 74.41 (25.87) 76.55 (24.64) 80.09 (23.90) 69.75 (27.96) 
Stop self-
control 
 
74.06 (26.59) 71.62 (28.33) 75.32 (26.66) 80.97 (22.95) 70.37 (25.43) 
Interpersonal 
self-control 
70.09 (25.95) 67.18 (30.48) 66.34 (30.25) 70.00 (31.84) 56.90 (31.75) 
Note. Sense of power, personal power and sense of responsibility were measured on scales ranging from 1 to 5, whereas the 
three self-control dimensions were measured on scales ranging from 0 to 100. 
 
General Discussion 
Experimental research conducted with student participants has documented that 
feeling powerful or feeling powerless affects outcomes that have high practical relevance for 
organizations such as goal pursuit, time perception, advice taking, or self-control (Galinsky et 
al., 2015; Guinote, 2017). However, it has yet been unclear how results from these studies 
can be generalized to organizational settings in which individuals have various roles that 
imply more or less objective power. We aimed to fill this gap by presenting a theoretical 
framework for understanding how objective power in organizations impacts psychological 
power with its various downstream consequences and empirically testing its key 
assumptions. We investigated self-control as an example of an organizationally vital 
outcome. A major strength of our theoretical framework is that it establishes conceptual 
clarity with regard to the power and self-control constructs that have both been defined 
broadly and/or inconsistently by disaggregating both constructs into their constituting 
elements (e.g., see Figure 5.1). 
In support of our hypotheses, we found in a preregistered experiment and a 
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preregistered experience-sampling study that imagining and actually experiencing 
interactions with superiors (i.e., having low situational power) decreased participants’ sense 
of power as compared to interactions with peers, whereas imagining interacting and actually 
interacting with subordinates (i.e., having high situational power) resulted in an increased 
sense of power as compared to interactions with peers. In turn, a higher sense of power was 
positively related to both personal power and sense of responsibility. These results show that 
interacting with others belonging to different hierarchical levels is the real-world equivalent of 
a structural power manipulation in the laboratory (Galinsky et al., 2015).  
However, with regard to self-control, the results were complex across the two studies. 
From a between-person perspective, participants in low power situations (i.e., situational 
power) reported on a descriptive level both more stop (supporting our hypothesis) and start 
self-control (contradicting our hypothesis) than participants in high power situations. From a 
within-person perspective, the effects were inconsistent across the two studies: In Study 1 
we found that personal power was negatively related to both start (supporting our 
hypothesis) and stop self-control (contradicting our hypothesis), whereas in Study 2, as 
hypothesized, personal power was positively related to start self-control. However, stop as 
well as interpersonal self-control were unaffected by changing situational circumstances.  
The following differences between the two studies might explain these results. First, 
self-control was measured differently. In Study 1 we rather targeted self-control performance 
and participants answered questions referring to concrete ways of (not) showing self-control. 
In contrast, in Study 2 we focused on self-control motivation and participants answered 
abstract questions on self-control (see also next paragraph).  
Second, given that participants in Study 1 only imagined the interactions and based 
their answers on implicit theories rather than actual experience, we consider the results of 
Study 2 to be more dependable. Furthermore, the positive within-person effect of power on 
start self-control complements previous between-person research, unequivocally showing 
that power is positively related to the concept of initiation on an abstract level (e.g., Keltner et 
al., 2003; Magee, 2009). On a more concrete level, previous experiments have also shown 
that participants in high power conditions showed better start self-control performance than 
participants in low power conditions, e.g., made more attempts to solve difficult tasks 
(DeWall, Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs, 2011; Guinote, 2007b), were better able to focus on the 
task at hand (Guinote, 2007c; Slabu, Guinote, & Wilkinson, 2013; Smith, Jostmann, 
Galinsky, & Van Dijk, 2008), and decided in favor of their long-term interests (Joshi & Fast, 
2013). Hence, in the case of start self-control, results from the laboratory seem to generalize 
to organizational settings. In summary, these inconsistent results emphasize the necessity to 
complement laboratory experiments with the investigation of experiential episodes. 
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Unexpected Findings for Effects on Stop Self-Control 
Previous experimental research has demonstrated that participants in high power 
conditions showed worse stop self-control performance than participants in low power 
conditions, e.g., cheated more (Lammers, Stapel et al., 2010) and did not think their course 
of action through (Smith et al., 2008; Scholl & Sassenberg, 2015). Fittingly, we found in 
Study 1 a negative relationship between power and stop self-control performance. However, 
stop (and also the functionally related interpersonal) self-control motivation were unaffected 
by power in our Study 2.  
This suggests that – at least with regard to stop self-control – it is very important to 
differentiate carefully between self-control motivation and self-control performance. Self-
control can be considered a process (Kotabe & Hofmann, 2015): Within the activation phase, 
desire and an at least partly incompatible higher order goal generate desire-goal conflict. 
This conflict marks the transition to the exertion phase in that it activates control motivation. 
Control motivation and control capacity interactively determine potential control effort. In the 
enactment phase, if there are no enactment constraints, the intended behavioral outcome of 
the previous phase is realized.  
Different factors matter in different phases of the (stop) self-control process: At the 
beginning of the process (i.e., desire strength and conflict), personality has been 
demonstrated to have a stronger impact than situational factors in down-regulating perceived 
desire strength and motivational conflict, whereas situational factors showed relatively more 
influence on components later in the process (resistance and behavior enactment; Hofmann, 
Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, 2012). Our Study 2 targeted the beginning of the self-control 
process. At the same time, our sample scored relatively high on trait self-control (i.e., the 
mean in our sample, 3.56, was a significantly higher mean than the theoretical scale mean, 
3, t(128) = 11.203, p < .001, d = 0.99) due to our study design requiring good self-
management skills. As demonstrated in the experience sampling study by Hofmann and 
colleagues, high self-control participants such as ours might not have experienced 
motivational conflicts and/or problematic desires and reported constantly high levels of state 
self-control motivation accordingly. Taken together, this suggests that self-control should be 
investigated as a multifaceted construct, not only with regard to a functional taxonomy as 
used here in Studies 1 and 2, but additionally with regard to a process view. 
The Role of Responsibility in the Power – Outcome Relationship 
Given the recent interest in the role of perceived responsibility (e.g., Sassenberg, 
Ellemers, Scheepers, Scholl, 2014; Tost, 2015) in effects of power on outcomes, we included 
sense of responsibility as one dimension of subjective power in our model. In light of our 
approach to measure the communal outcome of interest in the power-relevant situation 
(namely as behavior directed towards the person with whom the agent has the power 
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relationship, and not as behavior directed to a person outside the power relationship as it is 
common in experimental (power priming) research; Tost, 2015), we were surprised by the 
null effect of sense of responsibility on interpersonal self-control. 
In contrast to the studies presented here, the only other experience sampling study in 
power research fittingly found that feelings of responsibility mediated the relationship 
between power and the two communal outcomes felt closeness and the wish to interact 
(Smith & Hofmann, 2015). This discrepancy could be explained in several ways. First, 
although convincing in theory, sense of responsibility must not necessarily have effects in 
everyday contexts. Being aware of one’s responsibility does not mean that one also acts 
upon it (Scholl et al., 2017, Study 2). Second, as stated above, the only empirical evidence 
comes from the study by Smith and Hofmann. In this study the majority of participants were 
female; one third of the reported situations were classified as family-related and two-third of 
the family-related situations were high power situations. Taken together, this suggests that 
mothers with power over their children reported a substantial part of the high power 
situations. Power over one’s children is not necessarily the same as power over 
subordinates. Third, it might have been a problem of operationalization. Given the time-
intensive measurement in Study 2, we confronted participants with a rather abstract question 
to measure their (interpersonal) self-control, whereas “wanting to interact” or “feeling close” 
in the study by Smith and Hofmann are more narrowly described behaviors. Fourth, 
communal behaviors might not be a homogeneous category of behaviors: It is possible that 
there are subgroups within this broad category. For instance, feelings of closeness or wishes 
to interact are not tied to normative prescriptions, whereas showing interpersonal self-control 
is required by norms, especially in a professional context. 
Theoretical Implications for Power Research 
One of the unsolved conundrums of power research is what might constitute an 
adequate control condition. Control conditions are necessary to determine whether an effect 
of power is attributable to power or to powerlessness. The need for control conditions within 
power research has already been discussed elsewhere (du Plessis, Schaerer, Yap, & Thau, 
2016; Magee & Smith, 2013; Moskowitz, 2004). However, these claims have not received a 
great deal of attention.  
Admittedly, in between-person experimental designs, it is rather unattractive to have a 
control condition. First, conducting 3-cell-design-studies with a control condition is more 
expensive – more participants need to be recruited, tested, and compensated, which costs 
more time and money than only comparing conditions in a two-cell design. Second, it is not 
easy to determine what could constitute an adequate control condition. One idea has been to 
use non-relational conditions as control conditions (e.g., “write about your day yesterday” 
within the priming paradigm; e.g., Galinsky et al., 2006); however, power is a relational 
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phenomenon and cannot be meaningfully compared to non-social situations. Another idea is 
to establish a condition that is equal in terms of access to and control over resources and 
punishments (i.e., equal structural power). However, participants still might not perceive the 
power balance to be equal, as this perception might depend on many fairly stable individual 
difference variables, such as trait dominance, interpersonal hierarchy expectation, 
competence, or one’s own standing in the informal hierarchy within one’s organization 
(French & Raven, 1959; Schmid Mast, 2005; Schmid Mast, 2010). 
Studying power in within-person designs as we do in the current work provides a 
solution for the control condition-related problems. On the one hand, within-designs offer a 
substantial boost in statistical power and require fewer participants than would be needed to 
conduct a study with a 3-cell-design and adequate power (Charness, Gneezy, & Kuhn, 
2012). On the other hand, every individual can be his/her own control condition. The 
advantage is that the aforementioned factors that influence the perception of the power 
balance between individuals do not interfere with the interpretation of power’s effects, as they 
are constant across all three conditions. This is the approach we chose in our first study. 
However, this “simple within-approach” still relies on the assumption that structural and 
psychological power are linked by a linear and positive relationship. This is questionable 
against the background of work by interpersonal circumplex researchers on behavioral 
complementarity. Complementarity means that people tend to respond to dominant behavior 
with submissive behavior and to submissive behavior with dominant behavior (Markey, 
Funder, & Ozer, 2003; Sadler & Woody, 2003). Superiors and subordinates are not primarily 
their hierarchical roles - they are human beings first. Thus, interacting with a very dominant 
subordinate might result in a reluctant superior feeling less powerful than the subordinate 
feels, irrespective of the fact that it should be the other way around given the distribution of 
structural power. 
The more complex within-approach we chose in Study 2 allowed us to circumvent this 
issue. Sampling multiple interactions an individual has with different people on different 
hierarchical levels allows for the determination of the individual’s baseline psychological 
power – independently of structural power. Upward or downward deviations from this 
individual baseline psychological power can then be interpreted as high or low power 
situations. 
Practical Implications 
Self-control challenges are prevalent in everyday organizational life. Employees on all 
hierarchical levels need to concentrate on the task at hand and avoid being distracted by 
every incoming e-mail. They should neither say or do things in the spur of the moment, nor 
should they procrastinate important but unpleasant chores. Superiors and subordinates must 
cope with these demands in order to do their work successfully. Our results suggest that it is 
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important to differentiate between start and stop self-control because the success in these 
two kinds of challenges is determined by different factors. 
Stop self-control and the closely related interpersonal self-control seem to be 
determined to a larger extent by interindividual differences. In fields of activity in which 
impulse control and concentration are imperative (e.g., customer contact, contact with 
challenging populations such as children or old people), there may be merit in taking these 
into consideration when recruiting and selecting individuals. In contrast, start self-control is 
also susceptible to situational influences. This implies that there is a “right moment” to tackle 
start self-control tasks such as getting started doing something that one dislikes but that 
needs to be done or revising work that was thought to be completed already. Typically, these 
self-control challenges might arise following meetings with superiors. As personal power 
helps in dealing with start self-control challenges, it would be important for superiors to take 
care to not diminish their subordinates’ personal power in instructing them to do these kinds 
of tasks. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Potential for improvement exists with respect to the empirical testing of our 
propositions. First, we focused on self-control motivation in the current work. Of course, this 
is only the first step in the self-control process, and various factors can still interfere along the 
way to self-control enactment (cf. Kotabe & Hofmann, 2015). It would have been ideal to 
sample situations in which participants experienced both a power relevant situation and 
faced a self-control challenge in order to be able to capture actual self-control enactment. 
However, this would require sampling even more situations to increase the probability of 
documenting at least some of these kinds of situations. The other possibility would be to put 
the cart before the horse: One could also ask participants to report situations in which they 
exerted self-control and what they did before each of these. 
Second, we cannot rule out the possibility that the effects of situational power are 
confounded with effects of specific interaction partners. Participants only reported the 
interaction partner’s role. However, the same role (i.e., peer or subordinate) can be occupied 
by different people with different personalities and different relationship history, which 
probably affects the interaction situation. For instance, if an individual reported four 
interactions with subordinates in total and all four were interactions with Peter, the effects 
might either be effects of high power or effects of interacting with Peter. This is less of a 
problem if an individual’s reported interactions with subordinates referred to interactions with 
different people. 
In contrast to a laboratory environment in which one attempts to minimize the influence 
of context, context is inescapable in real life (Lewin, 1938). In prior (laboratory) power 
research, only a limited amount of studies have explicitly taken moderators such as status, 
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stability or legitimacy into consideration (Schmid Mast, 2010). We encourage further efforts in 
this direction and suggest previously neglected factors that might qualify the relationship 
between structural power and psychological power: organizational hierarchy climate, 
interpersonal hierarchy expectation, self-monitoring, and role integration/segmentation 
preferences. What these proposed moderators have in common is that they might amplify 
the perceptions of power differences between hierarchical positions, which should ultimately 
result in stronger effects on outcomes. 
Conclusion 
There is a lot of evidence in favor of psychological power as a determinant of various 
outcomes, either as an explaining mechanism linking structural power to outcomes (e.g., 
Bombari, Schmid Mast, & Bachmann, 2017; Galinsky et al., 2015) or as a predictor 
independent of structural power (Smith & Hofmann, 2016). We have demonstrated that 
psychological power cannot only be manipulated between-person as in previous 
experimental work, but that there is also substantial within-person variation in people’s levels 
of everyday psychological power. We therefore encourage future research to study power 
and its outcomes (again) outside the laboratory.  
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This last chapter summarizes major findings of this dissertation, provides a reflection 
on the strengths and limitations of the presented studies and discusses theoretical and 
practical implications. The main aim of this dissertation was to investigate the effects of 
social power on self-control as primary operationalization of responsible behavior. Given the 
broad nature of the definitions of both constructs involved, I have followed a molecular 
approach in investigating the relationship between objective and subjective power on the 
independent variable side, and start, stop, and interpersonal self-control on the outcome 
side. 
Does Power Result in Responsible Behavior? 
Based on the evidence I have gathered in four experimental studies and one quasi-
experimental study (see Table 6.1) using different power manipulations and different 
outcome operationalizations, the answer is no. Overall, the findings presented in this 
dissertation revealed no differences in self-control performance (see Chapters 2 and 3) and 
risk-taking (see Chapter 4) in response to experimental manipulations of power. In contrast, 
interpersonal accuracy (see Chapter 4) and self-control motivation (see Chapter 5) seem to 
be affected by power, however the findings were inconsistent across operationalizations or 
studies, respectively. In the light of these results, reminders of responsibility such as 
Voltaire’s quotation cited in the introduction (“With great power comes great responsibility”) 
remain relevant. 
The initial motivation to explore the relationship between social power and self-control 
arose from conflicting predictions made by the two major power theories, the 
approach/inhibition theory (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) and the social distance 
theory (Magee & Smith, 2013). Based on the reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST, Gray, 
1991), the approach/inhibition theory suggests that power is related to a heightened attention 
to rewards and to a drive to experience these rewards immediately, which should ultimately 
result in poor self-control. Conversely, based on principles of construal level theory (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010), the social distance theory proposes that the perceived larger social 
distance to other people experienced by powerholders brings them to engage in higher-level 
construal, which has been proven beneficial in boosting self-control. Applying a rather broad 
definition of self-control as the ability to align one’s own behavior with superordinate goals, 
values, and norms (cf. Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007), evidence exists for both of these 
mutually exclusive predictions of increased and decreased self-control following the 
experience of power. To give some examples: Participants in high-power conditions are 
better able to focus on the task at hand (Guinote, 2007b; Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van 
Dijk, 2008), and they persist longer and make more attempts to solve (unsolvable) tasks 
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(Guinote, 2007a) than participants in low-power conditions. They are, however, worse at 
suppressing thoughts (Guinote, 2007c), withstanding impulses to act (Scholl & Sassenberg, 
2015), and they take more risks (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). 
 
Table 6.1 
Overview on characteristics of studies conducted as part of this dissertation 
 
Chapter Kind of study Conditions Sample Power manipulation 
Dependent 
variable 
2 Online 
Experiment 
(direct 
replication) 
 
Between: 
HP vs. LP vs. 
C 
Students 
and working 
adults 
n = 263 
Episodic priming Self-control 
(behavior): 
Temporal 
discounting 
3 Laboratory 
Experiment 
(conceptual 
replication) 
Between: HP 
vs. LP 
Mostly 
students, 
female 
n = 95 
Role-play 
(Interview situation) 
Start self-control 
(behavior): 
1. Handgrip task 
2. Persistence in 
problem-solving 
 
Stop self-control 
(behavior): 
3. d2 test of 
attention 
4. Emotion 
suppression 
 
4 Laboratory 
Experiment 
Within: HP vs. 
LP 
Mostly 
students, 
male 
n = 78 
 
Role-play 
(Tangram puzzle 
task) 
1. Risk-taking 
(behavior) 
2. Interpersonal 
accuracy 
(behavior) 
 
5 Online 
Experiment 
Within: HP vs. 
LP vs. C 
Non-student 
n = 190 
Hierarchical position 
of imagined 
interaction partner 
 
1. Start self-control 
(motivation) 
2. Stop self-control 
(motivation) 
 
5 Experience 
sampling 
study 
Within: Quasi-
experiment, 
HP vs. LP vs. 
C 
Non-student 
n = 129 
Hierarchical position 
of actual interaction 
partner 
1. Start self-control 
(motivation) 
2. Stop self-control 
(motivation) 
3. Interpersonal 
self-control 
(motivation) 
Note. HP = high power, LP = low power, C = control 
 
When two theories make conflicting predictions and there is empirical evidence in favor 
of both, the question arises as to when each theory is right. A first step in answering this 
question is to establish if previous findings on power’s effects on self-control are robust. I 
conducted two replication studies accordingly. First, the online experiment reported in 
Chapter 2 was a direct replication of the finding that power would decrease temporal 
discounting (i.e., improve self-control, Joshi & Fast, 2013, Study 3). Using a much larger 
sample size but nearly identical procedures to those of the original authors we obtained a 
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much smaller, non-significant effect. Bolstered by auxiliary analyses, the inability of the 
power priming paradigm to elevate participants’ sense of power seemed to be a reasonable 
explanation. Second, the laboratory experiment reported in Chapter 3 describes a conceptual 
replication of previous findings. We developed a more effective role-play power manipulation 
based on the self-presentation part of the Trier Social Stress Test (Birkett, 2011) and 
investigated the idea that previously used self-control operationalizations might cluster into 
two different categories, start and stop self-control, which could be differentially affected by 
power. However, although the power manipulation strongly affected how powerful/powerless 
participants felt, we found no effects on self-control performance. 
A likely explanation for the two failed replications might be that previous works 
overestimated the effects of power on self-control. In laboratory settings, neither power nor 
self-control are operationalized in ways that are consequential for participants, i.e., both 
constructs lack personal relevance. In investigating the relationship between these 
constructs in organizational settings where power and self-control actually matter, I tried to 
address this issue (cf. Chapters 4 and 5). Studying power in the real world implies that there 
are not only power differences between people but that power also varies to a non-negligible 
extent in rather short time spans within-person. However, as there was not much literature I 
could rely on, I began by investigating power in a within-person laboratory experiment (cf. 
Chapter 4).  
In Chapter 4 I discussed what could be gained by studying power within-person: This 
approach has methodological advantages such as increased statistical power. It also allows 
for exploring questions that cannot be answered otherwise, such as whether power gain and 
power loss are experienced equally strongly or where an individual’s “baseline” 
(psychological) power is situated. The empirical study presented in this chapter showed that 
it was indeed possible to manipulate psychological power within-person using a newly 
developed (structural) power manipulation. In order to increase the likelihood of finding 
effects of this within-person power manipulation I chose outcomes that have been shown to 
be reliably affected by power manipulations, namely risk-taking and interpersonal accuracy. 
Both outcomes are related to the idea of responsible behavior. However, although the 
manipulation affected psychological power, it did not produce the expected effects on the 
dependent measures. 
Finally, Chapter 5 explored the idea of studying power in real life and presented a 
theoretical framework that links within-person variations in objective power and psychological 
power to self-control in organizational settings. As before, power and self-control were both 
conceptualized as multidimensional constructs. The aforementioned experiment and 
experience sampling study supported the key predictions of the theoretical framework. 
Variation in objectively demonstrable control of valued resources (i.e., situational power) was 
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accompanied by variation in subjective power, such that participants experiencing high 
situational power also reported a high sense of power, high personal power and a high sense 
of responsibility. However, with regard to the self-control dimensions, a more complex 
pattern of results emerged. From a between-person perspective, participants in low power 
situations (i.e., situational power) reported both more stop (supporting our hypothesis) and 
start self-control (contradicting our hypothesis) on a descriptive level than participants in high 
power situations. This might reflect the larger situational strength in real world settings 
compared to laboratory settings. In the real world, participants in low power situations might 
simply lack the freedom necessary to behave in line with their motivational focus, because 
the consequences of not showing start self-control and stop self-control are equally adverse. 
From a within-person perspective, the effects were inconsistent across the two studies: We 
found that personal power was negatively related to both start (supporting our hypothesis) 
and stop self-control (contradicting our hypothesis) in the experiment, whereas in the 
experience sampling study, as hypothesized, personal power was positively related to start 
self-control, while stop and interpersonal self-control were not affected by personal power. I 
consider the results of the experience-sampling study to be more dependable, as these 
participants actually experienced power. Taken together, the inconsistent results emphasize 
the necessity to complement experiments with the investigation of experiential episodes. 
Strengths and Limitations  
I structure my discussion of strengths and limitations according to the four validity types 
reviewed by Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) in the context of their theory of causal 
generalization. Of the various threats they named to each validity type, I will comment on the 
ones relevant to my studies in the next section. 
Statistical conclusion validity 
Statistical conclusion validity concerns inferences about covariation between treatment 
and outcome. This implies two related issues, namely whether the presumed treatment and 
outcome covary and how strongly they do so. There are several reasons why one could be 
tempted to draw invalid inferences about the existence and magnitude of the covariation 
between treatment and outcome such as low statistical power, fishing, restriction of range, 
and unreliability of measures.  
First, there is a risk of incorrectly concluding that a relationship between treatment and 
outcome is not significant if one conducts an insufficiently powered study. Power research in 
general tends to have rather small samples, although it is likely that the effects of power 
manipulations (especially power priming) on outcomes are not large (Salomon, 2016). A 
strength of my dissertation studies is that I consistently considered the issue of power in 
interpreting my results. I either determined the sample size before data collection (studies 
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presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4) or I conducted at least a post-hoc power analysis (studies 
presented in Chapter 5).  
Second, fishing describes the practice of going through the data (e.g., correlate or 
compare everything with everything) in the hope of finding significant effects and then 
interpreting these effects as being meaningful. This can lead to false conclusions, given that 
under null hypothesis significance testing there is the inherent possibility of effects becoming 
significant “by accident”. Fishing is not an issue in my dissertation because the hypotheses I 
tested in the five reported studies were preregistered in terms of sample size, analysis 
method for testing hypotheses, and exclusion criteria. In reporting the results, I clearly 
characterized results as either confirmatory or exploratory. When I ran multiple tests, I 
corrected the Type I error rate (see Chapter 3). 
Third, unreliable measures might be a problem. A highly reliable measure produces 
similar results under consistent conditions, so when different conditions yield different results, 
they likely reflect true differences instead of noise. Unfortunately, some of the outcome 
measures I used were single-item measures (temporal discounting in Chapter 2, risk-taking 
lottery task in Chapter 4, self-report measures of start, stop and interpersonal self-control in 
Chapter 5). However, although single-item scales are psychometrically less favorable than 
multiple-item scales, they might still be adequate. With regard to the behavioral measures, 
both paradigms are well-established (risk-taking lottery: e.g., Adam, Kroll, & Teubner, 2014; 
Bolton, Ockenfels, & Stauf, 2015; Eijkelenboom & Vostroknutov, 2016; temporal discounting: 
e.g., Curry, Price, & Price, 2008) and empirical evidence points to their construct validity as 
shown for instance by the findings that individual discount rates predict interindividual 
variation in real-world health behaviors such as exercise and smoking (Chabris, Laibson, 
Morris, Schuldt, & Taubinsky, 2008) or that individual discount rates discriminate between 
pathological and non-pathological gamblers (MacKillop, Anderson, Castelda, Mattson, & 
Donovick, 2006). With regard to the self-report measures, a clear advantage is that single-
item measures do not contain redundancy. It is therefore less boring and frustrating to 
complete them rather than having to answer a larger number of highly similar questions 
repeatedly (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). At the same time, single-item scales can be 
just as valid as longer scales as shown for instance by the single-item self-esteem scale 
(SISE; Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001), the single-item measure of social 
identification (SISI; Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2013), or the meta-analysis of single-item 
measures of overall job satisfaction showing uncorrelated correlations of .63 with scale 
measures of overall job satisfaction. 
Internal validity 
Internal validity refers to the adequacy of interpreting a covariation between A, the 
presumed treatment, and B, the presumed outcome, as a causal relationship. This adequacy 
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is challenged by ambiguous temporal precedence, systematic differences over conditions in 
respondent characteristics (selection), attrition, and testing effects among others. 
First, in order for the treatment to have an effect on the outcome, the treatment must 
take place before the outcome is measured. This is usually not the case in correlational 
studies, however, it is guaranteed in experimental designs. In the experiments I presented in 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, temporal precedence is not an issue, as participants first experienced 
the manipulation before they were confronted with the (clearly separated) outcome measure. 
In the two studies presented in Chapter 5, however, temporal precedence is not guaranteed. 
In the experiment, the three levels of the manipulation and the outcome measures were 
presented at once. Participants were instructed to proceed level by level and give their 
answers directly in reaction to one level of the manipulation. Despite these instructions, they 
might have chosen one level as an anchor and given their answer in reference to that anchor 
in the two other levels. In the experience-sampling study, manipulation and outcome were 
recorded at the same time. Again, although temporal precedence would be given if 
participants strictly adhered to the instruction to answer the questionnaires in direct 
subsequence to the interactions constituting the manipulation, it is not beyond doubt that 
participants did so. They might have done something else in between the interaction and the 
completion of the outcome measure or answered the questionnaire with a time lag after the 
interaction. In these cases, the answers to the outcome measures might reflect something 
other than the power manipulation. Given that the experiments and the two studies 
presented in Chapter 5 differ with regard to the conclusion whether power affects self-control, 
this should be kept in mind (see also conclusion in this chapter). 
Second, attrition – the loss of participants in the course of the experiment that is 
systematically related to experimental conditions – is unlikely to have affected the validity of 
the presented studies. In the two laboratory studies presented in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
assignment to conditions took place only when participants arrived in the laboratory and 
none of the participants failed to complete the outcome measure. The two studies presented 
in Chapter 5 had a within-person design: In the experiment, participants completed either all 
three conditions or none. In the experience-sampling study, not every participant reported 
instances of high-power, low-power, and equal-power; however, this is an inevitable, design-
based characteristic of the study. Admittedly, in the online experiment reported in Chapter 2, 
attrition could have been a problem, as dropout rates differed significantly across the three 
conditions. However, at least based on gender, age, and professional status the conditions 
were still similar. It is therefore unlikely that systematic dropout affected the validity of our 
manipulation. 
Third, selection might have compromised our findings reported in Chapter 4. We 
randomly assigned participants to the power-gain- and the power-loss-condition in this study. 
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Nonetheless, participants in the power-loss-condition reported less trait risk-taking than 
participants in the power-gain-condition and this was mirrored in the number of risky choices 
they made in the experiment. However, in the other studies this was not a problem, as 
participants were comparable across the experimental conditions in the between-person 
experiments reported in Chapters 2 and 3, and the studies reported in Chapter 5 had a 
within-person design that keeps individual differences constant across conditions. 
Construct validity 
Construct validity concerns the adequacy of inferences about higher order constructs 
given the measures and manipulations that were used. Construct validity is threatened by an 
inadequate explication of constructs, the confounding of constructs with levels of constructs 
as well as reactivity to the experimental situation amongst others. 
First, as I have detailed on various occasions throughout this dissertation, both the 
literatures on power and self-control suffer from the inadequate explication of constructs. 
Effects of various power manipulations have often been interpreted as effects of high or low 
power – but what kind of power (e.g., structural or psychological)? Differences in the Stroop 
task, temporal discounting paradigms, or the success in suppressing emotions have been 
interpreted as differences in self-control – but what kind of self-control? Initiatory or inhibitory 
self-control? Self-control capacity or enactment? In my dissertation studies I tried to 
disaggregate constructs into their smallest possible parts, to define constructs as precisely 
as possible, and to base my choice of measures on explanations and arguments. 
Second, as is common in psychological power research, I did not study power as 
continuum; hence, the confounding of constructs with levels cannot be ruled out. Usually, 
power researchers compare high to low to equal power conditions (or only two of these). 
However, power researchers usually omit no-power and absolute-power conditions. 
Additionally, it is unclear, whether e.g., high power conditions in two different studies (using 
different manipulations) are actually comparable. Insights may be gained using a finer 
gradation such as no-power, low-power, moderate high power (e.g., the real-life equivalent 
being a team leader), and high power (e.g., the real-life equivalent being a CEO) (cf. Fiedler, 
2011). For instance, in the case of self-control, it might be that power decreases stop self-
control only in situations of (nearly) absolute power. Initial evidence in favor of following a 
more fine-grained approach comes from Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke and De Dreu 
(2008). They found differences between a no-power and a low-power condition. Using a 
modified ultimatum game, they showed that allocators made low offers to powerless 
receivers. However, when recipients were completely powerless, offers increased. 
Third, participants’ behavior not only reflects the objective characteristics of the 
experimental situation but also participants’ subjective perceptions or assumptions about the 
purpose of the study. I tried to minimize reactivity by deflecting attention from hypotheses 
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and outcome measures (e.g., by using cover stories, see Chapters 3 and 4). However, a 
cover story must also be chosen wisely as it can bias participants to behave in a certain way. 
For instance, the cover story of the experiment reported in Chapter 4 was that I wanted to 
investigate cooperative work interactions. By providing this anchor, I might have induced 
participants to avoid making risky decisions. Moreover, in order to be able to control for 
demand characteristics post-hoc, I asked participants of the laboratory experiments what 
they thought the respective experiment was about. None of the participants of the experiment 
reported in Chapter 3 suspected the study’s hypotheses. Many of the participants of the 
experiment reported in Chapter 4 suspected that leadership, power differences, empathy, 
responsibility or risk-taking was being investigated, but only nine participants formulated 
ideas for possible research questions in proximity to our actual research questions. 
Additionally, I standardized experimental procedures and communication with participants as 
much as possible by means of providing experimenters with a detailed manual (Chapters 3 
and 4), providing written information material (Chapter 5), using standardized e-mails to 
communicate with participants (Chapter 5), and minimizing the number of appointed 
experimenters. 
External validity 
External validity describes the adequacy of drawing inferences about whether the 
treatment-outcome relationship holds across variations in people, settings, manipulations 
and measures. I tried to recruit diverse samples with regard to age and professional situation 
(students vs. professionals working in different domains). Students and professionals might 
differ in their understanding of power, as the former are less familiar with high structural 
power situations than the latter. Additionally, I studied the relationship between my focal 
constructs in the laboratory as well as in the field.  
However, I chose an all-female sample for the study presented in Chapter 3 and an all-
male sample for the study presented in Chapter 4. These decisions were made for practical 
reasons: Both studies used role-play manipulations and I wanted to avoid possible 
confounds induced by mixed gender interactions. There were also reasons pertaining to the 
outcome side: In the case of the study presented in Chapter 3, I wanted to minimize the risk 
of self-handicapping effects (e.g., in the creative problem solving task), as these effects 
seem to be less pronounced for women than for men (McCrea, Hirt, & Milner, 2008). In the 
case of the study presented in Chapter 4, I wanted to increase the probability of having a 
strong positive effect of power on risk-taking that I could reduce by our manipulation of 
outcome responsibility. As men are in general less risk averse (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 
1999; Cross, Copping, & Campbell, 2011), a male sample seemed to be a good choice. 
However, given that prior research has documented differences in how men and women 
substantiate and use their power (Carli, 1999; Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, & Van Engen, 
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2003; Eagly, & Johnson, 1990), results from power studies should not be generalized across 
gender. 
Finally, I studied well-educated samples. I either know that participants in these 
samples scored high on trait self-control (Chapter 5, experience sampling study) and rather 
low on trait risk-taking (Study in Chapter 4) or I assume that they are good at controlling 
themselves (studies in Chapters 2 and 3), because trait self-control is positively related to a 
higher grade point average (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), which is a precondition 
for attending a university or completing a qualified education. Trait self-control has been 
shown to affect how individuals tackle state self-control challenges (e.g., Baumeister, Wright, 
& Carreon , 2018; de Ridder, Kroese, & Gillebaart, 2018; Forestier, Sarrazin, Allenet, 
Gauchet, Heuzé, & Chalabaev, 2018). With regard to the outcome self-control, it is therefore 
not necessarily the case that my results would have been the same had I studied other 
samples with more variation in trait self-control or lower trait self-control in general as power 
might have more room to have its effects in participants low(er) in trait self-control. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, this dissertation has some notable strengths: First I respected open 
science best practices in all studies by preregistering my main hypotheses and making 
materials and data publicly available via the Open Science Framework. Second, I made an 
effort to establish good construct validity: I circumvented mono-operation- and mono-method-
bias by using multiple operationalizations. I manipulated power by means of episodic priming 
(Chapter 2), I developed two different role-play power manipulations (Chapters 3 and 4), and 
I investigated a “situational power manipulation” online and in everyday life (Chapter 5). 
Likewise, I used different approaches to measure self-control – a set of well-established 
laboratory measures (Chapters 2 and 3) and two different self-report measures (Chapter 5). 
Third, I addressed the lack of research on power in natural contexts by conducting research 
both in the laboratory (Chapters 2 – 4) and in organizational settings (Chapter 5) with student 
as well as employed participants. 
However, in addition to the threats to validity discussed in the previous sections (e.g., 
single-item measures, ambiguous temporal precedence in the studies presented in Chapter 
5, confounding of constructs with levels), the following issue may warrant consideration. The 
laboratory experiments with mostly student participants presented in Chapters 2 and 3 found 
no effect of power on self-control performance. In contrast, the two studies with employed 
participants presented in Chapter 5 yielded non-causal evidence for an effect of power on 
self-control motivation. However, as the measures and manipulations used, the levels of 
investigation (between vs. within), and the samples studied were different between these two 
groups of studies it is not possible to (empirically) tell what caused this difference in findings. 
More systematic research that varies only one parameter and keeps all other parameters 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  111 
constant is needed to identify the critical factor responsible for the differences. 
Implications for Theory and Future Research 
As shown in the previous section, the research presented in this dissertation allowed 
me to draw mostly valid conclusions about the absence of causal effects and the rather small 
size of non-causal effects of power on self-control. Together with the work by Zhang and 
Smith (2018), the studies presented as part of this dissertation are the only preregistered 
studies on the relationship between power and self-control. These studies have corrected the 
public record in that they produced null findings while previous research did find effects of 
power on self-control. Future research will have to acknowledge that certain assumptions are 
not empirically true, or at least much harder to detect and therefore probably of lesser 
relevance. In the following I discuss why my results are a valuable contribution and I also 
discuss the very promising strategy of identifying effects of power with real-world implications 
I presented in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Striving for Conceptual Clarity in Power Research 
The power construct suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity. Constructs defined as 
broadly as power (and self-control) make it difficult to understand related phenomena 
because different operationalizations that accentuate different aspects of these broad 
definitions might result in seemingly conflicting findings (for example see Table 3.2). The two 
major power theories, the approach/inhibition theory (Keltner et al., 2003) and the social 
distance theory (Magee & Smith, 2013) do not elaborate on their conceptualization of power. 
The approach/inhibition theory defines power as “an individual’s relative capacity to modify 
others’ states…” (Keltner et al., 2003, p. 265) and additionally specifies power bases by 
adding “…by providing or withholding resources or administering punishments” (p. 265; cf. 
coercive and reward power, French & Raven, 1959). In comparison, the social distance 
theory defines power as “asymmetric control over valued resources” (Magee & Smith, 2013, 
p. 159) without specifying power bases and stresses that power is a dyadic concept (cf. 
principle 1). Both theories understand power in terms of a structural characteristic and 
consider power to be more of a between-person difference variable, as possible within-
person variation is never mentioned. However, neither of the two provide guidance on how to 
operationalize the abstract construct of power or explain in detail how objective structural 
power is translated into the psychological experience of power. The latter issue is addressed 
only in the theoretical framework by Tost (2015). She suggests that structural power could 
manifest psychologically in two forms. The first psychological manifestation is the conscious 
sense of power, namely “one’s evaluation of the extent to which one has the ability to 
influence others” (Tost, 2015, p. 35). The second is the mostly subconscious cognitive 
network of power that consists of learned associations between power and various cognitive, 
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affective, and behavioral tendencies. Tost’s framework has been a very important first step in 
understanding how structural power is linked to psychological power and organizational 
outcomes. Unfortunately, it is not precise enough to be used as basis of empirical research in 
organizational settings.  
The framework I presented in Chapter 5 is meant to extend Tost’s (2015) ideas and 
make them testable. In my framework, I tried to disaggregate power into the narrowest 
definable units possible: I split social power (i.e., the ability to influence others’ behavior due 
to asymmetrical control over valued resources; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Keltner et al., 2003) 
into structural power (i.e., the objectively demonstrable control of valued resources; Tost, 
2015), situational power (i.e., the superiority of the own or the other’s stable hierarchical 
position within a specific social interaction), sense of power (i.e., the subjective judgment 
about one’s own ability to influence others in a given social situation), personal power (i.e., 
the subjective judgment about one’s own competence, agency, autonomy, and 
independence; cf. Overbeck & Park, 2001; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006; Lammers, Stoker, & 
Stapel, 2009) and the sense of responsibility (i.e., a state of being concerned for others’ well-
being and aware of the consequences of one’s own actions for others; Tost, 2015). In doing 
so, I also separate objective power (i.e., structural and situational power) from psychological 
power (i.e., sense of power, personal power, sense of responsibility; see Chapter 5) and 
acknowledge that psychological power might have both a variable and a trait-like component 
(see Chapter 4).  
The two major differences between Tost’s framework and mine are that I (1) introduced 
an additional step between structural power and sense of power and (2) conceptualized the 
cognitive network of power differently. First, I proposed that situational power, namely the 
interaction-specific distribution of structural power, is the link between stable structural power 
on the between-person level as expressed by a position in an organizational chart and sense 
of power as psychological representation of power. This additional step is necessary in order 
to accommodate the fact that power in real world (organizational) settings is dynamic in the 
sense that a given person is likely to experience variations in structural power throughout the 
day. For instance, members of the middle management are subordinates when interacting 
with their bosses, but they are superiors when interacting with their subordinates. As 
demonstrated in the experience-sampling study (see Chapter 5) and the only other 
experience-sampling study in this domain (Smith & Hofmann, 2016) the within-person 
variance in (structural) power is substantial (> 50 %) and cannot be neglected.  
Second, I replaced the cognitive network of power postulated by Tost (2015) with the 
construct of personal power. Tost assumes that this network is composed of constructs 
related to agency. Agency describes people’s experience of being capable of producing their 
intended effects in the environment and acting without interference from others. The 
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cognitive network of power is thought to operate both subconsciously and to a lesser extent 
also consciously. Although bolstered by findings in laboratory studies showing that power is 
in fact able to affect behavior subconsciously (for a review see Smith & Galinsky, 2010), 
investigating subconscious effects of power in real world settings is not feasible. Whereas an 
individual’s environment can be controlled in laboratory settings to the extent that changes in 
behavior can be attributed to the presence or absence of subconscious manipulations with 
satisfactory probability, there are too many possible cues in real world settings to draw 
inferences about causal relationships between subconscious cues and behavior. I therefore 
decided to include personal power as conscious judgment about one’s own agency in my 
framework instead of the more subconscious cognitive network of power. 
My approach to discern the power dimensions listed above also speaks to the issue of 
operationalization. Different laboratory power manipulations used in previous research target 
different power dimensions. For instance, economic games such as dictator games can 
operationalize structural power, but semantic priming cannot. Notwithstanding, researchers 
have often interpreted their findings in terms of “(a lack of) power resulted in effect X”, but 
they did not articulate which dimension of power (see above) likely caused the effect. The 
few exceptions (Georgesen & Harris 2000; Smith & Hofmann, 2016; Strelan, Weick, & 
Vasiljevic, 2014; studies presented in Chapter 5) investigating multiple power dimensions in 
the same study demonstrated that they have independent and also interactive effects. For 
instance, findings from an experience-sampling study showed that structural power and 
feelings of power had significant independent effects on happiness, mood, stress, perceived 
control, independence, felt closeness to others, as well as the wish to interact with others 
(Smith & Hofmann, 2016). In another study, chronically powerless individuals sought more 
revenge than chronically powerful individuals following various situational manipulations of 
power (Strelan et al., 2014). 
The increase in definitional precision could help researchers make sense of 
inconsistent findings. This applies, for instance, to the example of communal dependent 
variables (e.g., perspective taking, objectification, interpersonal sensitivity). As discussed in 
more detail by Tost (2015), there is evidence suggesting both a positive effect of power on 
communal dependent variables as well as a negative effect. However, the direction of the 
effect might be a function of the power manipulation used: the vast majority of studies finding 
a negative effect used episodic priming, which directly targets psychological power (Galinsky 
Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Lammers, 
Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012). In contrast, the majority of studies reporting a positive 
effect of power used role-play manipulations, which are designed to reproduce differences in 
structural power and might make the powerholder’s responsibility more salient accordingly 
(Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Overbeck & Park, 2006; Tost, 
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Wade-Benzoni, & Johnson, 2015). To conclude, I encourage future research to continue the 
study of power on a molecular level as well as to investigate within-person variations in 
power more thoroughly and identify conditions under which the effects are similar or different 
to those established in between-person designs. 
Striving for Conceptual Clarity in Self-Control Research 
In a similar vein to the power construct, I proposed to disaggregate self-control based 
on the content of self-control challenges in start (i.e., self-control that is needed for initiating 
goal-directed behavior), stop (i.e., self-control needed for suppressing behavior or refraining 
from acting impulsively), and interpersonal self-control (i.e., self-control needed to maintain 
good interpersonal relations). The few previous studies that differentiated these dimensions 
of self-control showed that trait start and stop self-control differed in their ability to predict 
health behaviors (Allom & Mullan, 2014), contextual performance at the workplace (de Boer, 
van Hoft, & Bakker, 2015), and on a societal level behaviors such as homicide, suicide, 
home foreclosures, divorce, and infidelity (Findley & Brown, 2017). I attempted to translate 
these content-related trait self-control dimensions into state self-control motivation (see 
Chapter 5) and state self-control performance (see Chapter 3). I found that self-control 
motivation was differentially affected by dimensions of power; however, self-control 
performance was not. This does not necessarily disconfirm the hypothesis that different 
dimensions of self-control are differentially affected by power, as testing a hypothesis 
requires making additional assumptions regarding operationalization (i.e., the laboratory 
measures I chose represent start and stop self-control well), which can be wrong.  
State self-control research as a whole suffers from pronounced operationalization 
issues. Two kinds of observations raise the question of what the various performance tasks 
used within this domain actually measure. First, there are objections with regard to the 
variety of self-control measures used in laboratory settings. The correlations within and 
between typically used tasks such as delay of gratification/delay discounting tasks or tasks 
targeting executive functions (e.g., Go/No-Go task, Stroop task) are rather low (r = .11 to  
r = .21; Duckworth & Kern, 2011), which does not inspire confidence in the claim that they all 
measure the same construct. In addition, the selection of tasks meant to measure self-control 
performance is rarely justified in terms of why exactly the authors think that performance in 
this task speaks to self-control and (new) tasks are rarely empirically validated (Lurquin, 
2017). Furthermore, there are cases of measures that have not only been used to 
operationalize self-control but also other potentially related constructs. For instance, the 
Stroop task has been used to measure both self-control (e.g., Gailliot, Plant, Butz, & 
Baumeister, 2007, Study 3) and executive functions (e.g., Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007), as well as 
delay discounting has been used to operationalize both self-control (Hardisty & Weber, 2009) 
and impulsivity (e.g., Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999). 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  115 
Second, an even more polemical objection is the question whether self-control must be 
measured outside the laboratory. The commonly used laboratory tasks are not so much 
about dilemmas that are actually meaningful for individuals (de Ridder et al., 2018). People 
very likely differ in their exertion of self-control in accordance with the personal importance of 
a goal. For instance, people might try much harder to lose weight by exercising in order to 
look good in swimwear or to study for a professional training exam that enables a promotion, 
than to squeeze the handles of a handgrip longer or better concentrate on cognitive tasks 
such as the Stroop or the Flanker task. Exercising or learning in these examples have long-
term consequences such as better health and self-confidence or more money and 
responsibility. Squeezing handgrips or concentrating have no consequences at all, in most 
cases not even on the compensation in the experiment. Therefore, it could be that typical 
laboratory self-control tasks measure differences in the degree to comply with the 
experimenter’s instructions. In summary, given these criticisms, it might be worth exploring 
this content-based taxonomy of self-control within power research using everyday behavioral 
indicators of self-control performance. 
How to Study the Relationship Between Power and Self-Control 
The two major power theories, the approach/inhibition theory (Keltner et al., 2003) and 
the social distance theory (Magee & Smith, 2013) differ in how they conceptualize self-
control. The approach/inhibition theory does not use the term self-control but refers to 
disinhibition, a state characterized by reward-focused, need-consistent, and potentially 
counternormative behavior. In spite of these different terms, the description of disinhibition 
fits the more inclusive overall definition of self-control used in this dissertation – self-control 
as the capacity to align one’s behavior with different kinds of standards and long-term goals 
(Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007) – in that disinhibition is the absence of self-control. With 
regard to the more fine-grained distinction in start and stop self-control that was proposed in 
this dissertation, disinhibition seems to be related to stop self-control. Thus, the 
approach/inhibition theory can be read as indicating that power impairs stop self-control due 
to the powerfuls’ heightened attention to rewards and their drive to experience these rewards 
immediately.  
Additionally, the approach/inhibition theory postulates that power leads to approach-
related behavior by means of the power-immanent activation of the behavioral approach 
system (BAS). Keltner and colleagues (2003) explicitly referred to approach-related behavior 
in the domains of eating, offensive aggression, and sexual behavior. However, this approach 
tendency seems to be present in other domains as well, for instance in goal striving (e.g., 
Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Guinote, 2007b) and motor behavior (e.g., Maner, 
Kaschak, & Jones, 2010; Smith & Bargh, 2008). As start self-control, i.e., the initiation of 
goal-consistent action despite a default tendency toward inaction, is also an example of 
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approach-related behavior, power could be expected to benefit start self-control. In summary, 
the approach/inhibition theory would benefit from incorporating the content-based distinction 
within the self-control construct as this would allow for the formulation of more nuanced 
predictions. 
In comparison, the social distance theory is narrower in focus. In this theory, self-
control is said to be exerted when “individuals prioritize more important, longer term motives 
over less important, shorter term motives when the two motives directly conflict” (Magee & 
Smith, 2013, p. 167). The authors assume that self-control consists of inhibiting automatic 
thoughts or impulsive responses connected to these short-term motives in order to shield the 
long-term outcome from hindrances. The theory predicts that power is positively associated 
with self-control due to the powerfuls’ use of high-level construal of goals and situations. This 
conflict-based conceptualization fits neither my definition of start self-control nor of stop self-
control well, as both dimensions are necessary to prioritize long-term goals over short-term 
goals. For instance, if you want to lose weight in the long run it is necessary to bring yourself 
to start doing physical training (start self-control) as well as to keep yourself from snacking on 
sweets (stop self-control). In this conflict-based self-control conceptualization, it is not 
possible to classify a self-control challenge as either requiring start or stop self-control from 
the outside, because individuals might differ in their habitual or spontaneous opinion (about 
the same kind of self-control challenge) of whether their focus is on initiating goal-directed 
action or on refraining from acting impulsively. To return to the example given above: Peter 
and Mary might both want to lose weight. Whereas Mary finds it rather easy to exercise but 
struggles not to snack on sweets, Peter does not like to move at all but has fewer problems 
abstaining from sweets. Losing weight might be a stop self-control challenge for Mary while it 
might be a start self-control challenge for Peter. This implies that it would be necessary to 
ask participants for their personal judgment of what kind of self-control they perceive they 
predominantly need in order to face a certain self-control challenge.  
Given that the self-control definition used in the social distance theory is not compatible 
with the content-based self-control conceptualization I proposed, it might make sense to 
study self-control from the perspective of the social distance theory using another possibility 
of disaggregating the broad self-control construct; self-control can also be considered a 
process with the three stages activation, exertion, and enactment (integrative self-control 
theory, Kotabe & Hofmann, 2015). In the activation stage, an individual experiences a desire 
that is at least to a certain extent in conflict with a higher order goal. In the exertion stage, 
control motivation and control capacity (i.e., the non-motivational cognitive resources one 
has available in a given moment to override desire with a higher order goal) interactively 
determine potential control effort. In the enactment stage, the intended behavioral outcome 
of the previous phase is realized if there are no enactment constraints. Previous studies have 
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focused on the effects of power on self-control capacity and self-control enactment. 
Laboratory findings suggest the trend that people in high power conditions have a better self-
control capacity (e.g., Schmid, Kleiman, & Amodio, 2015; Slabu, Guinote, & Wilkinson, 2013; 
Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008), but are not necessarily better in the enactment 
phase (e.g., HP > LP: Tost, Wade-Benzoni, & Johnson, 2015 vs. HP < LP: Lammers, Stapel, 
& Galinsky, 2010 vs. HP = LP: Zhang & Smith, 2018). Empirical evidence with regard to self-
control motivation is limited. One article found that power benefits self-control 
motivation/performance if the task is perceived as worthy of leaders (DeWall, Baumeister, 
Mead, & Vohs, 2011). The studies presented in Chapter 5 suggest that start self-control 
motivation is predicted by differences in power within individuals and all three self-control 
motivation dimensions are also predicted by differences in power between individuals. How 
power impacts on self-control activation has not been investigated yet. Future research could 
investigate the so far understudied stages. 
Finally, in line with the prevalent implicit assumption within power research that power 
operates in a linear fashion I hypothesized and tested linear (between-person) effects but 
failed to find them. However, this assumption may have to be challenged and a curvilinear 
relationship between power and self-control could be tested instead. High power and low 
power could both be related to higher self-control than equal power albeit for different 
reasons: When among peers (i.e., in the equal power condition) people might not perceive 
the need to present themselves as particularly disciplined or persistent. In contrast, 
subordinates might think that they need to meet or exceed their superiors’ expectations 
either in order to be rewarded or out of fear of negative consequences if they do not. 
Superiors might be motivated to act and decide in a self-controlled way by organizational 
properties such as informal dependencies or alignment of goals, because this behavior will 
probably be rewarded by subordinates with good work and loyalty. To answer this question, it 
would be necessary to have studies with three-cell-designs, i.e., studies including a low 
power, high power, and a control condition as data basis. However, three-cell designs are in 
the minority within the power literature (du Plessis, Schaerer, Yap, & Thau, 2016), and the 
specific part of this literature that investigates the relationship between power and self-control 
is no exception (see Table 3.2). Future research might therefore also test for curvilinear 
effects of power. 
Other Operationalizations of Responsible Behavior 
This dissertation investigated self-control as the main operationalization of responsible 
behavior. Although a rather broad conceptualization of self-control was used, there are still 
many other measures that capture (parts of) defining characteristics of responsible behavior. 
For instance, possible outcome operationalizations could be cognitive perspective taking 
(e.g., Oswald, 1996), prefactual thinking (e.g., Sanna, 1996), (future-oriented) time 
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perspective (Zimbardo, Keough, & Boyd, 1997), or decision-making in all kinds of situations 
marked by a conflict between interests of different stakeholders, between the self and others, 
or present vs. future interests as such present in discounting paradigms combining social 
with temporal or probability discounting (e.g., Charlton, Yi, Porter, Carter, Bickel, & Rachlin, 
2013), or decision making for others (e.g., Pahlke, Strasser, & Vieider, 2015). These 
outcomes have received only limited attention within power research to date (Galinsky et al., 
2006; Scholl & Sassenberg, 2015) but would be relevant for organizational settings as well. 
Practical Implications 
Responsible superiors would not focus solely on their own interest, but at least get a 
general idea of the interests of all stakeholders involved in a decision, be it internal 
stakeholders such as subordinates, their own team or organization as a whole, or external 
stakeholders. They will of course face conflicting interests, but the responsible superior 
would try to find a fair solution that minimizes negative impact on the affected parties and 
consider long-term consequences. Both from a normative point of view and from the point of 
view of the stakeholders, a responsible superior would be ideal.  
However, based on the results presented in this dissertation it seems that, on a 
situational level (i.e., single interactions in laboratory settings or interactions at the 
workplace), power and responsible behavior are not systematically related (cf. null findings in 
Chapters 2 and 3 but non-causal evidence for relationships between power and self-control 
in Chapter 5) – even though the responsibility for subordinates should be obvious when one 
is in a position with high structural power because this position grants the possibility to do 
good or avoid harm to a larger extent than the subordinate position does. My results also 
show that this responsibility is not reflected in outcomes even when it is perceived. 
If responsible leader behavior is less a question of momentary perceptions but more a 
question of stable factors such as personality, there might be merit in selecting or promoting 
the “right” people to positions of power. Apart from the role-based responsibility addressed 
above, i.e., responsibility given to an individual by others higher up in hierarchy (cf. 
accountability, Hall, Royle, Brymer, Perreweé, Ferris, & Hochwarter, 2006), responsibility can 
also be a trait-like inner obligation to take care of other people (completely independent of 
power conceptually) that is likely to stem from a stable tendency to focus on other people. A 
multitude of concepts describes this tendency such as interdependent self-construal (Aron, 
Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000; Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 
2007), empathy (Davis, 1983), concern for others (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987), social value 
orientation (Van Lange, 1999) and interpersonal values (Locke, 2000). People high in this 
tendency are likely to be the more responsible powerholders (Sassenberg, Ellemers, 
Scheepers, & Scholl, 2014; Tost, 2015; Williams, 2014). 
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Conclusion 
Both power and self-control have received a lot of attention within social psychological 
research (and beyond) during the last decades. Research with either of both of these 
constructs must still tackle important issues such as establishing conceptual clarity (both) or 
making the step from the laboratory to the real world (power). This dissertation tried to 
contribute a piece to the puzzle by disaggregating the broad constructs of self-control and 
power into their molecules and by proposing a theoretical framework for how to study power 
in organizational settings. In conclusion, future power research might build on the insight into 
how objective, structural power is translated into outcomes via perceptions of psychological 
power. The highly promising route of studying the effects of power using the contextual 
approach presented in this dissertation should be chosen to investigate outcomes other than 
self-control in order to complement previous between-person laboratory research.  
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  120 
REFERENCES 
Adam, M. T., Kroll, E. B., & Teubner, T. (2014). A note on coupled lotteries. Economics 
Letters, 124(1), 96–99. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.024 
 
Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse 
control. Psychological Bulletin, 82(4), 463–496. doi:10.1037/h0076860 
 
Alberts, H. J., Martijn, C., Greb, J., Merckelbach, H., & de Vries, N. K. (2007). Carrying on or 
giving in: The role of automatic processes in overcoming ego depletion. British Journal 
of Social Psychology, 46(2), 383–399. doi:10.1348/014466606X130111 
 
Allom, V., & Mullan, B. (2014). Individual differences in executive function predict distinct 
eating behaviours. Appetite, 80, 123–130. doi:10.1016/j.appet.2014.05.007 
 
Anderson, C., & Berdahl, J. L. (2002). The experience of power: Examining the effects of 
power on approach and inhibition tendencies. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 83(6), 1362–1377. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1362 
 
Anderson, C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2006). Power, optimism, and risk-taking. European Journal 
of Social Psychology, 36(4), 511–536. doi:10.1002/ejsp.324 
 
Anderson, C., John, O. P., & Keltner, D. (2012). The personal sense of power. Journal of 
Personality, 80(2), 313–344. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2011.00734.x 
 
Anderson, C., Spataro, S. E., & Flynn, F. J. (2008). Personality and organizational culture as 
determinants of influence. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(3), 702–710. 
doi:10.1037/0021-9010.93.3.702 
 
Anicich, E. M., & Hirsh, J. B. (2017). The psychology of middle power: Vertical code-
switching, role conflict, and behavioral inhibition. Academy of Management 
Review, 42(4), 659–682. doi:10.5465/amr.2016.0002 
 
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of other in the self scale and the 
structure of interpersonal closeness. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 63(4), 596–612. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596 
 
Ashforth, B. E., Kreiner, G. E., & Fugate, M. (2000). All in a day's work: Boundaries and 
micro role transitions. Academy of Management Review, 25(3), 472–491. 
doi:10.5465/amr.2000.3363315 
 
Bari, A., & Robbins, T. W. (2013). Inhibition and impulsivity: Behavioral and neural basis of 
response control. Progress in Neurobiology, 108, 44–79. 
doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2013.06.005 
 
Barnes, C. M., Lucianetti, L., Bhave, D. P., & Christian, M. S. (2015). “You wouldn’t like me 
when I’m sleepy”: Leaders’ sleep, daily abusive supervision, and work unit 
engagement. Academy of Management Journal, 58(5), 1419–1437. 
doi:10.5465/amj.2013.1063 
 
Barratt, E. S. (1985). Impulsive subtraits: Arousal and information processing. In J. T. 
Spence & C. E. Izard (Eds.), Motivation, emotion, and personality (pp. 137–146). 
Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier/North Holland Publishing. 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  121 
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-effects models 
using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67(1), 1–48. doi:10.18637/jss.v067.i01. 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Tice, D. M. (2007). The strength model of self-control. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16(6), 351–355. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8721.2007.00534.x 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Wright, B. R., & Carreon, D. (2018). Self-control “in the wild”: Experience 
sampling study of trait and state self-regulation. Self and Identity, 1–35. 
doi:10.1080/15298868.2018.1478324 
 
Bendahan, S., Zehnder, C., Pralong, F. P., & Antonakis, J. (2015). Leader corruption 
depends on power and testosterone. The Leadership Quarterly, 26(2), 101–122. 
doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2014.07.010 
 
Bernieri, F. J. (2001). Toward a taxonomy of interpersonal sensitivity. In J. A. Hall & F. J. 
Bernieri, Interpersonal sensitivity - Theory and measurement (pp. 3–20). Mahwah, NJ, 
USA: Lawrence Erlbaum.  
 
Bickel, W. K., Jarmolowicz, D. P., Mueller, E. T., Gatchalian, K. M., & McClure, S. M. (2012). 
Are executive function and impulsivity antipodes? A conceptual reconstruction with 
special reference to addiction. Psychopharmacology, 221(3), 361–387. 
doi:10.1007/s00213-012-2689-x 
 
Bickel, W. K., Odum, A. L., & Madden, G. J. (1999). Impulsivity and cigarette smoking: Delay 
discounting in current, never, and ex-smokers. Psychopharmacology, 146(4), 447–454. 
doi:10.1007/PL00005490 
 
Birkett, M. A. (2011). The Trier Social Stress Test protocol for inducing psychological stress. 
Journal of Visualized Experiments, 56, e3238. doi:10.3791/3238 
 
Blader, S. L., & Chen, Y. R. (2012). Differentiating the effects of status and power: A justice 
perspective. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(5), 994–1014. 
doi:10.1037/a0026651  
 
Blais, A., & Weber, E. U. (2006). A domain-specific risk-taking (DOSPERT) scale for adult 
populations. Judgment and Decision Making, 1(1), 33–47. Retrieved from: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1301089  
 
Boksem, M. A., Smolders, R., & Cremer, D. D. (2012). Social power and approach-related 
neural activity. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(5), 516–520. 
doi:10.1093/scan/nsp006  
 
Bolton, G. E., Ockenfels, A., & Stauf, J. (2015). Social responsibility promotes conservative 
risk behavior. European Economic Review, 74, 109–127. 
doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.10.002 
 
Bombari, D., Schmid Mast, M., & Bachmann, M. (2017). Felt power explains the link between 
position power and experienced emotions. Emotion, 17(1), 55–66. 
doi:10.1037/emo0000207  
 
Bombari, D., Schmid Mast, M., Brosch, T., & Sander, D. (2013). How interpersonal power 
affects empathic accuracy: Differential roles of mentalizing vs. mirroring?. Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 7, 375. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00375 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  122 
Boucher, H. C., & Kofos, M. N. (2012). The idea of money counteracts ego depletion 
effects. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(4), 804–810. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.003 
 
Brickenkamp, R. (1994). Test d2: Aufmerksamkeits-Belastungs-Test. Goettingen, Germany: 
Hogrefe. 
 
Bugental, D. B., & Lewis, J. C. (1999). The paradoxical misuse of power by those who see 
themselves as powerless: How does it happen?. Journal of Social Issues, 55(1), 51–
64. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00104 
 
Buono, F. D., Whiting, S. W., & Sprong, M. E. (2015). Comparison of temporal discounting 
among obese college students and obese adults. Behavior Analysis: Research and 
Practice, 15(2), 139–147. doi:10.1037/bar0000015 
 
Burkley, E. (2008). The role of self-control in resistance to persuasion. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 34(3), 419–431. doi:10.1177/0146167207310458 
 
Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (1994). Measuring emotion: the self-assessment manikin and 
the semantic differential. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 
25(1), 49–59. doi:10.1016/0005-7916(94)90063-9 
 
Brandt, M. J., IJzerman, H., Dijksterhuis, A., Farach, F. J., Geller, J., Giner-Sorolla, R., 
Grange, J. A., Perugini, M., Spies, J. R., & Van't Veer, A. (2014). The replication 
recipe: What makes for a convincing replication?. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 50, 217–224. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2013.10.005 
 
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999). Gender differences in risk taking: A 
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125(3), 367–383. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.125.3.367 
 
Cai, R. A., & Guinote, A. (2017). Doing many things at a time: Lack of power decreases the 
ability to multitask. British Journal of Social Psychology, 56(3), 475–492. 
doi:10.1111/bjso.12190 
 
Cameron, K. (2011). Responsible leadership as virtuous leadership. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 98, 25–35. doi:10.1007/s10551-011-1023-6 
 
Carli, L. L. (1999). Gender, interpersonal power, and social influence. Journal of Social 
Issues, 55(1), 81–99. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00106 
 
Carney, D. R., Cuddy, A. J., & Yap, A. J. (2010). Power posing: Brief nonverbal displays 
affect neuroendocrine levels and risk tolerance. Psychological Science, 21(10), 1363–
1368. doi:10.1177/0956797610383437 
 
Carter, E. C., Kofler, L. M., Forster, D. E., & McCullough, M. E. (2015). A series of meta-
analytic tests of the depletion effect: Self-control does not seem to rely on a limited 
resource. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(4), 796–815. 
doi:10.1037/xge0000083 
 
Carter, E. C., & McCullough, M. E. (2014). Publication bias and the limited strength model of 
self-control: Has the evidence for ego depletion been overestimated?. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 5, 823. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00823 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  123 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1982). Control theory: A useful conceptual framework for 
personality–social, clinical, and health psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 92(1), 111–
135. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.92.1.111 
 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: 
A control-process view. Psychological Review, 97(1), 19–35. doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.97.1.19 
 
Cassidy, T., & Lynn, R. (1989). A multifactorial approach to achievement motivation: The 
development of a comprehensive measure. Journal of Occupational Psychology. 62, 
301–312. Retrieved from: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232568667_A_multifactorial_approach_to_ac
hievement_motivation_The_development_of_a_comprehensive_measure 
 
Cesario, J., & McDonald, M. M. (2013). Bodies in context: Power poses as a computation of 
action possibility. Social Cognition, 31(2), 260–274. doi:10.1521/soco.2013.31.2.260 
 
Chabris, C. F., Laibson, D., Morris, C. L., Schuldt, J. P., & Taubinsky, D. (2008). Individual 
laboratory-measured discount rates predict field behavior. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 37(2-3), 237–269. doi:10.1007/s11166-008-9053-x 
 
Chang, C. H., Rosen, C. C., & Levy, P. E. (2009). The relationship between perceptions of 
organizational politics and employee attitudes, strain, and behavior: A meta-analytic 
examination. Academy of Management Journal, 52(4), 779–801. 
doi:10.5465/amj.2009.43670894 
 
Charlton, S. R., Yi, R., Porter, C., Carter, A. E., Bickel, W., & Rachlin, H. (2013). Now for me, 
later for us? Effects of group context on temporal discounting. Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 26(2), 118–127. doi:10.1002/bdm.766 
 
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., & Kuhn, M. A. (2012). Experimental methods: Between-subject 
and within-subject design. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81(1), 1–8. 
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.08.009 
 
Charness, G., & Jackson, M. O. (2009). The role of responsibility in strategic risk-taking. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69(3), 241–247. 
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.006 
 
Cheung, T. T., Gillebaart, M., Kroese, F., & De Ridder, D. (2014). Why are people with high 
self-control happier? The effect of trait self-control on happiness as mediated by 
regulatory focus. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 722. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00722 
 
Clarkson, J. J., Hirt, E. R., Jia, L., & Alexander, M. B. (2010). When perception is more than 
reality: The effects of perceived versus actual resource depletion on self-regulatory 
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(1), 29–46. 
doi:10.1037/a0017539  
 
Cook, J. E., Arrow, H., & Malle, B. F. (2011). The effect of feeling stereotyped on social 
power and inhibition. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(2), 165–180. 
doi:10.1177/0146167210390389 
 
Côté, S., Kraus, M. W., Cheng, B. H., Oveis, C., Van der Löwe, I., Lian, H., & Keltner, D. 
(2011). Social power facilitates the effect of prosocial orientation on empathic 
accuracy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 217–232. 
doi:10.1037/a0023171  
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  124 
Crean, J. P., de Wit, H., & Richards, J. B. (2000). Reward discounting as a measure of 
impulsive behavior in a psychiatric outpatient population. Experimental and Clinical 
Psychopharmacology, 8(2), 155–162. doi:10.1037/1064-1297.8.2.155 
 
Cross, S. E., Bacon, P. L., & Morris, M. L. (2000). The relational-interdependent self-
construal and relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(4), 791–
808. doi:10.1O37//0O22-3514.78.4791  
 
Cross, C. P., Copping, L. T., & Campbell, A. (2011). Sex differences in impulsivity: A meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 137(1), 97–130. doi:10.1037/a0021591 
 
Curry, O. S., Price, M. E., & Price, J. G. (2008). Patience is a virtue: Cooperative people 
have lower discount rates. Personality and Individual Differences, 44(3), 780–785. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2007.09.023 
 
Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power. Behavioral Science, 2(3), 201–215. 
doi:10.1002/bs.3830020303 
 
Dalal, R. S., Lam, H., Weiss, H. M., Welch, E. R., & Hulin, C. L. (2009). A within-person 
approach to work behavior and performance: Concurrent and lagged citizenship-
counterproductivity associations, and dynamic relationships with affect and overall job 
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 52(5), 1051–1066. 
doi:10.5465/amj.2009.44636148 
 
Daly, M., Delaney, L., Egan, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2015). Childhood self-control and 
unemployment throughout the life span: Evidence from two British cohort 
studies. Psychological Science, 26(6), 709–723. doi:10.1177/0956797615569001 
 
Darioly, A., & Schmid Mast, M. (2011). Facing an incompetent leader: The effects of a 
nonexpert leader on subordinates' perception and behaviour. European Journal of 
Work and Organizational Psychology, 20(2), 239–265, 
doi:10.1080/13594320903429576 
 
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a 
multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(1), 113–
126. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.113 
 
de Boer, B. J., van Hooft, E. A., & Bakker, A. B. (2011). Stop and start control: A distinction 
within self-control. European Journal of Personality, 25(5), 349–362. 
doi:10.1002/per.796 
 
de Boer, B. J., van Hooft, E. A., & Bakker, A. B. (2015). Self-control at work: Its relationship 
with contextual performance. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 30(4), 406–421. 
doi:10.1108/JMP-08-2012-0237 
 
DeCelles, K. A., DeRue, D. S., Margolis, J. D., & Ceranic, T. L. (2012). Does power corrupt 
or enable? When and why power facilitates self-interested behavior. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 97(3), 681–689. doi:10.1037/a0026811 
 
de Cremer, D., & Van Dijk, E. (2005). When and why leaders put themselves first: Leader 
behaviour in resource allocations as a function of feeling entitled. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 35(4), 553–563. doi:10.1002/ejsp.260 
 
  
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  125 
de Ridder, D. T., de Boer, B. J., Lugtig, P., Bakker, A. B., & van Hooft, E. A. (2011). Not 
doing bad things is not equivalent to doing the right thing: Distinguishing between 
inhibitory and initiatory self-control. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(7), 
1006–1011. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.01.015 
 
de Ridder, D., Kroese, F., & Gillebaart, M. (2018). Whatever happened to self-control? A 
proposal for integrating notions from trait self-control studies into state self-control 
research. Motivation Science, 4(1), 39–49. doi:10.1037/mot0000062 
 
de Ridder, D. T., Lensvelt-Mulders, G., Finkenauer, C., Marijn Stok, F., & Baumeister, R. F. 
(2012). Taking stock of self-control: A meta-analysis of how trait self-control relates to a 
wide range of behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 16(1), 76–99. 
doi:10.1177/1088868311418749  
 
DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Mead, N. L., & Vohs, K. D. (2011). How leaders self- 
regulate their task performance: Evidence that power promotes diligence, depletion, 
and disdain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(1), 47–65. 
doi:10.1037/a0020932 
 
Derrick, J. L. (2013). Energized by television: Familiar fictional worlds restore self-
control. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 4(3), 299–307. 
doi:10.1177/1948550612454889 
 
Dholakia, U. M., Gopinath, M., Bagozzi, R. P., & Nataraajan, R. (2006). The role of regulatory 
focus in the experience and self-control of desire for temptations. Journal of Consumer 
Psychology, 16(2), 163–175. doi:10.1207/s15327663jcp1602_7 
 
Diamond, A., Briand, L., Fossella, J., & Gehlbach, L. (2004). Genetic and neurochemical 
modulation of prefrontal cognitive functions in children. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 161(1), 125–132. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.161.1.125 
 
Dixon, M. R., Marley, J., & Jacobs, E. A. (2003). Delay discounting by pathological gamblers. 
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 36(4), 449–458. doi:10.1901/jaba.2003.36-449 
 
Duckworth, A. L., & Kern, M. L. (2011). A meta-analysis of the convergent validity of self- 
control measures. Journal of Research in Personality, 45(3), 259–268. 
doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2011.02.004 
 
Duguid, M. M., & Goncalo, J. A. (2012). Living large: The powerful overestimate their own 
height. Psychological Science, 23(1), 36–40. doi:10.1177/0956797611422915 
 
du Plessis, C., Schaerer, M., Yap, A. J., & Thau, S. (2016). Psychological Science’s 
Preoccupation with the Powerful: A Quantitative Review of Experimental Designs, 
Attribution of Results, and Effect Sizes in Social Power Research. Poster presented at 
the Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, USA. 
 
Eagly, A. H., Johannesen-Schmidt, M. C., & Van Engen, M. L. (2003). Transformational, 
transactional, and laissez-faire leadership styles: A meta-analysis comparing women 
and men. Psychological Bulletin, 129(4), 569–591. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.4.569 
 
Eagly, A. H., & Johnson, B. T. (1990). Gender and leadership style: A meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 108(2), 233–256. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.2.233 
 
Edwards, J. R., & Rothbard, N. P. (2000). Mechanisms linking work and family: Clarifying the 
relationship between work and family constructs. Academy of Management 
Review, 25(1), 178–199. doi:10.5465/amr.2000.2791609 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  126 
Eijkelenboom, G., & Vostroknutov, A. (2016). The impact of the degree of responsibility and 
mutual decision making on choices under risk. Working paper, Maastricht University 
and University of Trento. Retrieved from: 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3f52/27fe51bddbaa7eaa05b877d135f6277a4db5.pdf 
 
Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations. American Sociological Review, 27(1), 
31–41. Retrieved from: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2089716?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents 
 
Ent, M. R., Baumeister, R. F., & Tice, D. M. (2015). Trait self-control and the avoidance of 
temptation. Personality and Individual Differences, 74, 12–15. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2014.09.031 
 
Epley, N., Waytz, A., Akalis, S., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2008). When we need a human: 
Motivational determinants of anthropomorphism. Social Cognition, 26(2), 143–155. 
doi:10.1521/soco.2008.26.2.143 
 
Eysenck, S. B., Easton, G., & Pearson, P. R. (1984). Age norms for impulsiveness, 
venturesomeness and empathy in children. Personality and Individual Differences, 
5(3), 315–321. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(84)90070-9 
 
Fast, N. J., Gruenfeld, D. H., Sivanathan, N., & Galinsky, A. D. (2009). Illusory control: A 
generative force behind power's far-reaching effects. Psychological Science, 20(4), 
502–508. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02311.x 
 
Fast, N. J., Sivanathan, N., Mayer, N. D., & Galinsky, A. D. (2012). Power and overconfident 
decision-making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 117(2), 
249–260. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.11.009 
 
Fiedler, K. (2011). Voodoo correlations are everywhere—not only in neuroscience. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(2), 163–171. 
doi:10.1177/1745691611400237 
 
Findley, M., & Brown, R. (2017). Fifty states of self-control: A US statewide examination of 
the initiation and inhibition dimensions of self-regulation. The Journal of Social 
Psychology, 158(1), 23–36. doi:10.1080/00224545.2017.1297287 
 
Fisher, C. D., & To, M. L. (2012). Using experience sampling methodology in organizational 
behavior. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 33(7), 865–877. doi:10.1002/job.1803 
 
Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. American 
Psychologist, 48(6), 621–628. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.48.6.621 
 
Fiske, S. T., & Berdahl, J. (2007). Social power. In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), 
Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 678–692). New York, NY, USA: 
Guilford Press.  
 
Fiske, S. T., & Dépret, E. (1996). Control, interdependence and power: Understanding social 
cognition in its social context. European Review of Social Psychology, 7(1), 31–61. 
doi:10.1080/14792779443000094 
 
Fleeson, W., & Noftle, E. (2008). The end of the person–situation debate: An emerging 
synthesis in the answer to the consistency question. Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass, 2(4), 1667–1684. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00122.x 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  127 
Flynn, F. J. (2003). How much should I give and how often? The effects of generosity and 
frequency of favor exchange on social status and productivity. Academy of 
Management Journal, 46(5), 539–553. doi:10.5465/30040648 
 
Flynn, F. J., Reagans, R. E., Amanatullah, E. T., & Ames, D. R. (2006). Helping one's way to 
the top: Self-monitors achieve status by helping others and knowing who helps 
whom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(6), 1123–1137. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.91.6.1123 
 
Forestier, C., Sarrazin, P., Allenet, B., Gauchet, A., Heuzé, J. P., & Chalabaev, A. (2018). 
“Are you in full possession of your capacity?”. A mechanistic self-control approach at 
trait and state levels to predict different health behaviors. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 134, 214–221. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2018.05.044 
 
Forstmeier, S., Drobetz, R., & Maercker, A. (2011). The delay of gratification test for adults: 
Validating a behavioral measure of self-motivation in a sample of older 
people. Motivation and Emotion, 35(2), 118–134. doi:10.1007/s11031-011-9213-1 
 
Foulk, T. A., Lanaj, K., Tu, M. H., Erez, A., & Archambeau, L. (2018). Heavy is the head that 
wears the crown: An actor-centric approach to daily psychological power, abusive 
leader behavior, and perceived incivility. Academy of Management Journal, 61(2), 
661–684. doi:10.5465/amj.2015.1061 
 
Fragale, A. R., Overbeck, J. R., & Neale, M. A. (2011). Resources versus respect: Social 
judgments based on targets' power and status positions. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 47(4), 767–775. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.03.006 
 
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 19(4), 25–42. doi:10.1257/089533005775196732 
 
French, J. R. P., Jr., & Raven, B. H. (1959). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright 
(Ed.), Studies in social power (p. 150–167). Ann Arbor, MI, USA: Institute for Social 
Research. 
 
Friese, M., & Hofmann, W. (2009). Control me or I will control you: Impulses, trait self-control, 
and the guidance of behavior. Journal of Research in Personality, 43(5), 795–805. 
doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2009.07.004 
 
Friese, M., Messner, C., & Schaffner, Y. (2012). Mindfulness meditation counteracts self-
control depletion. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2), 1016–1022. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.01.008 
 
Friese, M., & Wänke, M. (2014). Personal prayer buffers self-control depletion. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 51, 56–59. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2013.11.006 
 
Fujita, K. (2011). On conceptualizing self-control as more than the effortful inhibition of 
impulses. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15(4), 352–366. 
doi:10.1177/1088868311411165 
 
Fujita, K., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Levin-Sagi, M. (2006). Construal levels and self-control. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(3), 351–367. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.90.3.351 
 
Gailliot, M. T., & Baumeister, R. F. (2007). The physiology of willpower: Linking blood 
glucose to self-control. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11(4), 303–327. 
doi:10.1177/1088868307303030 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  128 
Gailliot, M. T., Plant, E. A., Butz, D. A., & Baumeister, R. F. (2007). Increasing self-regulatory 
strength can reduce the depleting effect of suppressing stereotypes. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(2), 281–294. doi:10.1177/0146167206296101 
 
Galinsky, A. D., Chou, E. Y., Halevy, N., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2012). The far-reaching effects 
of power: At the individual, dyadic, and group levels. In M. A. Neale & E. A. 
Mannix (Eds.), Looking back, moving forward: A review of group and team-based 
research (pp. 81–113). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
doi:10.1108/S1534-0856(2012)0000015007  
 
Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Magee, J. C. (2003). From power to action. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85(3), 453–466. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.3.453 
 
Galinsky, A. D., Jordan, J., & Sivanathan, N. (2008). Harnessing power to capture 
leadership. In D. Forsyth & C. Hoyt (Eds.), Social psychology and leadership (pp. 283–
299). Westport, CT, USA: Praeger Press. 
 
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2006). Power and 
perspectives not taken. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1068–1074. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01824.x 
 
Galinsky, A. D., Rucker, D. D., & Magee, J. C. (2015). Power: Past findings, present 
considerations, and future directions. In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), APA 
Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology, Interpersonal Relations (Vol. 3, pp. 
421–460). Washington, DC, USA: American Psychological Association. 
doi:10.1037/14344-016 
 
Gangestad, S. W., & Snyder, M. (2000). Self-monitoring: Appraisal and reappraisal. 
Psychological Bulletin, 126(4), 530–555. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.126.4.530 
 
George, J. M., & Jones, G. R. (2000). The role of time in theory and theory building. Journal 
of Management, 26(4), 657–684. doi:10.1177/014920630002600404 
 
Georgesen, J. C., & Harris, M. J. (2000). The balance of power: Interpersonal consequences 
of differential power and expectancies. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 26(10), 1239–1257. doi:10.1177/0146167200262006 
 
Gerlitz, J. Y., & Schupp, J. (2005). Zur Erhebung der Big-Five-basierten 
Persönlichkeitsmerkmale im SOEP. DIW Research Notes, 4. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Juergen_Schupp/publication/228378218_Zur_Erh
ebung_der_Big-Five-
basierten_Persnlichkeitsmerkmale_im_SOEP/links/09e4150a7a19843714000000.pdf 
 
Gianotti, L. R., Figner, B., Ebstein, R. P., & Knoch, D. (2012). Why some people discount 
more than others: Baseline activation in the dorsal PFC mediates the link between 
COMT genotype and impatient choice. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 6.  
doi:10.3389/fnins.2012.00054 
 
Giessner, S. R., & Schubert, T. W. (2007). High in the hierarchy: How vertical location and 
judgments of leaders’ power are interrelated. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 104(1), 30–44. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.10.001 
 
Gillebaart, M., & de Ridder, D. T. (2015). Effortless self-control: A novel perspective on 
response conflict strategies in trait self-control. Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass, 9(2), 88–99. doi:10.1111/spc3.12160 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  129 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1990). Action phases and mind-sets. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino 
(Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 53–92). New York, NY, USA: 
Guilford.  
 
Gonzaga, G. C., Keltner, D., & Ward, D. (2008). Power in mixed-sex stranger interactions. 
Cognition and Emotion, 22(8), 1555–1568. doi:10.1080/02699930801921008 
 
Goodwin, S. A., Gubin, A., Fiske, S. T., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2000). Power can bias impression 
processes: Stereotyping subordinates by default and by design. Group Processes & 
Intergroup Relations, 3(3), 227–256. doi:10.1177/1368430200003003001 
 
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann Jr, W. B. (2003). A very brief measure of the Big-
Five personality domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37(6), 504–528. 
doi:10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00046-1 
 
Gottfredson, M. R. & Hirschi, T. (1990). A General Theory of Crime. Palo Alto, CA, USA: 
Stanford University Press.  
 
Gray, J. A. (1991). Neural systems of motivation, emotion and affect. In J. Madden (Ed.), 
Neurobiology of learning, emotion and affect (pp. 273–306). New York, NY, USA: 
Raven Press. 
 
Gray, J. A., & McNaughton, N. (2000). Fundamentals of the septo-hippocampal system. In J. 
A. Gray & N. McNaughton (Eds.), The neuropsychology of anxiety: an enquiry into the 
functions of septo-hippocampal system (2nd edition, pp. 204–232), Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Green, L., & Myerson, J. (2004). A discounting framework for choice with delayed and 
probabilistic rewards. Psychological Bulletin, 130(5), 769–792. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.130.5.769 
 
Gruenfeld, D. H., Inesi, M. E., Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Power and the 
objectification of social targets. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(1), 
111–127. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.111 
 
Guinote, A. (2007a). Power and the suppression of unwanted thoughts: Does control over 
others decrease control over the self? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
43(3), 433–440. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.03.003 
 
Guinote, A. (2007b). Power and goal pursuit. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
33(8), 1076–1087. doi:10.1177/0146167207301011 
 
Guinote, A. (2007c). Power affects basic cognition: Increased attentional inhibition and 
flexibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43(5), 685–697. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.06.008 
 
Guinote, A. (2017). How power affects people: Activating, wanting, and goal seeking. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 68, 353–381. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010416-044153 
 
Guinote, A., & Ong, T. (2012). Direct debit or pay in person? Power, action, and goal 
maintenance. Revista de Psicología Social, 27(3), 317–322. 
doi:10.1174/021347412802845531 
 
Guinote, A., Weick, M., & Cai, A. (2012). Does power magnify the expression of 
dispositions?. Psychological Science, 23(5), 475–482. doi:10.1177/0956797611428472 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  130 
Guyse, J. L., Keller, L. R., & Eppel, T. (2002). Valuing environmental outcomes: Preferences 
for constant or improving sequences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 87(2), 253–277. doi:10.1006/obhd.2001.2965 
 
Hagger, M. S., Chatzisarantis, N. L., Alberts, H., Anggono, C. O., Batailler, C., Birt, A. R., ... 
& Calvillo, D. P. (2016). A multilab preregistered replication of the ego-depletion 
effect. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11(4), 546–573. 
doi:10.1177/1745691616652873 
 
Hagger, M. S., Wood, C., Stiff, C., & Chatzisarantis, N. L. (2010). Ego depletion and the 
strength model of self-control: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 136(4), 495–
525. doi:10.1037/a0019486 
 
Halali, E., Bereby-Meyer, Y., & Ockenfels, A. (2013). Is it all about the self? The effect of self-
control depletion on ultimatum game proposers. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 
240. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00240 
 
Hall, J. A., Carter, J. D., & Horgan, T. G. (2001). Status roles and recall of nonverbal cues. 
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 25(2), 79–100. doi:10.1023/A:1010797627793 
 
Hall, J. A., Coats, E. J., & Smith LeBeau, L. (2005). Nonverbal behavior and the vertical 
dimension of social relations: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 131(6), 898–
924. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.131.6.898 
 
Hall, J. A., Schmid Mast, M., & Latu, I. M. (2015). The vertical dimension of social relations 
and accurate interpersonal perception: A meta-analysis. Journal of Nonverbal 
Behavior, 39(2), 131–163. doi:10.1007/s10919-014-0205-1 
 
Hall, J. A., Murphy, N. A., & Carney, D. R. (2006). On the varieties of asymmetrical 
dependency: Feelings, motives, behavior, and accuracy in a dyadic interaction. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 36(4), 583–599. doi:10.1002/ejsp.337 
 
Hall, J. A., Murphy, N. A., & Schmid Mast, M. (2006). Recall of nonverbal cues: Exploring a 
new definition of interpersonal sensitivity. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 30(4), 141–
155. doi:10.1007/s10919-006-0013-3 
 
Hall, J. A., Murphy, N. A., & Schmid Mast, M. (2007). Nonverbal self-accuracy in 
interpersonal interaction. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(12), 1675–
1685. doi:10.1177/0146167207307492 
 
Hall, A. T., Royle, M. T., Brymer, R. A., Perrewé, P. L., Ferris, G. R., & Hochwarter, W. A. 
(2006). Relationships between felt accountability as a stressor and strain reactions: 
The neutralizing role of autonomy across two studies. Journal of Occupational Health 
Psychology, 11(1), 87–99. doi:10.1037/1076-8998.11.1.87 
 
Hamilton, K., Shih, S. I., & Mohammed, S. (2016). The development and validation of the 
rational and intuitive decision styles scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 98(5), 
523–535. doi:10.1080/00223891.2015.1132426 
 
Handgraaf, M. J., Van Dijk, E., Vermunt, R. C., Wilke, H. A., & De Dreu, C. K. (2008). Less 
power or powerless? Egocentric empathy gaps and the irony of having little versus no 
power in social decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(5), 
1136–1149. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.95.5.1136 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  131 
Hardisty, D. J., & Weber, E. U. (2009). Discounting future green: Money versus the 
environment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138(3), 329–340. 
doi:10.1037/a0016433 
 
Hardy, C. L., & Van Vugt, M. (2006). Nice guys finish first: The competitive altruism 
hypothesis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(10), 1402–1413. 
doi:10.1177/0146167206291006 
 
Heckman, B. W., Ditre, J. W., & Brandon, T. H. (2012). The restorative effects of smoking 
upon self-control resources: a negative reinforcement pathway. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 121(1), 244–249. doi:10.1037/a0023032 
 
Herman, C. P. (1996). Thoughts of a veteran of self-regulation failure. Psychological 
Inquiry, 7(1), 46–50. doi:10.1207/s15327965pli0701_8  
 
Hiemer, J., & Abele, A. E. (2012). High power= Motivation? Low power= Situation? The 
impact of power, power stability and power motivation on risk-taking. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 53(4), 486–490. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2012.04.008 
 
Hirsh, J. B., Galinsky, A. D., & Zhong, C. B. (2011). Drunk, powerful, and in the dark: How 
general processes of disinhibition produce both prosocial and antisocial 
behavior. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(5), 415–427. 
doi:10.1177/1745691611416992 
 
Hoch, S. J., & Loewenstein, G. F. (1991). Time-inconsistent preferences and consumer self-
control. Journal of Consumer Research, 17(4), 492–507. doi:10.1086/208573 
 
Hoffman, L., & Stawski, R. S. (2009). Persons as contexts: Evaluating between-person and 
within-person effects in longitudinal analysis. Research in Human Development, 6(2-3), 
97–120. doi:10.1080/15427600902911189 
 
Hofmann, W., Baumeister, R. F., Förster, G., & Vohs, K. D. (2012). Everyday temptations: An 
experience sampling study of desire, conflict, and self-control. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 102(6), 1318–1335. doi:0.1037/a0026545 
 
Hofmann, W., Luhmann, M., Fisher, R. R., Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2013). Yes, but 
are they happy? Effects of trait self-control on affective well-being and life 
satisfaction. Journal of Personality, 82(4), 265–277. doi:10.1111/jopy.12050 
 
Hofmann, W., Schmeichel, B. J., & Baddeley, A. D. (2012). Executive functions and self-
regulation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(3), 174–180. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.01.006 
 
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic 
Review, 92(5), 1644–1655. doi:10.1257/000282802762024700 
 
Hollander, E. P., & Offermann, L. R. (1990). Power and leadership in organizations: 
Relationships in transition. American Psychologist, 45(2), 179–189. doi:10.1037/0003-
066X.45.2.179 
 
Howard, E. S., Gardner, W. L., & Thompson, L. (2007). The role of the self-concept and the 
social context in determining the behavior of power holders: Self-construal in intergroup 
versus dyadic dispute resolution negotiations. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 93(4), 614–631. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.4.614 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  132 
Hoyle, R. H., & Davisson, E. K. (2016). Varieties of self-control and their personality 
correlates. In K. D. Vohs & R. F. Baumeister (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation: 
Research, theory, and applications (3rd edition, pp. 396–413). New York, NY, USA: 
Guilford Press. 
 
Huang, L., Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Guillory, L. E. (2011). Powerful postures 
versus powerful roles: Which is the proximate correlate of thought and 
behavior?. Psychological Science, 22(1), 95–102. doi:10.1177/0956797610391912 
 
Ickes, W., Bissonnette, V., Garcia, S., & Stinson, L. L. (1990). Implementing and using the 
dyadic interaction paradigm. In C. Hendrick & M. S. Clark (Eds.), Review of personality 
and social psychology, Research methods in personality and social psychology (Vol. 
11, pp. 16–44). Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications. 
 
Inzlicht, M., & Gutsell, J. N. (2007). Running on empty: Neural signals for self-control 
failure. Psychological Science, 18(11), 933–937. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.02004.x 
 
Inzlicht, M., & Schmeichel, B. J. (2012). What is ego depletion? Toward a mechanistic 
revision of the resource model of self-control. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 
7(5), 450–463. doi:10.1177/1745691612454134 
 
Inzlicht, M., Schmeichel, B. J., & Macrae, C. N. (2014). Why self-control seems (but may not 
be) limited. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(3), 127–133. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.12.009 
 
Jia, L., Koh, A. H. Q., & Tan, F. M. E. (2018). Asymmetric goal contagion: Social power 
attenuates goal contagion among strangers. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 48(5), 673–686. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2360 
 
Job, V., Dweck, C. S., & Walton, G. M. (2010). Ego depletion—Is it all in your head? Implicit 
theories about willpower affect self-regulation. Psychological Science, 21(11), 1686–
1693. doi:10.1177/0956797610384745 
 
Johnson, C. S., & Lammers, J. (2012). The powerful disregard social comparison 
information. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(1), 329–334. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.10.010 
 
Johnson, R. E., Lanaj, K., & Barnes, C. M. (2014). The good and bad of being fair: Effects of 
procedural and interpersonal justice behaviors on regulatory resources. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 99(4), 635–650. doi:10.1037/a0035647 
 
Joireman, J., Sprott, D. E., & Spangenberg, E. R. (2005). Fiscal responsibility and the 
consideration of future consequences. Personality and Individual Differences, 39(6), 
1159–1168. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2005.05.002 
 
Jordan, J., Sivanathan, N., & Galinsky, A. D. (2011). Something to lose and nothing to gain: 
The role of stress in the interactive effect of power and stability on risk taking. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 56(4), 530–558. doi:10.1177/0001839212441928 
 
Joshi, P. D., & Fast, N. J. (2013). Power and reduced temporal discounting. Psychological 
Science, 24(4), 432–438. doi:10.1177/0956797612457950 
 
Judd, C. M., Kenny, D. A., & McClelland, G. H. (2001). Estimating and testing mediation and 
moderation in within-subject designs. Psychological Methods, 6(2), 115–134. 
doi:10.1037/1082-989X.6.2.115 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  133 
Kaiser, R. B., Hogan, R., & Craig, S. B. (2008). Leadership and the fate of organizations. 
American Psychologist, 63(2), 96–110. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.63.2.96 
 
Karoly, P. (1993). Mechanisms of self-regulation: A systems view. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 44(1), 23–52. doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.44.020193.000323 
 
Karremans, J. C., & Smith, P. K. (2010). Having the power to forgive: When the experience 
of power increases interpersonal forgiveness. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 36(8), 1010–1023. doi:10.1177/0146167210376761 
 
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. 
Psychological Review, 110(2), 265–284. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.265  
 
Keltner, D., Van Kleef, G. A., Chen, S., & Kraus, M. W. (2008). A reciprocal influence model 
of social power: Emerging principles and lines of inquiry. Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, 40, 151–192. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(07)00003-2 
 
Ketturat, C., Frisch, J. U., Ullrich, J., Häusser, J. A., van Dick, R., & Mojzisch, A. (2016). 
Disaggregating within-and between-person effects of social identification on subjective 
and endocrinological stress reactions in a real-life stress situation. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(2), 147–160. doi:10.1177/0146167215616804 
 
Kirby, K. N., & Herrnstein, R. J. (1995). Preference reversals due to myopic discounting of 
delayed reward. Psychological Science, 6(2), 83–89. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.1995.tb00311.x 
 
Klein, R. A., Ratliff, K. A., Vianello, M., Adams, R. B. Jr., Bahník, Š., Bernstein, M. 
J.,...Nosek, B. A. (2014). Investigating variation in replicability: A “Many Labs” 
replication project. Social Psychology, 45, 142–152. doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000178 
 
Kotabe, H. P., & Hofmann, W. (2015). On integrating the components of self-control. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(5), 618–638. 
doi:10.1177/1745691615593382 
 
Kouchaki, M., & Smith, I. H. (2014). The morning morality effect: The influence of time of day 
on unethical behavior. Psychological Science, 25(1), 95–102. 
doi:10.1177/0956797613498099 
 
Kraus, M. W., & Mendes, W. B. (2014). Sartorial symbols of social class elicit class-
consistent behavioral and physiological responses: A dyadic approach. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 143(6), 2330–2340. doi:10.1037/xge0000023 
 
Kunstman, J. W., & Maner, J. K. (2011). Sexual overperception: Power, mating motives, and 
biases in social judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(2), 282–
294. doi:10.1037/a0021135 
 
Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P. B., & Christensen, R. H. B. (2017). lmerTest package: Tests in 
linear mixed effects models. Journal of Statistical Software, 82(13), 1–26. 
doi:10.18637/jss.v082.i13. 
 
Lammers, J., Dubois, D., Rucker, D. D., & Galinsky, A. D. (2017). Ease of retrieval 
moderates the effects of power: Implications for the replicability of power recall 
effects. Social Cognition, 35(1), 1–17. doi:10.1521/soco.2017.35.1.1 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  134 
Lammers, J., Galinsky, A. D., Gordijn, E. H., & Otten, S. (2008). Illegitimacy moderates the 
effects of power on approach. Psychological Science, 19(6), 558–564. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02123.x 
 
Lammers, J., Galinsky, A. D., Gordijn, E. H., & Otten, S. (2012). Power increases social 
distance. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3(3), 282–290.  
doi:10.1177/1948550611418679 
 
Lammers, J., Stapel, D. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). Power increases hypocrisy: Moralizing 
in reasoning, immorality in behavior. Psychological Science, 21(5), 737–744. 
doi:10.1177/0956797610368810 
 
Lammers, J., Stoker, J. I., Rink, F., & Galinsky, A. D. (2016). To have control over or to be 
free from others? The desire for power reflects a need for autonomy. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(4), 498–512. doi:10.1177/0146167216634064 
 
Lammers, J., Stoker, J. I., & Stapel, D. A. (2009). Differentiating social and personal power: 
Opposite effects on stereotyping, but parallel effects on behavioral approach 
tendencies. Psychological Science, 20(12), 1543–1548. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02479.x 
 
Lammers, J., Stoker, J. I., & Stapel, D. A. (2010). Power and behavioral approach orientation 
in existing power relations and the mediating effect of income. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 40(3), 543–551. doi:10.1002/ejsp.702 
 
Lane, S. D., Cherek, D. R., Rhoades, H. M., Pietras, C. J., & Tcheremissine, O. V. (2003). 
Relationships among laboratory and psychometric measures of impulsivity: 
Implications in substance abuse and dependence. Addictive Disorders & Their 
Treatment, 2(2), 33–40. Retrieved from 
http://journals.lww.com/addictiondisorders/Abstract/2003/02020/Relationships_Among_
Laboratory_and_Psychometric.1.aspx 
 
Langner, C. A., & Keltner, D. (2008). Social power and emotional experience: Actor and 
partner effects within dyadic interactions. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 44(3), 848–856. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.08.002 
 
Laurin, K., Fitzsimons, G. M., Finkel, E. J., Carswell, K. L., vanDellen, M. R., Hofmann, W., ... 
& Brown, P. C. (2016). Power and the pursuit of a partner’s goals. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 110(6), 840–868. doi:10.1037/pspi0000048 
 
Leikas, S., Lönnqvist, J. E., Verkasalo, M., & Nissinen, V. (2013). Power and personality 
perception in real-life hierarchical relationships. European Journal of Personality, 27(2), 
155–168. doi:10.1002/per.1849 
 
Lewin, K. (1938). Contributions to psychological theory. The conceptual representation and 
the measurement of psychological forces. Durham, NC, US: Duke University Press. 
doi:10.1037/13613-000 
 
Lermer, E., Streicher, B., Sachs, R., Raue, M., & Frey, D. (2015). The effect of construal 
level on risk-taking. European Journal of Social Psychology, 45(1), 99–109. 
doi:10.1002/ejsp.2067 
 
Lian, H., Yam, K. C., Ferris, D. L., & Brown, D. (2017). Self-control at work. Academy of 
Management Annals, 11(2), 703–732. doi:10.5465/annals.2015.0126 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  135 
Li, D., Wang, C., Yin, Q., Mao, M., Zhu, C., & Huang, Y. (2016). Frontal cortical asymmetry 
may partially mediate the influence of social power on anger expression. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 7, 73. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00073  
 
Locke, K. D. (2000). Circumplex scales of interpersonal values: Reliability, validity, and 
applicability to interpersonal problems and personality disorders. Journal of Personality 
Assessment, 75(2), 249–267. doi:10.1207/S15327752JPA7502_6 
 
Lockwood, P., Jordan, C. H., & Kunda, Z. (2002). Motivation by positive or negative role 
models: Regulatory focus determines who will best inspire us. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 83(4), 854–864. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.4.854 
 
Lord, R. G., Foti, R. J., & De Vader, C. L. (1984). A test of leadership categorization theory: 
internal structure, information processing, and leadership perceptions. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Performance, 34(3), 343–378.  
doi: 10.1016/0030-5073(84)90043-6 
 
Lurquin, J.H. (2017). Evaluating the Current Conceptualization and Measurement of Self-
Control: a Systematic Review and an Individual Differences Study (Doctoral 
Dissertation). Retrieved from: 
https://scholar.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1141&context=psyc_gradetds 
 
MacKillop, J., Amlung, M. T., Few, L. R., Ray, L. A., Sweet, L. H., & Munafò, M. R. (2011). 
Delayed reward discounting and addictive behavior: A meta-analysis. 
Psychopharmacology, 216(3), 305–321. doi:10.1007/s00213-011-2229-0 
 
Madden, G. J., & Johnson, (2010). A delay-discounting primer. In G. J. Madden & W. K. 
Bickel (Eds.), Impulsivity: The behavioral and neurological science of discounting (pp. 
11–38). Washington, DC, USA: American Psychological Association. 
 
Magee, J. C. (2009). Seeing power in action: The roles of deliberation, implementation, and 
action in inferences of power. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(1), 1–14. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.06.010 
 
Magee, J. C., & Smith, P. K. (2013). The social distance theory of power. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 17(2), 158–186. doi:10.1177/1088868312472732 
 
Maloney, P. W., Grawitch, M. J., & Barber, L. K. (2012). The multi-factor structure of the Brief 
Self-Control Scale: Discriminant validity of restraint and impulsivity. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 46(1), 111–115. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2011.10.001 
 
Maner, J. K., Gailliot, M. T., Butz, D. A., & Peruche, B. M. (2007). Power, risk, and the status 
quo: Does power promote riskier or more conservative decision making?. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(4), 451–462. doi:10.1177/0146167206297405 
 
Maner, J. K., Kaschak, M. P., & Jones, J. L. (2010). Social power and the advent of 
action. Social Cognition, 28(1), 122–132. doi:10.1521/soco.2010.28.1.122 
 
Markey, P. M., Funder, D. C., & Ozer, D. J. (2003). Complementarity of interpersonal 
behaviors in dyadic interactions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(9), 
1082–1090. doi:10.1177/0146167203253474 
 
Martijn, C., Alberts, H. J., Merckelbach, H., Havermans, R., Huijts, A., & De Vries, N. K. 
(2007). Overcoming ego depletion: The influence of exemplar priming on self-control 
performance. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(2), 231–238. 
doi:10.1002/ejsp.350 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  136 
Martijn, C., Tenbült, P., Merckelbach, H., Dreezens, E., & de Vries, N. K. (2002). Getting a 
grip on ourselves: Challenging expectancies about loss of energy after self-
control. Social Cognition, 20(6), 441–460. doi:10.1521/soco.20.6.441.22978 
 
Masicampo, E. J., Martin, S. R., & Anderson, R. A. (2014). Understanding and overcoming 
self-control depletion. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 8(11), 638–649. 
doi:10.1111/spc3.12139 
 
McCrea, S. M., Hirt, E. R., & Milner, B. J. (2008). She works hard for the money: Valuing 
effort underlies gender differences in behavioral self-handicapping. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 44(2), 292–311. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.05.006 
 
McIntyre, J. C., von Hippel, W., & Barlow, F. K. (2016). Self-regulation and power: How self-
regulatory failures can enhance social power. Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass, 10(1), 41–49. doi:10.1111/spc3.12228 
 
McClelland, G. H. (2000). Nasty data. In H. T. Reis, & C. M. Judd, Handbook of Research 
Methods in Social and Personality Psychology (pp. 393–411). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
McNaughton, N., & Gray, J. A. (2002). "The neuropsychology of anxiety" as it really is: A 
response to O'Mara (2001). Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 12(4), 363–367. 
doi:10.1080/09602010244000129A  
 
Meier, L. L., & Gross, S. (2015). Episodes of incivility between subordinates and supervisors: 
Examining the role of self-control and time with an interaction-record diary study. 
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 36(8), 1096–1113. doi:10.1002/job.2013 
 
Mineka, S., & Hendersen, R. W. (1985). Controllability and predictability in acquired 
motivation. Annual Review of Psychology, 36(1), 495–529. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.36.020185.002431 
 
Mischel, W. (1974). Processes in Delay of Gratification. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 7, 249–292. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60039-8. 
 
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. I. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. Science, 
244(4907), 933–938. doi:10.1126/science.2658056 
 
Mischel H. N., & Mischel W. (1987) The development of children’s knowledge of self-control 
strategies. In F. Halisch & J. Kuhl (Eds.) Motivation, Intention, and Volition (pp. 321–
336). Berlin, Germany: Springer. 
 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D. 
(2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex 
“Frontal Lobe” tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 49–100. 
doi:10.1006/cogp.1999.0734  
 
Moffitt, T. E., Arseneault, L., Belsky, D., Dickson, N., Hancox, R. J., Harrington, H., ... & 
Sears, M. R. (2011). A gradient of childhood self-control predicts health, wealth, and 
public safety. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(7), 2693–2698. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1010076108 
 
Moffitt, T. E., Poulton, R., & Caspi, A. (2013). Lifelong impact of early self-control. American 
Scientist, 101(5), 352–359. Retrieved from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43707089 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  137 
Molden, D. C., Hui, C. M., Scholer, A. A., Meier, B. P., Noreen, E. E., D’Agostino, P. R., & 
Martin, V. (2012). Motivational versus metabolic effects of carbohydrates on self-
control. Psychological Science, 23(10), 1137–1144. doi:10.1177/0956797612439069 
 
Moller, A. C., Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2006). Choice and ego-depletion: The moderating 
role of autonomy. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(8), 1024–1036. 
doi:10.1177/0146167206288008 
 
Moser, C., Stauffacher, M., Smieszek, T., Seidl, R., Krütli, P., & Scholz, R. W. (2013). 
Psychological factors in discounting negative impacts of nuclear waste. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 35, 121–131. doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2013.06.003 
 
Moskowitz, D. S. (2004). Does elevated power lead to approach and reduced power to 
inhibition? Comment on Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003). Psychological 
Review, 111(3), 808–811. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.111.3.808 
 
Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of limited resources: 
Does self-control resemble a muscle?. Psychological Bulletin, 126(2), 247–259. 
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.126.2.247 
 
Muraven, M., Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Self-control as a limited resource: 
Regulatory depletion patterns. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(3), 
774–789. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.774 
 
Muraven, M., & Slessareva, E. (2003). Mechanisms of self-control failure: Motivation and 
limited resources. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(7), 894–906. 
doi:10.1177/0146167203029007008 
 
Murphy, R. O., Ackermann, K. A., & Handgraaf, M. (2011). Measuring social value 
orientation. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(8), 771–781. Retrieved from: 
https://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/wurpubs/fulltext/193453 
 
Neuberg, S. L., & Fiske, S. T. (1987). Motivational influences on impression formation: 
outcome dependency, accuracy-driven attention, and individuating processes. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 53(3), 431–444. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.53.3.431 
 
Nordbye, G. H. H., & Teigen, K. H. (2014). Being responsible versus acting responsibly: 
Effects of agency and risk taking on responsibility judgments. Scandinavian Journal of 
Psychology, 55(2), 102–114. doi:10.1111/sjop.12111 
 
Olson, K. R. (2005). Engagement and self-control: Superordinate dimensions of Big Five 
traits. Personality and Individual Differences, 38(7), 1689–1700. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2004.11.003 
 
Open Science Collaboration (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. 
Science, 349(6251), aac4716. doi:10.1126/science.aac4716 
 
Oswald, P. A. (1996). The effects of cognitive and affective perspective taking on empathic 
concern and altruistic helping. The Journal of Social Psychology, 136(5), 613–623. 
doi:10.1080/00224545.1996.9714045 
 
Overbeck, J. R., & Droutman, V. (2013). One for all: Social power increases self-anchoring of 
traits, attitudes, and emotions. Psychological Science, 24(8), 1466–1476. 
doi:10.1177/0956797612474671 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  138 
Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. (2001). When power does not corrupt: Superior individuation 
processes among powerful perceivers. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81(4), 549–565. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.4.549 
 
Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. (2006). Powerful perceivers, powerless objects: Flexibility of 
powerholders’ social attention. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 99(2), 227–243. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.10.003 
 
Pahlke, J., Strasser, S., & Vieider, F. M. (2015). Responsibility effects in decision making 
under risk. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 51(2), 125–146. doi:10.1007/s11166-015-
9223-6 
 
Perrone, D., Sullivan, C. J., Pratt, T. C., & Margaryan, S. (2004). Parental efficacy, self-
control, and delinquency: A test of a general theory of crime on a nationally 
representative sample of youth. International Journal of Offender Therapy and 
Comparative Criminology, 48(3), 298–312. doi:10.1177/0306624X03262513 
 
Peters, J., & Büchel, C. (2009). Overlapping and distinct neural systems code for subjective 
value during intertemporal and risky decision making. The Journal of Neuroscience, 
29(50), 15727–15734. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3489-09.2009 
 
Petkanopoulou, K., Willis, G. B., & Rodríguez-Bailón, R. (2012). Controlling others and 
controlling oneself: Social power and emotion suppression. Revista de Psicología 
Social, 27(3), 305–316. doi:10.1174/021347412802845586 
 
Pittman, T. S., & Heller, J. F. (1987). Social motivation. Annual Review of Psychology, 38(1), 
461–490. doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.38.020187.002333 
 
Pless, N. M. (2007). Understanding responsible leadership: Role identity and motivational 
drivers. Journal of Business Ethics, 74(4), 437–456. doi:10.1007/s10551-007-9518-x 
 
Postmes, T., Haslam, S. A., & Jans, L. (2013). A single-item measure of social identification: 
Reliability, validity, and utility. British Journal of Social Psychology, 52(4), 597–617. 
doi:10.1111/bjso.12006 
 
Pyone, J. S., & Isen, A. M. (2011). Positive affect, intertemporal choice, and levels of 
thinking: Increasing consumers' willingness to wait. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 48(3), 532–543. doi:10.1509/jmkr.48.3.532 
 
Rachlin, H. (1995). Self-control: Beyond commitment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18(1), 
109–121. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00037602 
 
Rachlin, H., & Green, L. (1972). Commitment, choice and self-control. Journal of the 
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 17(1), 15–22. doi:10.1901/jeab.1972.17-15 
 
Rachlin, H., & Jones, B. A. (2008). Social discounting and delay discounting. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 21(1), 29–43. doi:10.1002/bdm.567 
 
Ranehill, E., Dreber, A., Johannesson, M., Leiberg, S., Sul, S., & Weber, R. A. (2015). 
Assessing the robustness of power posing: No effect on hormones and risk tolerance 
in a large sample of men and women. Psychological Science, 26(5), 653–656. 
doi:10.1177/0956797614553946 
 
Raue, M., Streicher, B., Lermer, E., & Frey, D. (2015). How far does it feel? Construal level 
and decisions under risk. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 4(3), 
256–264. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.005 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  139 
Raven, B. H. (1992). A power/interaction model of interpersonal influence: French and Raven 
thirty years later. Journal of Social Behavior & Personality, 7(2), 217–244. Retrieved 
from: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1292303175?accountid=14796 
 
Ravlin, E. C., & Meglino, B. M. (1987). Effect of values on perception and decision making: A 
study of alternative work values measures. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72(4), 666–
673. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.72.4.666 
 
Reichardt, C. S. (2006). The principle of parallelism in the design of studies to estimate 
treatment effects. Psychological Methods, 11(1), 1–18. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.11.1.1 
 
Reimers, S., Maylor, E. A., Stewart, N., & Chater, N. (2009). Associations between a one-
shot delay discounting measure and age, income, education and real-world impulsive 
behavior. Personality and Individual Differences, 47(8), 973–978.  
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.07.026 
 
Reis, H. T., Gable, S. L., & Maniaci, M. R. (2014). Methods for studying everyday experience 
in its natural context. In H. T. Reis & C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook of Research 
Methods in Social and Personality Psychology (2nd edition, pp. 373–403). New York, 
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Reynolds, B., Ortengren, A., Richards, J. B., & de Wit, H. (2006). Dimensions of impulsive 
behavior: Personality and behavioral measures. Personality and Individual Differences, 
40(2), 305–315. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2005.03.024 
 
Reynolds, B., Penfold, R. B., & Patak, M. (2008). Dimensions of impulsive behavior in 
adolescents: Laboratory behavioral assessments. Experimental and Clinical 
Psychopharmacology, 16(2), 124–131. doi:10.1037/1064-1297.16.2.124 
 
Richards, T. J., & Green, G. P. (2015). Environmental Choices and Hyperbolic Discounting: 
An Experimental Analysis. Environmental and Resource Economics, 62(1), 83–103. 
doi:10.1007/s10640-014-9816-6 
 
Robins, R. W., Hendin, H. M., & Trzesniewski, K. H. (2001). Measuring global self-esteem: 
Construct validation of a single-item measure and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(2), 151–161. 
doi:10.1177/0146167201272002 
 
Ronay, R., & Von Hippel, W. (2010). Power, testosterone, and risk-taking. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 23(5), 473–482. doi:10.1002/bdm.671 
 
Rosseel, Y. (2012). lavaan: an R package for structural equation modeling. Journal of 
Statistical Software, 48(2), 1–36. doi:10.18637/jss.v048.i02 
 
Rothbard, N. P., Phillips, K. W., & Dumas, T. L. (2005). Managing multiple roles: Work-family 
policies and individuals’ desires for segmentation. Organization Science, 16(3), 243–
258. doi:10.1287/orsc.1050.0124 
 
Rus, D., van Knippenberg, D., & Wisse, B. (2010). Leader self-definition and leader self-
serving behavior. The Leadership Quarterly, 21(3), 509–529. 
doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2010.03.013 
 
Sadler, P., & Woody, E. (2003). Is who you are who you're talking to? Interpersonal style and 
complementarily in mixed-sex interactions. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 84(1), 80–96. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.80 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  140 
Salomon, E. C. (2016). Concept associations as the basis of social priming (Doctoral 
dissertation). Retrieved from: https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/ 
 
Sanna, L. J. (1996). Defensive pessimism, optimism, and stimulating alternatives: Some ups 
and downs of prefactual and counterfactual thinking. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 71(5), 1020–1036. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.5.1020 
 
Sassenberg, K., Ellemers, N., Scheepers, D., & Scholl, A. (2014). Power corrupts” revisited: 
The role of construal of power as opportunity or responsibility. In J.-W. van Prooijen & 
P. A. M. van Lange (Eds.), Power, politics, and paranoia: Why people are suspicious of 
their leaders (pp. 73–87). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schaerer, M., Lee, A. J., Galinsky, A. D., Thau, S., Schaerer, M., Lee, A. J., & Thau, S. 
(2018). Contextualizing social power research within organizational behavior. In D. L. 
Ferris, R. E. Johnson, & C. Sedikides (Eds.), The self at work: Fundamental theory and 
research (pp. 194–221). London, UK: Routledge. 
 
Schaumberg, R. L., & Flynn, F. J. (2012). Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown: The 
link between guilt proneness and leadership. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 103(2), 327–342. doi:10.1037/a0028127  
 
Scheepers, D., de Wit, F., Ellemers, N., & Sassenberg, K. (2012). Social power makes the 
heart work more efficiently: Evidence from cardiovascular markers of challenge and 
threat. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(1), 371–374. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.06.014 
 
Schlenker, B. R., Britt, T. W., Pennington, J., Murphy, R., & Doherty, K. (1994). The triangle 
model of responsibility. Psychological Review, 101(4), 632–652. doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.101.4.632  
 
Schmeichel, B. J., & Vohs, K. (2009). Self-affirmation and self-control: Affirming core values 
counteracts ego depletion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(4), 770–
782. doi:10.1037/a0014635 
 
Schmeichel, B. J., Vohs, K. D., & Duke, S. C. (2011). Self-control at high and low levels of 
mental construal. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2(2), 182–189.  
doi:10.1177/1948550610385955 
 
Schmid, P. C. (2018). Less power, greater conflict: Low power increases the experience of 
conflict in multiple goal settings. Social Psychology, 49, 47–62. doi:10.1027/1864-
9335/a000327 
 
Schmid, P. C., Kleiman, T., & Amodio, D. M. (2015). Power effects on cognitive control: 
Turning conflict into action. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(3), 655–
663. doi:10.1037/xge0000068  
 
Schmid, P. C., Schmid Mast, M., & Mast, F. W. (2015). Prioritizing—The task strategy of the 
powerful?. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 68(10), 2097–2105. 
doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1008525 
 
Schmid Mast, M. (2002). Dominance as expressed and inferred through speaking time: A 
meta-analysis. Human Communication Research, 28(3), 420–450. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
2958.2002.tb00814.x 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  141 
Schmid Mast, M. (2005). Interpersonal hierarchy expectation: Introduction of a new 
construct. Journal of Personality Assessment, 84(3), 287–295. 
doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa8403_08 
 
Schmid Mast, M. (2010). Interpersonal behaviour and social perception in a hierarchy: The 
interpersonal power and behaviour model. European Review of Social Psychology, 
21(1), 1–33. doi:10.1080/10463283.2010.486942 
 
Schmid Mast, M., Jonas, K., & Hall, J. A. (2009). Give a person power and he or she will 
show interpersonal sensitivity: The phenomenon and its why and when. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 97(5), 835–850. doi:10.1037/a0016234 
 
Schmidt, K.-H., & Neubach, B. (2010). Selbstkontrollanforderungen bei der Arbeit—
Fragebogen zur Erfassung eines bislang wenig beachteten Belastungsfaktors[Self-
control demands: Questionnaire for measuring a neglected job stressor]. Diagnostica, 
56, 133–143. doi:10.1026/0012-1924/a000015 
 
Schmitt, D. P., Realo, A., Voracek, M., & Allik, J. (2008). Why can't a man be more like a 
woman? Sex differences in Big Five personality traits across 55 cultures. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 94(1), 168–182. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.1.168 
 
Schneider, B., González-Romá, V., Ostroff, C., & West, M. A. (2017). Organizational climate 
and culture: Reflections on the history of the constructs in the Journal of Applied 
Psychology. Journal of Applied Psychology, 102(3), 468–482. doi:10.1037/apl0000090 
 
Scholl, A., & Sassenberg, K. (2014a). Where could we stand if I had…? How social power 
impacts counterfactual thinking after failure. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 53, 51–61. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2014.02.005 
 
Scholl, A., & Sassenberg, K. (2014b). “While you still think, I already type”: Experienced 
social power reduces deliberation during e-mail communication. Cyberpsychology, 
Behavior, and Social Networking, 17(11), 692–696. doi:10.1089/cyber.2014.0293 
 
Scholl, A., & Sassenberg, K. (2015). Better know when (not) to think twice: How social power 
impacts prefactual thought. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(2), 159–
170. doi:10.1177/0146167214559720 
 
Scholl, A., Sassenberg, K., Scheepers, D., Ellemers, N., & de Wit, F. (2017). A matter of 
focus: Powerholders feel more responsible after adopting a cognitive other-focus, 
rather than a self-focus. British Journal of Social Psychology, 56(1), 89–102. 
doi:10.1111/bjso.12177 
 
Shadish, W., Cook, T. D., Campbell, D. T., & (2002). Experimental and quasi-experimental 
designs for generalized causal inference. Boston, MA, USA: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Sharma, L., Markon, K. E., & Clark, L. A. (2014). Toward a theory of distinct types of 
“impulsive” behaviors: A meta-analysis of self-report and behavioral measures. 
Psychological Bulletin, 140(2), 374–408. doi:10.1037/a0034418 
 
Simons, D. J. (2014). The value of direct replication. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 
9(1), 76–80. doi:10.1177/1745691613514755 
 
Simonsohn, U. (2015). Small Telescopes. Detectability and the Evaluation of Replication 
Results. Psychological Science, 26(5), 559–569. doi:10.1177/0956797614567341 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  142 
Singh, R. (1998). Causal Analyses in Interpersonal Relations: On Importance of the Control 
Condition. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 33–50. doi:10.1111/1467-
839X.00004 
 
Sivanathan, N., Pillutla, M. M., & Murnighan, J. K. (2008). Power gained, power lost. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 105(2), 135–146. 
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2007.10.003 
 
Slabu, L., & Guinote, A. (2010). Getting what you want: Power increases the accessibility of 
active goals. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(2), 344–349. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.10.013 
 
Slabu, L., Guinote, A., & Wilkinson, D. (2013). How quickly can you detect it?. Social 
Psychology, 44(1), 37–41. doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000096 
 
Sligte, D. J., De Dreu, C. K., & Nijstad, B. A. (2011). Power, stability of power, and 
creativity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(5), 891–897. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.03.009 
 
Smith, P. K., & Bargh, J. A. (2008). Nonconscious effects of power on basic approach and 
avoidance tendencies. Social Cognition, 26(1), 1–24. doi:10.1521/soco.2008.26.1.1 
 
Smith, C. L., & Hantula, D. A. (2008). Methodological considerations in the study of delay 
discounting in intertemporal choice: A comparison of tasks and modes. Behavior 
Research Methods, 40(4), 940–953. doi:10.3758/BRM.40.4.940  
 
Smith, P. K., Jostmann, N. B., Galinsky, A. D., & van Dijk, W. W. (2008). Lacking power 
impairs executive functions. Psychological Science, 19(5), 441–447. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02107.x 
 
Smith, P. K., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). The nonconscious nature of power: Cues and 
consequences. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 10, 918–938. 
doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00300.x 
 
Smith, P. K., & Hofmann, W. (2016). Power in everyday life. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 113(36), 10043–10048. doi:10.1073/pnas.1604820113 
 
Smith, P. K., Jostmann, N. B., Galinsky, A. D., & Van Dijk, W. W. (2008). Lacking power 
impairs executive functions. Psychological Science, 19(5), 441–447. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02107.x 
 
Smith, P. K., & Trope, Y. (2006). You focus on the forest when you’re in charge of the trees: 
Power priming and abstract information processing. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 90, 578–596. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.90.4.578 
 
Snodgrass, S. E. (1985). Women's intuition: The effect of subordinate role on interpersonal 
sensitivity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(1), 146–155. Retrieved 
from: https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED229680.pdf 
 
Snyder, M. (1987). Public appearances, private realities: The psychology of self-monitoring. 
New York, NY, USA: WH Freeman/Times Books/Henry Holt & Co. 
 
Soukoreff, W. R., & Scott Mackenzie, I. (1995). Theoretical upper and lower bounds on 
typing speed using a stylus and a soft keyboard. Behaviour & Information Technology, 
14(6), 370–379. doi:10.1080/01449299508914656 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  143 
Spence, J. R., Ferris, D. L., Brown, D. J., & Heller, D. (2011). Understanding daily citizenship 
behaviors: A social comparison perspective. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 32(4), 
547–571. doi:10.1002/job.738 
 
Stegmann, S., van Dick, R., Ullrich, J., Charalambous, J., Menzel, B., Egold, N., & Wu, T. T.-
C. (2010). Der Work Design Questionnaire – Vorstellung und erste Validierung einer 
deutschen Version. Zeitschrift für Arbeits- und Organisationspsychologie, 54(1), 1–28. 
doi:10.1026/0932-4089/a000002  
 
Sturm, R. E., & Antonakis, J. (2015). Interpersonal power: A review, critique, and research 
agenda. Journal of Management, 41(1), 136–163. doi:10.1177/0149206314555769 
 
Strelan, P., Weick, M., & Vasiljevic, M. (2014). Power and revenge. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 53(3), 521–540. doi:10.1111/bjso.12044 
 
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. 
Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571–610. doi:10.5465/amr.1995.9508080331 
 
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. L. (2004). High self-control predicts good 
adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of 
Personality, 72(2), 271–324. doi:10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00263.x 
 
Thaler, R. H., & Shefrin, H. M. (1981). An economic theory of self-control. Journal of Political 
Economy, 89(2), 392–406. doi:10.1086/260971 
 
Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. Oxford, UK: John 
Wiley.  
 
Thomas, A., Locke, K. D., & Strauss, B. (2012). Das Inventar zur Erfassung interpersonaler 
Motive (IIM). Diagnostica, 58, 211–226. doi:10.1026/0012-1924/a000074 
 
Tiedens, L. Z., & Fragale, A. R. (2003). Power moves: Complementarity in dominant and 
submissive nonverbal behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(3), 
558–568. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.3.558  
 
Tiedens, L. Z., Unzueta, M. M., & Young, M. J. (2007). An unconscious desire for hierarchy? 
The motivated perception of dominance complementarity in task partners. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 93(3), 402–414. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.3.402  
 
Tost, L. P. (2015). When, why, and how do powerholders “feel the power”? Examining the 
links between structural and psychological power and reviving the connection between 
power and responsibility. Research in Organizational Behavior, 35, 29–56. 
doi:10.1016/j.riob.2015.10.004 
 
Tost, L. P., Wade-Benzoni, K. A., & Johnson, H. H. (2015). Noblesse oblige emerges (with 
time): Power enhances intergenerational beneficence. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 128, 61–73. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.03.003 
 
Trauzettel-Klosinski, S., & Dietz, K. (2012). Standardized assessment of reading 
performance: The new international reading speed texts IReST. Investigative 
Ophthalmology & Visual Science, 53(9), 5452–5461. doi:10.1167/iovs.11-8284 
 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal-level theory of psychological distance. 
Psychological Review, 117(2), 440–463. doi:10.1037/a0018963 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  144 
van Dijke, M., de Cremer, D., Langendijk, G., & Anderson, C. (2018). Ranking low, feeling 
high: How hierarchical position and experienced power promote prosocial behavior in 
response to procedural justice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 103(2), 164–181. 
doi:10.1037/apl0000260 
 
van Dijke, M., & Poppe, M. (2006). Striving for personal power as a basis for social power 
dynamics. European Journal of Social Psychology, 36(4), 537–556. 
doi:10.1002/ejsp.351 
 
van Kleef, G. A., Oveis, C., van der Löwe, I., Luo Kogan, A., Goetz, J., & Keltner, D. (2008). 
Power, distress, and compassion: Turning a blind eye to the suffering of 
others. Psychological Science, 19(12), 1315–1322. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2008.02241.x 
 
van Lange, P. A. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An 
integrative model of social value orientation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 77(2), 337–349. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.2.337  
 
Vedel, A., Thomsen, D. K., & Larsen, L. (2015). Personality, academic majors and 
performance: Revealing complex patterns. Personality and Individual Differences, 85, 
69–76. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2015.04.030 
 
Voegtlin, C. (2011). Development of a scale measuring discursive responsible 
leadership. Journal of Business Ethics, 98(S1), 57–73. doi:10.1007/s10551-011-1020-9 
 
Voegtlin, C., Patzer, M., & Scherer, A. G. (2012). Responsible leadership in global business: 
A new approach to leadership and its multi-level outcomes. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 105(1), 1–16. doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0952-4 
 
Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., & Ciarocco, N. J. (2005). Self-regulation and self-
presentation: Regulatory resource depletion impairs impression management and 
effortful self-presentation depletes regulatory resources. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 88(4), 632–657. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.4.632 
 
Vohs, K. D., Lasaleta, J. D., & Fennis, B. (2009). Self-regulation in the interpersonal sphere. 
In J. P. Forgas, R. F. Baumeister & D. M. Tice (Eds.), Psychology of Self-Regulation: 
Cognitive, Affective, and Motivational Processes (Sydney Symposium in Social 
Psychology, pp. 289–302). New York, NY, USA: Psychology Press. 
 
Voyer, B. G., & McIntosh, B. (2013). The psychological consequences of power on self-
perception: Implications for leadership. Leadership & Organization Development 
Journal, 34(7), 639–660. doi:10.1108/LODJ-10-2011-0104 
 
Wallace, J. C., Edwards, B. D., Paul, J., Burke, M., Christian, M., & Eissa, G. (2016). Change 
the referent? A meta-analytic investigation of direct and referent-shift consensus 
models for organizational climate. Journal of Management, 42(4), 838–861. 
doi:10.1177/0149206313484520 
 
Wang, Z. J., Kuang, Y., Tang, H. Y., Gao, C., Chen, A., & Chan, K. Q. (2018). Are decisions 
made by group representatives more risk averse? The effect of sense of responsibility. 
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 31(3), 311–323. doi:10.1002/bdm.2057 
 
Warner, R. M., Kenny, D. A., & Stoto, M. (1979). A new round robin analysis of variance for 
social interaction data. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(10), 1742–
1757. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.10.1742 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  145 
Weick, M., McCall, C., & Blascovich, J. (2017). Power moves beyond complementarity: A 
staring look elicits avoidance in low power perceivers and approach in high power 
perceivers. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(8), 1188–1201. 
doi:10.1177/0146167217708576 
 
Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Lacking control increases illusory pattern 
perception. Science, 322(5898), 115–117. doi:10.1126/science.1159845 
 
Whitson, J. A., Liljenquist, K. A., Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Cadena, 
B. (2013). The blind leading: Power reduces awareness of constraints. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 49(3), 579–582. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.10.009 
 
Willer, R. (2009). Groups reward individual sacrifice: The status solution to the collective 
action problem. American Sociological Review, 74(1), 23–43. 
doi:10.1177/000312240907400102 
 
Williams, M. J. (2014). Serving the self from the seat of power: Goals and threats predict 
leaders’ self-interested behavior. Journal of Management, 40(5), 1365–1395. 
doi:10.1177/0149206314525203 
 
Wilson, T. D., Aronson, E., & Carlsmith, K. (2010). The art of laboratory experimentation. In 
S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology (Vol. 1, 
pp. 51–81). Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley. 
 
Wiltermuth, S. S., & Flynn, F. J. (2013). Power, moral clarity, and punishment in the 
workplace. Academy of Management Journal, 56(4), 1002–1023. 
doi:10.5465/amj.2010.0960 
 
Wisse, B., & Rus, D. (2012). Leader self-concept and self-interested behavior: The 
moderating role of power. Journal of Personnel Psychology, 11(1), 40–48. 
doi:10.1027/1866-5888/a000054 
 
Witt, M. A., & Stahl, G. K. (2016). Foundations of responsible leadership: Asian versus 
Western executive responsibility orientations toward key stakeholders. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 136(3), 623–638. doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2534-8 
 
Wolfe, R. J., & McGinn, K. L. (2005). Perceived relative power and its influence on 
negotiations. Group Decision and Negotiation, 14(1), 3–20. doi:10.1007/s10726-005-
3873-8 
 
Woltin, K. A., Corneille, O., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Förster, J. (2011). Narrowing down to open up 
for other people's concerns: Empathic concern can be enhanced by inducing detailed 
processing. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(2), 418–424. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.11.006 
 
Yap, A. J., Wazlawek, A. S., Lucas, B. J., Cuddy, A. J., & Carney, D. R. (2013). The 
ergonomics of dishonesty: The effect of incidental posture on stealing, cheating, and 
traffic violations. Psychological Science, 24(11), 2281–2289. 
doi:10.1177/0956797613492425 
 
Yi, R., Pitcock, J. A., Landes, R. D., & Bickel, W. K. (2010). The short of it: Abbreviating the 
temporal discounting procedure. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 
18(4), 366–374. doi:10.1037/a0019904 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  146 
Zhang, M., & Smith, P. K. (2018). Does power reduce temporal discounting? Commentary on 
Joshi and Fast (2013). Psychological Science, 29(6), 1010–1019. 
doi:10.1177/0956797617754219 
 
Zimbardo, P. G., Keough, K. A., & Boyd, J. N. (1997). Present time perspective as a 
predictor of risky driving. Personality and Individual Differences, 23(6), 1007–1023. 
doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(97)00113-X 
 
 
  
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  147 
APPENDIX 
 
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  I 
Table 1.1 
Overview on studies on the relationship between power and self-control. 
 
Source Study Research Design Sample 
Level of 
analysis  
Kind of 
power Self-control operationalization 
Relevance 
of  
power 
Relevance 
of  
self-
control 
DeWall et al. 
(2011) 
1A Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Dichotic listening task no no 
DeWall et al. 
(2011) 
1B Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Number of attempts to solve solvable 
anagrams  
no no 
DeWall et al. 
(2011) 
2 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Dichotic listening task no no 
Grossklags & 
Barradale (2014) 
  Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Structural 
power 
Hypothetical monetary temporal discounting no no 
Guinote (2007a) 1 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Thought suppression task no no 
Guinote (2007b) 1 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Action planning in hypothetical situations: time 
and information needed 
no no 
Guinote (2007b) 2 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Time needed to initiate goal-directed action no no 
Guinote (2007b) 3 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Problem-solving task (Drawing a geometric 
figure without retracing any lines and without 
lifting the pencil from the paper) 
no no 
Guinote (2007c) 1 Laboratory 
experiment 
Non-Student Between Sense of 
power 
Framed-line test: inhibition of peripheral 
information 
no no 
Heller & Ullrich 
(2017) 
- Online 
experiment 
Adult 
convenience 
sample 
Between Sense of 
power 
Hypothetical non-monetary temporal 
discounting 
no no 
Joshi & Fast 
(2013) 
1 Online 
experiment 
Mturk Between Sense of 
power 
Hypothetical monetary temporal discounting no no 
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Table 1.1 cont. 
Overview on studies on the relationship between power and self-control. 
 
Source Study Research Design Sample 
Level of 
analysis  
Kind of 
power Self-control operationalization 
Relevance 
of  
power 
Relevance 
of  
self-
control 
Joshi & Fast 
(2013) 
2 Online 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Semi-hypothetical monetary temporal 
discounting 
no no 
Joshi & Fast 
(2013) 
3 Online 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Hypothetical non-monetary temporal 
discounting 
no no 
Joshi & Fast 
(2013) 
4 Correlational 
online study 
Working 
individuals 
(Mturk) 
Between Self-
reported 
power 
Lifetime savings yes yes 
Lammers et al. 
(2010) 
1 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Actual cheating behavior no (yes) 
Li et al. (2016) - Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Within Sense of 
power 
Anger expression tendency no (yes) 
Petkanopoulou et 
al. (2012) 
1 Correlational 
questionnaire 
study 
Adult 
convenience 
sample 
(Airport) 
Between Sense of 
power 
Emotional Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & 
John, 2003) 
(yes) (yes) 
Petkanopoulou et 
al. (2012) 
2 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Emotion Suppression (negative-emotions 
eliciting pictures) 
no no 
Schmid et al. 
(2015) 
1 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Flanker Task no no 
Schmid et al. 
(2015) 
2 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Flanker Task no no 
Scholl & 
Sassenberg 
(2014b) 
1 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Time spent on thinking before starting to type 
an email 
no no 
Scholl & 
Sassenberg 
(2015) 
1 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power  
Number of prefactual thoughts no no 
Scholl & 
Sassenberg 
(2015) 
2 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Number of prefactual thoughts no no 
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Table 1.1 cont. 
Overview on studies on the relationship between power and self-control. 
 
Source Study Research Design Sample 
Level of 
analysis  
Kind of 
power Self-control operationalization 
Relevance 
of  
power 
Relevance 
of  
self-
control 
Slabu et al. 
(2013) 
- Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Structural 
power 
Spatial cueing task: response time on invalid 
trials 
(yes) no 
Smith et al. 
(2008) 
2 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Stroop task: error rate no no 
         
Smith et al. 
(2008) 
3 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Tower of Hanoi task: error rate no no 
Smith et al. 
(2008) 
4 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Sense of 
power 
Stroop task: error rate no no 
Yap et al. (2013) 1 Field experiment Convenience 
Sample (Train 
station) 
Between Cognitive 
power 
network 
Actual cheating behavior no (yes) 
Yap et al. (2013) 2 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Cognitive 
power 
network 
Actual cheating behavior no (yes) 
Yap et al. (2013) 3 Laboratory 
experiment 
Student Between Cognitive 
power 
network 
Actual cheating behavior no (yes) 
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Table 3.1 
Overview of conceptualizations of multidimensional self-control/impulsivity  
 
   Dimensions and measures 
Domain Authors Organizing 
principle 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Self-report 
measures 
De Boer, Van 
Hooft, & 
Bakker (2011) 
Function Start self-
control 
Items targeting 
control needed to 
do something that 
a person would 
otherwise not do 
Stop self-
control 
Items targeting 
control needed to 
not do something 
that a person 
would otherwise 
do 
 
     
De Ridder, de 
Boer, Lugtig, 
Bakker, & van 
Hooft (2011) 
 
Function Initiation 
Items targeting 
activation of  
long-term goal 
Inhibition 
Items targeting 
inhibition of 
indulgence 
     
Maloney, 
Grawitch, & 
Barber (2012) 
Function Impulsivity 
Items targeting 
action on 
spontaneous 
thoughts and 
feelings 
Restraint  
Items targeting 
the tendency to 
resist temptation 
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Table 3.1 cont. 
Overview of conceptualizations of multidimensional self-control/impulsivity 
 
   Dimensions and measures 
Domain Authors Organizing 
principle 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Behavioral 
measures 
Hagger, Wood, 
Stiff, & 
Chatzisarantis 
(2010) 
 
Modality Cognitive 
processing 
Affective 
processing 
     
Hagger, Wood, 
Stiff, & 
Chatzisarantis 
(2010) 
Task content Controlling 
attention* 
- Computerized 
vigilance task 
Controlling 
emotions* 
- Regulate 
affect while 
presented 
with emotive 
video or 
pictures 
Controlling 
thoughts* 
- Suppressing 
thoughts of a 
‘white bear’ 
Controlling 
impulses* 
- Handgrip 
task 
- Modified 
Stroop task 
- Unsolvable 
geometric 
figure-
tracing task 
- Persistence 
on cold 
pressor task 
 
Cognitive 
processing* 
- Solvable 
anagram/ 
word 
fragments 
task 
- Analytical 
reasoning 
GRE 
problems 
- Working 
memory 
tasks 
Choice and 
volition* 
- Consumer 
decision 
task 
- Choosing to 
solve a 
challenging 
or easy 
anagram 
task 
- Temporal 
discounting 
Social 
processing* 
- Test of 
stereotyping 
and prejudice 
based on 
ratings of 
target 
- Perceived 
likelihood of 
engaging in 
sexual 
infidelity 
Sharma, 
Markon, & 
Clark (2014) 
Task content Inattention 
- Stroop 
(error) 
- Delayed 
memory 
- Immediate 
memory 
- Porteus 
Maze Test 
Inhibition 
- Go/No Go 
(inhibition) 
- MFFT 
(latency) 
- Circle tracing 
task (slow 
time) 
- MFFT (error) 
- Iowa gambling 
task 
- Stop-signal 
reaction time 
Impulsive 
decision-
making 
- Delay of 
gratification 
(hypothetic) 
- Delay of 
gratification 
(contingent) 
Shifting 
- Wisconsin 
Card Sort 
Task 
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Table 3.1 cont. 
Overview of conceptualizations of multidimensional self-control/impulsivity 
 
   Dimensions and measures 
Domain Authors Organizing 
principle 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Self-report & 
behavioral 
measures 
Duckworth & 
Kern (2011) 
Measurement 
& 
Task content 
Self-report 
- Eysenck 
Impulsiveness 
Scale 
- Self-Control 
Scale 
- Barratt 
Impulsiveness 
Scale 
Delay of 
gratification/ 
temporal 
discounting 
- Hypothetical 
choice delay 
task 
- Real choice 
delay task 
- Sustained 
delay task 
- Repeated 
trials delay 
task 
 
Executive 
functioning 
- Go/No-go 
Task 
- Stroop task 
- Set switching 
tasks 
- Attention 
tasks 
- Gambling 
tasks 
- Risk tasks 
Informant 
report  
No information 
available 
   
Lane, Cherek, 
Rhoades, 
Pietras, & 
Tcheremissine 
(2003) 
Measurement 
& 
Task content 
Self-report 
- Barratt 
Impulsivity 
Scale 
- Eysenck 
Impulsiveness 
Questionnaire 
- Dickman 
Impulsivity 
Inventory 
- Wender Utah 
Rating Scale 
Delay of 
reward 
- Self-Control 
Choice Task 
- Hypothetical 
delay 
discounting 
- Contingent 
delay 
discounting 
Response 
inhibition 
- Immediate 
Memory 
Task 
- Response 
Inhibition/ 
DRL Task 
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Table 3.1 cont. 
Overview of conceptualizations of multidimensional self-control/impulsivity 
 
   Dimensions and measures 
Domain Authors Organizing 
principle 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Self-report & 
behavioral 
measures 
Reynolds, 
Ortengren, 
Richards, & de 
Wit (2006) 
Measurement 
& 
Task content 
Self-report 
- Barratt 
Impulsive-
ness Scale 
- Eysenck 
Impulsive-
ness 
Question-
naire 
- Multidimens. 
Personality 
Question-
naire 
(constraint 
scale) 
 
Impulsive 
decision-
making 
- Delay 
discounting 
- Balloon 
analogue risk 
task 
Impulsive 
disinhibition 
- Stop task 
- Go/no-go 
task 
    
Reynolds, 
Penfold, & 
Patak (2008) 
Measurement 
& 
Task content 
Self-report 
- Barratt 
Impulsivenes
s Scale 
- Conners-
Wells’ 
Adolescent 
Self-Report 
Scale 
Impulsive 
decision-
making 
- Delay 
discounting 
- Probability 
discounting 
- Experiential 
discounting  
Impulsive 
disinhibition 
- Experiential 
discounting 
latency to 
bank 
rewards 
- Conners’ 
Continuous 
Performance 
Test-II 
Impulsive 
inattention 
- Go/stop task 
 
   
Note. *Only examples shown. 
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Table 3.2 
Studies on power and self-control classified according to inhibitory and initiatory self-control 
 
Source Study Power manipulation Dependent measure  (self-control operationalization) Main result 
HP = 
more 
self-
control? 
Functional 
component 
DeWall et al. (2011) 1B Episodic priming  
(HP, LP, C) 
Number of attempts to solve solvable anagrams  LP = C = HP Equal Start 
DeWall et al. (2011) 1A Not enacted role 
assignment  
(HP, LP, C) 
Dichotic listening task LP = C < HP More Start 
DeWall et al. (2011) 2 Not enacted role 
assignment  
(HP, LP, C) 
Dichotic listening task LP = C < HP More Start 
Guinote (2007b) 3 Not enacted role 
assignment  
(HP, LP) 
Problem-solving task (Drawing a geometric figure 
without retracing any lines and without lifting the 
pencil from the paper) 
Persistence: HP > LP 
No. of attempts: HP > 
LP 
More Start 
Guinote (2007c) 1 Episodic priming  
(HP, LP) 
Framed-line test: inhibition of peripheral 
information 
HP > LP  More Start 
Slabu et al. (2013)   Decision: impact of 
opinion  
(HP, C) 
Spatial cueing task: response time on invalid 
trials 
Short SOA condition: 
HP < C 
More Start 
Smith et al. (2008) 2 Conceptual priming  
(HP, LP, C) 
Stroop task: error rate HP = C < LP More Start 
Smith et al. (2008) 4 Conceptual priming  
(HP, LP, C) 
Stroop task: error rate HP = C < LP More Start 
Joshi & Fast (2013) 2 Episodic priming  
(HP, C) 
Semi-hypothetical monetary temporal discounting HP < C More Start 
Joshi & Fast (2013) 3 Episodic priming  
(HP, LP, C) 
Hypothetical non-monetary temporal discounting LP = C > HP More Start 
Joshi & Fast (2013) 1 Not enacted role 
assignment  
(HP, LP) 
Hypothetical monetary temporal discounting LP > HP More Start 
Table 3.2 cont. 
Studies on power and self-control classified according to inhibitory and initiatory self-control 
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Source Study Power Manipulation Dependent Measure  (self-control operationalization) Main Result 
HP = 
more 
self-
control? 
Functional 
component 
Guinote (2007a) 1 Not enacted role 
assignment  
(HP, LP) 
Thought suppression task HP > LP Less Stop 
Guinote (2007b) 1 Episodic priming  
(HP, LP) 
Action planning in hypothetical situations: time 
and information needed 
LP > HP Less Stop 
Smith et al. (2008) 3 Episodic priming  
(HP, LP, C) 
Tower of Hanoi task: error rate HP = C < LP More Stop 
Anderson & Galinsky (2006) 4 Episodic priming  
(HP, LP) 
Willingness to engage in unprotected sex HP > LP Less Stop 
Guinote (2007b) 2 Episodic priming  
(HP, LP) 
Time needed to initiate goal-directed action HP < LP Less Stop 
Lammers et al. (2010) 1 Episodic priming  
(HP, LP) 
Actual cheating behavior HP > LP Less Stop 
Scholl & Sassenberg (2015) 2 Episodic priming  
(HP, LP) 
Number of prefactual thoughts HP < LP Less Stop 
Scholl & Sassenberg (2015) 1 Not enacted role 
assignment  
(HP, LP) 
Number of prefactual thoughts HP < LP Less Stop 
Scholl & Sassenberg (2014b) 1 Not enacted role 
assignment  
(HP, LP) 
Time spent on thinking before starting to type 
an email 
LP > HP Less Stop 
Note. HP = high power condition; LP = low power condition; C = control condition. 
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Table 4.1 
Correlations between selected trait measures and measured experimental variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
2 .30**                 
3 .31** .12                
4 .01 -.07 .19+               
5 .04 -.02 .15 .49***              
6 .16 -.03 .16 .37*** .10             
7 -.08 -.03 -.13 -.04 -.30** -.19+            
8 -.03 .05 -.26* .01 -.15 -.16 .83***           
9 .16 .03 .09 .06 .06 .13 -.02 -.02          
10 -.17 -.01 -.10 -.13 -.05 -.15 -.08 -.12 -.04         
11 -.09 -.14 .04 .04 -.02 -.01 .23+ .12 -.30* -.18        
12 -.07 -.15 -.14 .21+ .06 .04 .23+ .17 -.03 -.39** .12       
13 .16 -.12 -.15 -.12 -.15 .14 -.19 -.16 -.05 -.16 -.27 .10      
14 .04 -.10 -.03 -.01 -.17 .05 -.07 -.08 -.07 -.01 .12 -.20+ .02     
15 -.12 .12 .08 -.01 .06 -.08 .15 .08 .06 .00 .23+ .04 -.77*** -.12    
16 .09 .18 .18 -.03 .13 -.06 -.14 -.14 .16 .01 -.11 .10 .04 -.70*** .10   
17 .17 -.11 .07 -.09 .00 .26* -.22+ -.17 .27* .03 -.41*** .00 .12 .10 -.08 -.19  
18 .20 .13 -.04 -.33** -.14 .00 .00 -.06 .07 .09 -.03 -.11 .01 -.08 .20 .14 .06 
Note. 1 = trait power; 2 = situational power in round 1; 3 = situational power in round 2; 4 = DOSPERT all scales; 5 = DOSPERT subscale finance, 6 = 1-item risk measure; 7 = number of safe choices in 
round 1; 8 = number of safe choices in round 2; 9 = profile correlation thoughts in round 1; 10 =  profile correlation thoughts in round 2; 11 = absolute difference thoughts in round 1; 12 = absolute 
difference thoughts in round 2; 13 = profile correlation feelings in round 1; 14 = profile correlation feelings in round 2; 15 = absolute difference feelings in round 1; 16 = absolute difference feelings in 
round 2; 17 = recall accuracy in round 1; 18 = recall accuracy in round 2 
+ p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 4.2 
Means and standard deviations in experimental conditions 
 
 Sample 
Size1 
Possible 
Range 
 
High power first (power loss) condition 
 
Low power first (power gain) condition 
   High power Low power High power Low power 
   M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Psychological power (Manipulation 
Check) 
78 1, 7 3.90a 1.06 3.87a 1.11 4.98b 0.74 3.59a 0.92 
Sense of responsibility (Manipulation 
Check) 
78 1, 7 5.19a 1.20 4.00b 1.47 5.46a 0.93 4.24b 1.68 
Number of safe choices 78 0, 9 5.41a 2.43 5.62a 2.41 5.12a 2.39 5.04a 2.41 
Accuracy (Thoughts) – Absolute 
discrepancy 
74 0, 30 6.35ab 3.43 5.65ab 2.96 5.81ab 2.26 6.78b 3.53 
Accuracy (Feelings) – Absolute 
discrepancy 
74 0, 114 26.62a 6.79 23.89ab 7.34 24.46ab 7.36 25.27ab 5.12 
Accuracy (Thoughts) – Profile 
correlation 
52 -1.0, +1.0  .08a 0.54 .40b 0.46 .19ab 0.57 .16a 0.52 
Accuracy (Feelings) – Profile 
correlation 
67 -1.0, +1.0  .47a 0.26 .58b 0.31 .53ab 0.25 .53ab 0.21 
Recall Accuracy – Profile correlation 72 -1.0, +1.0 -.03a 0.40 .19b 0.48 .11ab 0.38 .18ab 0.43 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share the same subscript differ at p < .10 in independent and paired t-Tests. 1The deviating sample sizes for the accuracy measures stem from the facts that (1) 
the confederate did not provide ratings of his interaction partner but was rated by his interaction partner, and (2) it was not possible to calculate profile correlations if the standard deviations of item sets 
concerning thoughts and feelings was zero. 
 
 
 
 
  
SOCIAL POWER AND SELF-CONTROL  XII 
Table 4.3 
Results for mixed ANOVAs with the five accuracy measures as dependent variables 
 
 Thoughts Feelings Recall 
 Profile correlation  Absolute difference Profile correlation  Absolute difference Profile correlation 
Effects df F p ηp2 df F p ηp2 df F p ηp2 df F p ηp2 df F p ηp2 
Power 
 
1,48 0.41 .53 .008 1,63 0.21 .65 .003 1,63 1.42 .24 .020 1,63 1.28 .26 .020 1,68 5.47* .02 .070 
Order 
 
1,48 0.25 .62 .005 1,63 0.01 .92 <.001 1,63 0.14 .71 .002 1,63 0.13 .71 .002 1,68 0.17 .68 .002 
Responsibility 
 
1,48 0.04 .85 <.001 1,63 0.41 .53 .006 1,63 0.64 .43 .010 1,63 0.05 .83 <.001 1,68 0.93 .34 .010 
Order x Power 
 
1,48 3.18+ .08 .060 1,63 4.18+ .05 .060 1,63 4.41* .04 .070 1,63 6.52* .01 .090 1,68 2.90+ .09 .040 
Order x 
Responsibility 
 
1,48 0.01 .92 <.001 1,63 0.14 .71 .002 1,63 0.01 .92 <.001 1,63 0.05 .83 <.001 1,68 0.50 .48 .007 
Power x 
Responsibility 
 
1,48 0.11 .74 .002 1,63 0.40 .53 .006 1,63 3.41+ .07 .050 1,63 1.35 .25 .020 1,68 1.63 .21 .020 
Power x Order x 
Responsibility 
1,48 3.55+ .07 .070 1,63 0.02 .90 <.001 1,63 0.83 .37 .010 1,63 0.22 .64 .003 1,68 0.64 .43 .009 
+p < .10. *p < .05. 
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Table 5.5 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables 
 
Variables M SD n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Low situational 
power 
 
0.35 0.48 1139        
2. High situational 
power 
 
0.24 0.43 1139 -.41***       
3. Sense of power 
 
2.98 1.10 1126 -.52*** .41***      
4. Personal power 
 
3.56 0.89 1126 -.09** .09** .19***     
5. Sense of 
responsibility 
 
3.27 1.03 1126 -.28*** .29*** .57*** .08**    
6. Start SC 
 
75.44 24.96 1121 .02 -.02 -.04 .10** .02   
7. Stop SC 
 
73.47 27.37 1118 .00 -.02 .03 .02 .00 .19***  
8. Interpersonal SC 67.61 29.36 1120 -.03 -.01 .02 .00 .00 .09** .15*** 
Note. SC = Self-control. Correlations were calculated using person-mean centered variables (exception: situational power). Sense of power, personal power and sense of responsibility were measured 
on scales ranging from 1 to 5, whereas the three self-control dimensions were measured on scales ranging from 0 to 100. 
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. + p < .10.  
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Table 5.7 
Results of multilevel analyses testing propositions 2 – 3b and 8 – 10 
 
 
Criterion Sense of power Personal power 
Sense of 
responsibility Start self-control Stop self-control 
Interpersonal self-
control 
  
Fixed effects 
Parameter 
 
      
Intercept 3.13*** (0.08) 3.58*** (0.05) 3.26*** (0.04) 74.90*** (1.65) 72.91*** (1.72) 68.59*** (2.07) 
Level 1 
(Measurement occasions) 
 
Low situational power -1.00*** (0.07) --- --- --- --- --- 
High situational power 0.99*** (0.10) --- --- --- --- --- 
Sense of power --- 0.14*** (0.03) 0.59*** (0.04) -1.26*    (0.62) 0.67    (0.71) 0.55    (0.73) 
Personal power --- --- --- 2.99*** (0.88) 0.48    (1.00) --- 
Sense of responsibility --- --- --- --- --- -0.39    (0.75) 
Level 2 (Individuals)  
Low situational power -0.13     (0.17) --- --- --- --- --- 
High situational power -0.02     (0.16) --- --- --- --- --- 
Sense of power --- 0.31*** (0.07) 0.61*** (0.05) -3.29    (2.55) -5.83*   (2.67) -0.26    (4.03) 
Personal power --- --- --- 7.33*   (2.91) 9.92**  (3.04) --- 
Sense of responsibility --- --- --- --- --- -4.01    (4.41) 
  
Random effects 
Variance  
 
 
Intercept 0.10     (0.32) 0.28    (0.52) 0.12    (0.34) 293.08    (17.12) 311.02    (17.64) 493.73    (22.22) 
Low situational power 0.19     (0.43) --- --- --- --- --- 
High situational power 0.43     (0.66) --- --- --- --- --- 
Sense of power --- 0.03     (0.16) 0.08    (0.29) / / / 
Personal power --- --- --- / / --- 
Sense of responsibility --- --- --- --- --- / 
Residual 0.39    (0.63) 0.41    (0.64) 0.50    (0.71) 329.68    (18.16) 422.42    (20.55) 319.62    (17.88) 
R2 62.0% 37.6% 46.2% 33.4% 30.3% 50.7% 
Note. --- = Predictor was not part of the model because it was not part of the hypotheses. / = Predictor was not part of the model because a comparison of BIC indicated that is was not adequate to add 
random slopes. For fixed effects standard errors are in parentheses. For random effects standard deviations are in parentheses. (Pseudo-)R2 was calculated comparing the absolute null model without 
any predictor to the model presented in this table. 
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. 

